Student Dialogue
March 12, 2018

Hosted at
Providence Day School
5800 Sardis Road
Charlotte, North Carolina

THE ECHO FOUNDATION
1125 E. Morehead St., Suite 101
Charlotte, NC 28204
The Echo Foundation devotes this year’s study to the capacity for an individual to reshape the world against systemic indifference. Inspired by Samantha Power’s relentless dedication to securing human rights for the most vulnerable populations and nations, *Inspire Action Against Indifference* honors the rights endowed to every human life.

Developed by Echo student interns, this curriculum guide offers educators and students alike a user-friendly tool with which to understand global atrocities, as well as what we, as a nation and as individuals, can do to stop them.

The Echo Foundation offers these resource materials and collection of essays as an inspiration to you who shape the next generation. We challenge you to search each day for opportunities to weave lessons of compassion, respect for all people, and ethical decision making into every subject area; to teach children not to be indifferent to the suffering of others and to take a stand for justice; to believe in themselves, that they too have the power to make a difference… indeed, that it is their moral obligation to do so.

*Stephanie G. Ansaldo*
Founder and President
Samantha Power: 
Inspire Action Against Indifference

“Our obligation is to give meaning to life and in doing so to overcome the passive, indifferent life” – Nobel Laureate for Peace, Elie Wiesel
Foreword

I was a Balkan child raised in Serbia until the age of 11, at which time I moved to the United States with my family. I was able to grow up with a unique look at the world. My life in America opened my horizons and let me experience cultures and views of people from around the world. Both the Balkan experience and the American experience allowed for me to see the world with different lenses. When I was 16, I had the privilege of traveling to Cuba with The Echo Foundation. This experience added to my perspective of the world. I am a philanthropist and I want to spend my life serving humanity.

Jana Ivkovic

To construct a better world, we must bear witness to the atrocities of this one. Samantha Power’s work consistently does just that. It is an honor to offer this collection of texts for teachers, which will enable their students to learn from Power’s research on the threats of genocide and global insecurity that occupy our present. Hopefully this curriculum - compiled by Jana Ivkovic with pedagogical and editorial contributions by John Nabors, Drew Hammill, and Dr. John Cox – will prove fruitful both in classrooms around the world and at the Student Dialogue hosted by Providence Day School.

John Winn
Samantha Power Curriculum Guide

I. Curriculum Alignment with North Carolina Standard Course of Study

II. Samantha Power: The Campaigner
   A. Biography
   B. Exclusive: Samantha Power On Her Special Friendship With Elie Wiesel
   C. Why Elie Wiesel’s Night Still Matters So Much To Me -- And All Of Us
   D. Study Questions

III. Life Before the United Nations
   A. On a Mission to Shine a Spotlight on Genocide; Samantha Power’s Mind Leaps From Bosnia to Iraq
   B. Remember Rwanda, but Take Action in Sudan
   C. Bystanders to Genocide
   D. Winning the Pulitzer Prize
   E. Publishers Weekly Review on A Problem From Hell
   F. San Francisco Chronicle Review A Problem From Hell
   G. The Telegraph Book Review on A Problem From Hell
   H. Study Questions

IV. United States Ambassador to the United Nations
   A. Full transcript: Remarks by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at a Security Council Session on Ukraine
   B. Samantha Power: U.S. Won’t Commit to Veto of Palestinian State Resolution
   C. “Are you truly incapable of shame?” Samantha Power Blasts Assad Regime, Allies
   D. U.S. Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power's Full Speech at the Security Council on Israel
   E. Samantha Power's Scathing Speech on Russia
   F. In South Sudan, Mass Killings, Rapes and the Limits of U.S. Diplomacy
   G. Study Questions

V. Life After the United Nations
   A. Samantha Power Returns to Harvard
   B. Writing a Memoir
   C. Foreign Propaganda
   D. Study Questions

VI. A History of Genocide

The Echo Foundation 5 Inspire Action Against Indifference
A. Armenian Genocide
B. The Holocaust
C. Cambodia Genocide
D. Rwandan Genocide
E. Bosnian Genocide
F. Darfur Sudan Genocide
G. Our World in Data: Genocides
H. Study Questions

VII. Reference Materials
A. Bibliography
B. Filmography
C. Relevant Organizations and Websites
I. **Alignment with NC Standard Course of Study**

This serves as a resource for teachers and faculty working in North Carolina Public Schools and planning to attend Echo’s annual Student Dialogue. In preparation for the dialogue, we ask that teachers familiarize their students with the curriculum on former U.S. Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power. We would like to thank CMS Social Studies Specialists John Nabors and Drew Hammill for their contributions in aligning this document with NC Standards.

- In collaboration with CMS, we at Echo have put together a list of State Common Core Standards that the curriculum addresses in various courses and subjects.
- This list showcases various North Carolina Requirements met by the Samantha Power Curriculum.
- Hopefully this resource will prompt teachers to integrate the inspiring life and work of Samantha Power into their coursework.

*We hope to see you at the Teacher’s Workshop January 25 and at the Student Dialogue March 12.*

**SOCIAL STUDIES**

1. **World History, WH.H.7.1:** “Evaluate key turning points of the modern era in terms of their lasting impact (e.g., conflicts, documents, policies, movements, etc.).”

2. **World History, WH.H.7.5:** “Analyze the emergence of capitalism as a dominant economic pattern and the responses to it from various nations and groups (e.g., utopianism, social democracy, socialism, communism, etc.).”

3. **World History, WH.H.7.6:** “Explain how economic crisis contributed to the growth of various political and economic movements (e.g., Great Depression, nationalistic movements of colonial Africa and Asia, socialist and communist movements, effect on capitalist economic theory, etc.).”

4. **World History, WH.H.8:** “Analyze global interdependence and shifts in power in terms of political, economic, social and environmental changes and conflicts since the last half of the twentieth century.”  
   - Chapter Six of the curriculum (127-187) examines the origin and recurrence of genocide across the 20th century: Turkey, Germany, Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia. Teachers of World History could develop a lesson on the precarity of colonized and de-colonized nations in the postwar era based on the history offered in this chapter.
5. **World History, WH.H.8.2**: “Explain how international crisis has impacted international politics (e.g., Berlin Blockade, Korean War, Hungarian Revolt, Cuban Missile Crisis, OPEC oil crisis, Iranian Revolt, “9-11”, terrorism, etc.).”

6. **World History, WH.H.8.3**: “Analyze the “new” balance of power and the search for peace and stability in terms of how each has influenced global interactions since the last half of the twentieth century (e.g., post WWII, Post Cold War, 1990s Globalization, New World Order, global achievements and innovations).”

7. **World History, WH.H.8.4**: “Analyze scientific, technological and medical innovations of postwar decades in terms of their impact on systems of production, global trade and standards of living (e.g., satellites, computers, social networks, information highway).”

8. **History, 7.H.1.3**: “Use primary and secondary sources to interpret various historical perspectives.”

9. **History, 7.H.2.1**: “Analyze the effects of social, economic, military and political conflict among nations, regions, and groups (e.g. war, genocide, imperialism and colonization).”

10. **History, 7.H.2.3**: “Explain how increased global interaction accelerates the pace of innovation in modern societies (e.g. advancements in transportation, communication networks and business practices).”

11. **American History, AH2.H.2.1**: “Analyze key political, economic, and social turning points since the end of Reconstruction in terms of causes and effects.”

12. **American History, AH2.H.2.2**: “Evaluate key turning points since the end of Reconstruction in terms of their lasting impact.”

13. **American History, AH2.H.4.1**: “Analyze the political issues and conflicts that impacted the United States since Reconstruction and the compromises that resulted.”


15. **7.G.1.1**: “Explain how environmental conditions and human response to those conditions influence modern societies and regions (e.g. natural barriers, scarcity of resources and factors that influence settlement).”

16. **7.G.1.2**: “Explain how demographic trends (e.g. population growth and decline, push/pull factors and urbanization) lead to conflict, negotiation, and compromise in modern societies and regions.”
17. **Economics, 7.E.1.1:** “Explain how competition for resources affects the economic relationship among nations (e.g. colonialism, imperialism, globalization and interdependence).”

18. **Civics and Governance, 7.C&G.1.3:** “Compare the requirements for (e.g. age, gender, legal and economic status) and responsibilities of citizenship under various governments in modern societies (e.g. voting, taxes and military service).”

19. **Civics and Governance, 7.C&G.1.4:** “Compare the sources of power and governmental authority in various societies (e.g. monarchs, dictators, elected officials, anti-governmental groups and religious, political factions).”

20. **Civics and Governance, CE.C&G.1:** “Understand the roles authorities have in enforcing individual rights, rules and laws for the common good.”
   - Chapter Four of the curriculum (89-120) offers an overview of Samantha Power’s work as U.S. Ambassador to the UN. Teachers of Civics will find articles and speeches discussing the nuanced and complicated obligations that the U.S. government has to the international community. This chapter could prompt a comparative lesson on the roles authorities play in the United States versus Russia or Syria.
   - Alternatively, Chapter Four could prompt a lesson on the difficulties the United States faces in securing rights for others within and beyond its borders.

**ENGLISH/LANGUAGE ARTS**

1. **English/Language Arts 9-10 Reading Standards:** “Analyze ideas and themes across texts and mediums.”
   - In “Bystanders to Genocide,” included in the curriculum packet (pages 40-78), Samantha Power outlines and examines a myriad of different perspectives and media that constellate around Rwanda in 1994. This article could spark a lesson and discussion on genocide and the way different media shape global atrocities as well as how we choose to respond to them.

2. **English/Language Arts 11-12 Writing Standards:** “Write an argument to support a claim that results from studying a topic or reading a text.”
   - Using the curriculum on Samantha Power, teachers could assign an argumentative essay that asks students how they believe the U.S. should have responded to Rwanda by referring to the article “Bystanders to Genocide” (40-78 in the curriculum packet).
   - Another prompt could ask students if they think U.S foreign policy should be used to assert or withdraw the hegemonic force of the United States in global affairs by referring to Samantha Power’s various remarks on the subject throughout the curriculum.

**MATH**

1. **Math 1, NC.M1.S-ID:** “Summarize, represent, and interpret data on a single count or measurement variable.” And, **Math 3, M3.S-IC:** “Evaluate articles and websites that report
data by identifying the source of the data, the design of the study, and the way the data are graphically displayed.”

- In Chapter Six, teachers will find an article by *Our World in Data* on genocide. Using the article’s various sources and visualizations of data and statistics, Math teachers could create a lesson that analyzes how genocide is numerically measured and represented, is applicable to the real world, and meets North Carolina education requirements. (https://ourworldindata.org/genocides/)

**SCIENCE**

1. **Earth and Environmental, EEn.2.8**: “Evaluate human behaviors in terms of how likely they are to ensure the ability to live sustainably on Earth.”

- Throughout the curriculum Samantha Power offers both hard and soft diplomatic techniques for opposing genocide. However, Power never considers how raising climate awareness or introducing sustainable technologies might prevent political instability around the world. Teachers could use this curriculum (especially: “In South Sudan, Mass Killings, Rapes, and the Limits of U.S. Diplomacy,” 115-118) to design a lesson where students consider how sustainability could be used as a diplomatic technique in South Sudan and around the world.
II. Samantha Power: The Campaigner

1. Biography
2. Exclusive: Samantha Power On Her Special Friendship With Elie Wiesel
3. Why Elie Wiesel’s “Night” Still Matters So Much to Me – And All Of Us
4. Study Questions
Samantha Power

Wikipedia

Samantha Jane Power (born September 21, 1970) is an American academic, author and diplomat who served as the United States Ambassador to the United Nations from 2013 to 2017.

Power began her career by covering the Yugoslav Wars as a journalist. From 1998 to 2002, she served as the Founding Executive Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, where she later became the first Anna Lindh Professor of Practice of Global Leadership and Public Policy. She was a senior adviser to Senator Barack Obama until March 2008, when she resigned from his presidential campaign.

Power joined the Obama State Department transition team in late November 2008. She served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights on the National Security Council from January 2009 to February 2013. In April 2012, Obama chose her to chair a newly formed Atrocities Prevention Board. During her tenure, Power's office focused on such issues as United Nations reform, women's rights, LGBT rights, religious freedom and religious minorities, refugees, human trafficking, human rights, and democracy, including in the Middle East and North Africa, Sudan, and Myanmar. She is considered to have been a key figure in the Obama administration in persuading the president to intervene militarily in Libya. In 2016, she was listed as the 41st most powerful woman in the world by Forbes.

Power is a subject of the 2014 documentary Watchers of the Sky, which explains the contribution of several notable people, including Power, to the cause of genocide prevention.

She won a Pulitzer Prize in 2003 for her book A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, a study of the U.S. foreign policy response to genocide.

Early life and education

Power was born in Dublin, the daughter of Vera Delaney, a field-hockey international and kidney doctor, and Jim Power, a dentist and piano player. Raised in Ireland until she was nine,

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Power lived in Castleknock and was schooled in Mount Anville Montessori, Goatstown, Dublin, until her mother emigrated to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in 1979.

She attended Lakeside High School in Atlanta, Georgia, where she was a member of the cross country team and the basketball team. She subsequently graduated from Yale University and from Harvard Law School. In 1993, at age 23, she became a U.S. citizen.

Career


From 1998 to 2002, Power served as the Founding Executive Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, where she later served as the Anna Lindh Professor of Practice of Global Leadership and Public Policy.

In 2004, Power was named by *Time* magazine as one of the 100 most influential people in the world that year. In fall 2007, she began writing a regular column for *Time*.

Power spent 2005–06 working in the office of U.S. Senator Barack Obama as a foreign policy fellow, where she was credited with sparking and directing Obama's interest in the Darfur conflict. She served as a senior foreign policy adviser to Obama's 2008 presidential campaign, but stepped down after referring to Hillary Clinton as "a monster". Power apologized for the remarks made in an interview with *The Scotsman* in London, and resigned from the campaign shortly thereafter.

The second book she edited and compiled, *Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World*, was released on February 14, 2008.


Involvement in 2008 U.S. presidential campaign

Power was an early and outspoken supporter of Barack Obama. In August 2007, Power authored a memo titled "Conventional Washington versus the Change We Need", in which she provided one of the first comprehensive statements of Obama's approach to foreign policy. In the memo
she writes: "Barack Obama's judgment is right; the conventional wisdom is wrong. We need a new era of tough, principled and engaged American diplomacy to deal with 21st century challenges."

In February and March 2008, Power began an international book tour to promote her book, *Chasing the Flame*. Because of her involvement in the Obama campaign, many of the interviews she gave revolved around her and Barack Obama's foreign-policy views, as well as the 2008 campaign.

"Armenians for Obama" uploaded a video of Power to YouTube where she referred to Obama's "unshakeable conscientiousness" regarding genocide in general and the Armenian genocide in particular, as well as saying that he would "call a spade a spade, and speak the truth about it".

Power appeared on BBC's *HARDtalk* on March 6, stating that Barack Obama's pledge to "have all U.S. combat brigades out of Iraq within 16 months" was a "best case scenario" that "he will revisit when he becomes president." Challenged by the host as to whether this contradicted Obama's campaign commitment, she responded, "You can’t make a commitment in March 2008 about what circumstances will be like in January 2009.... He will, of course, not rely on some plan that he’s crafted as a presidential candidate or a U.S. Senator. He will rely upon a plan — an operational plan — that he pulls together in consultation with people who are on the ground to whom he doesn’t have daily access now, as a result of not being the president." She concluded by saying that "what we can take seriously is that he will try to get U.S. forces out of Iraq as quickly and responsibly as possible." In February 2009, Obama announced that the U.S. would end combat operations in Iraq by August 31, 2010 and withdraw all U.S. soldiers by the end of 2011. The U.S. formally ended its mission in Iraq on December 15 of that year.

**The Obama Administration**

After the 2008 presidential election, Power joined president-elect Obama's State Department transition team. In January 2009, President Obama appointed Power to the National Security Council, where she served as a Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights.

In this capacity, Power kept the U.S. out of the Durban Review Conference, the 2009 iteration of the UN World Conference against Racism, which was criticized for descending into "a festival of Israel bashing." Within the Obama administration, Power advocated for military intervention in Libya during the Libyan Civil War on humanitarian grounds. With then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and UN ambassador Susan Rice, Power lobbied Obama to pursue a UN Security Council resolution authorizing an international coalition force to protect Libyan civilians. Power left the National Security Council in February 2013.
Nomination


Power's nomination was backed by Republican senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, and former independent senator Joseph Lieberman. Power also received support from U.S. diplomat Dennis Ross, the national director of the Anti-Defamation League Abraham Foxman, Israel's ambassador to the U.S. Michael Oren, lawyer and commentator Alan Dershowitz, the director of the Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti, the director of the Israel Project, the Jewish
Council for Public Affairs, the President of the Rabbinical Assembly, the Eastern Director of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, the National Jewish Democratic Council, Rabbi Shmuley Boteach, publisher Marty Peretz, and military writer Max Boot.

Her nomination also faced some opposition. Former U.S. ambassador to the UN John R. Bolton and a former acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Frank Gaffney, criticized her for a 2003 article she authored in *The New Republic*, in which Bolton claims she compared the United States to Nazi Germany.

Power was confirmed as UN ambassador by the U.S. Senate on August 1, 2013, by a vote of 87 to 10, and was sworn in a day later by the Vice President.

**Views on projecting military power to prevent human rights abuses**

Her advocacy of humanitarian intervention has been criticized for being tendentious and militaristic, for answering a "problem from hell" with a "solution from hell." Furthermore, Power's advocacy of deploying the United States armed forces to combat human rights abuses has been criticized as running contrary to the idea that the main purpose of the military is for national defense.

**Views on Israel**

Chemi Shalev wrote that individuals have described Power as being pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli, on the basis of statements which she made in a 2002 interview with Harry Kreisler. When asked what advice she would give to the president if either the Israelis or the Palestinians looked "like they might be moving towards genocide," Power said that the United States might consider the deployment of a "mammoth protection force" to monitor developments between the Israelis and Palestinians, characterizing it as a regrettable but necessary "imposition of a solution on
unwilling parties," and "the lesser of evils." She clarified that remark on several occasions, including in an interview with Haaretz correspondent Shmuel Rosner in August 2008.

In July 2014, Power expressed support for Israel's right to defend itself during the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict.

In December 2016, she justified the Obama administration's refusal to veto a resolution against Israeli settlements. Power told the 15-member U.N. Security Council: "Israeli settlement activity in territories occupied in 1967 undermines Israel’s security, harms the viability of a negotiated two-state outcome, and erodes prospects for peace and stability in the region."

**Tenure**

Speaking in September 2013, regarding the Syrian Civil War, Power told a news conference that the American intelligence findings “overwhelmingly point to one stark conclusion: The Assad regime perpetrated an attack.” She added, “The actions of the Assad regime are morally reprehensible, and they violate clearly established international norms.” Power went on to criticize the failure of the United Nations structure to thwart or prosecute the atrocities committed in the Syrian conflict, which is now well into its third year. She said, “The system devised in 1945 precisely to deal with threats of this nature did not work as it was supposed to.” She added, "Even in the wake of the flagrant shattering of the international norm against chemical weapons use, Russia continues to hold the council hostage and shirk its international responsibilities. "What we have learned, what the Syrian people have learned, is that the Security Council the world needs to deal with this crisis is not the Security Council we have." Power has herself, however, been criticized by journalist Jeff Jacoby for her lack of commitment to stopping the conflict, writing that she has mostly "acquiesced in the president’s [Obama's] unwillingness to act."

Power with Secretary of State John Kerry at a UN ministerial, October 2, 2015

In 2014, speaking on the crisis in Ukraine, Ambassador Power, told reporters that Washington was "gravely disturbed" by reports of Russian military deployments into the Crimea. "The
United States calls upon Russia to pull back the military forces that are being built up in the region, to stand down, and to allow the Ukrainian people the opportunity to pursue their own government, create their own destiny and to do so freely without intimidation or fear," she said. Power declined to characterize Russian military actions when asked if they constituted aggression. She called for an independent international mediation mission to be quickly dispatched to Ukraine.

In July 2014, during a forum at Hunter College commemorating the 45th anniversary of the Stonewall riots, Power said that, in spite of significant progress in the US, the LGBT rights movement was "far from over," noting that, "There are some parts of the world where the situation abroad is actually taking a sharp turn for the worse for LGBT individuals." She stated that homosexuality remains criminalized in nearly 80 countries, that Brunei was moving towards becoming the eighth country to enact capital punishment for same-sex sexual acts, and that Russia and Nigeria had also instituted anti-LGBT legislation in the last year. Referring to a law signed in February by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni that imposes a life sentence upon anyone found guilty of repeated same-sex sexual acts, she said: "Unfortunately, Uganda's anti-gay legislation is not an outlier. Nor is the climate of intolerance and abuse that it has fostered." This speech occurred on the first anniversary of the U.S. Supreme Court decision that struck down a portion of the Defense of Marriage Act, and a week after the Obama administration announced travel bans against Ugandan officials responsible for anti-LGBT human rights abuses.

In March 2015, Power described defense cuts planned by European countries such as Britain as "very concerning" in light of the "diffuse" challenges facing the world, such as the Ebola crisis in west Africa and the threat from the Islamic State of the Levant (ISIL). She flew to Brussels to urge European nations to abide by a NATO pledge to devote to defense at least two per cent of their national budget, and she suggested that their current spending already risked being insufficient.
Power has faced criticism for her silence on Obama’s failure to recognize the Armenian Genocide, especially after its 100th anniversary in 2015. She has refused to comment on the issue.

In June 2015, Power spoke to the US House Foreign Affairs Committee while negotiations were taking place with Iran regarding granting relief of sanctions on the country in return for them scaling back their nuclear program. She told the Committee that the US would retain the ability to reinstate sanctions against Iran without unanimous support from the UN Security Council, though she said she could not provide details until a deal was finalized.

In 2016 while speaking on the situation in Syria, Power said, "What Russia is sponsoring and doing is not counter-terrorism, it is barbarism," "Instead of pursuing peace, Russia and Assad make war. Instead of helping get life-saving aid to civilians, Russia and Assad are bombing the humanitarian convoys, hospitals and first responders who are trying desperately to keep people alive," Power said. A Sept. 9 ceasefire deal between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov aimed at putting Syria's peace process back on track effectively collapsed on Monday when an aid convoy was bombed.

Power, in her last major speech in the role to tell the international community it must do everything it can to stop what she described as a Russian assault on the world order. Outlining Russian actions like the annexation of Crimea, the bombing of civilians in Syria, and a hacking of America’s election, Power drew a picture of a state whose primary aim is to sow chaos and wreak havoc on the “rules-based” world order that is girded by international law and run in bodies like the United Nations. “Russia’s actions are not standing up a new world order, they are tearing down the one that exists, and this is what we are fighting against,” she said in a speech at the Atlantic Council on 17 January. “Having defeated the forces of fascism and communism, we now confront the forces of authoritarianism and nihilism.” Those who argue, as Trump has, that undoing sanctions against Russia will make the Kremlin more amenable “have it backwards,” Power said. “Easing punitive measures…will only embolden Russia,” encourage North Korea and Iran to follow them and send the message that all they need to do is “wait it out,” Power argued.

On May 31, 2017, Power's testimony and relevant records were subpoenaed by the House Intelligence Committee as part of its investigation into the unmasking of Americans whose conversations were inadvertently captured during intelligence surveillance.

**Honors**

Barnard College awarded Power its highest award, the 2015 Barnard Medal of Distinction, citing among other achievements her book, "Problem from Hell", and her denunciation of genocide and hope that vows of “never again” would truly mean “never again”. In June 2016, she was awarded the 2016 Henry A. Kissinger Prize.
Exclusive: Samantha Power On Her Special Friendship With Elie Wiesel

By Jane Eisner
Forward
September 13, 2017

A Pulitzer Prize-winning author and academic turned diplomat, Samantha Power is best known for her efforts to bring her work highlighting genocide prevention onto the national and global stage.

Power is now writing about her experiences from a perch at Harvard University, after concluding in January a tumultuous four years as the United States ambassador to the United Nations. Active in Barack Obama’s first presidential campaign, she served on the 2008 transition team and then as senior director of multilateral affairs and human rights for the National Security Council before representing the Obama administration in Turtle Bay.

A native of Ireland, Power, 46, grew close to the late Elie Wiesel through their common interest in genocide prevention; she wrote the new introduction to Wiesel’s “Night,” which we excerpted on our site. She spoke to the Forward’s editor-in-chief, Jane Eisner, from Cambridge, Massachusetts, about her friendship with Wiesel, why he’d be on a plane to Juba if he were still alive, and why Twitter is sometimes bad for her health.

(This interview has been edited for space and clarity.)

Jane Eisner: The first official dinner you hosted in your home after you became U.S. ambassador to the United Nations was in honor of Elie Wiesel. Why did you choose to honor him then?

Samantha Power: What anyone who works in government and at the U.N. experiences very quickly is how abstract the suffering of others can be when you are talking about it in a windowless room, when you are debating thousands of miles away from the people who are affected by your decisions. And for me, and tens of millions of people, Elie always found a way
to get real. He always found a way to cut through jargon or make you feel embarrassed by your own abstractions.

There’s no thinker or writer or person who has had more influence on my moral understanding than Elie Wiesel, and I found myself and my family suddenly resident at the Waldorf Astoria, [the official residence of the U.N. ambassador], and I thought what a wonderful opportunity to pay tribute to a giant.

JE: Tell us about your relationship. When did you go from being professionals with a shared interest in preventing genocide to establishing a friendship?

SP: I first got introduced to Elie and his life as a kid, like so many millions of children do, reading his story. An Irish immigrant, I read “Night” for the first time in high school in Atlanta, Georgia. I never dreamed that I would ever meet the man, never mind develop a friendship with him. I consider it the blessing of a lifetime that our relationship developed over time.

I wrote “A Problem From Hell,” my book on American responses to genocide, and after I finished it, I sought him out. He was someone who kept popping up in its pages as an advocate when it mattered most. As I looked into Cambodia, Saddam Hussein, Bosnia, Bitburg, there was Elie Wiesel. Again and again he made himself a historic voice, and an extremely relevant voice, when issues of great moral magnitude were hanging in the balance.

So I sought him out, and he was kind enough not to hate the book I had written! There is no greater terror than sending off your battered manuscript, six years of work, to someone who appears repeatedly in the book, and also to someone who has been such a foundational inspiration for the sensibility that gave rise to the question at its heart: Why are we bystanders in the face of genocide? In the wake of this first meeting, we began a correspondence.

Soon thereafter, the genocide in Darfur, Sudan, occurred. And Elie, to his eternal credit and in keeping with how he had lived his life for decades, made himself a public voice for action to try to help those people who were being slaughtered in Darfur. We worked together to press the U.N. Security Council to do more, and we spoke at rallies in Washington and at advocacy events in New York.

That period was quite gratifying for him — not because there was any silver bullet to Darfur but because what he saw across the U.S. was a burst of activism by young people on college campuses who demanded that the principle of “Never again” be brought to life.

In your foreword to the new edition of “Night,” you talk about being haunted by Moishe the Beadle, an odd character from Wiesel’s town who tries to warn people about the Nazis, to no
avail. Is there a Moishe the Beadle on the world stage today, who is trying to warn us of an impending tragedy?

We all have these moments where injustice is brought to us. It can be ordinary injustice, or it can be injustice on an epic scale, like Moishe the Beadle tried to convey. It’s tempting not to believe, or to believe and not to fully process, to keep horrible or inconvenient information at remove. I think of “Caesar,” the code name of the Syrian photographer who smuggled out thousands of graphic photos [taken from 2011 to 2013] of Syrian prisoners who had been systematically tortured by the Assad regime. Some people didn’t believe him; others believed, but pushed the information away. Amid the challenges associated with whether and how to intervene in Syria, we, the United States, and the world didn’t find a way to respond to those crimes in a way that Caesar would have imagined when he risked his life to bring us this damning evidence.

That’s a very vivid, single individual who did his part as much as the Beadle did to get the world to see, to shake the world. I know how devastated he is, not only by what he saw, but also by the fact that we and other government officials who saw the photos didn’t do far more in response.

JE: You wrote that Wiesel would venture to unlikely, isolated places — to meet with refugees escaping the Khmer Rouge and Miskito Indians driven from their land in Nicaragua. If he were alive today, where would he go?

SP: While the Holocaust was the defining event of his remarkable life, he didn’t believe that something had to be genocide, or even a mass atrocity, to be worthy of his activism, of his voice. He was aware of the power of his voice, and the importance of preserving its heft, weight, so he didn’t throw his moral authority around on issues without deep reflection on the good that could be done if he lent support to a cause.

Sometimes as we seek to apply “Never again,” as we resolve not to be bystanders, we can miss injustices right before our nose. Elie taught us not to do that. The bar need not be set as genocide for when we act. If it is, we may miss the opportunity to do something within our communities in our time, or we may miss the opportunity to act abroad before it is too late.
It is perilous to speculate on what Elie might be doing or where he might be traveling today. But I suppose I can speak to issues that cry out for attention. I know that Elie cared about the ghastly plight of refugees, as right now more people are displaced from their homes, 67 million, than at any time since World War II. In his life he often showed solidarity with those individuals, and, despite all the fear that people have about bringing refugees in — and we have to address people’s fears and not just blow past them — he served as a remarkable example of what a refugee who comes and is embraced by the United States can give back. Throughout his life, through his travels, he gave faces to refugee crises, and managed to break down this abstract idea of a “refugee” into discrete families who are just trying to keep their children fed, safe, alive.

Elie often would go to places where the news wasn’t. Yemen today is a place where the suffering is so acute, and where there is an alarmingly large gap between the scale of the disaster and the amount of outside coverage, interest and response.

And South Sudan — Elie was so heartened when that people who suffered a genocide achieved independence from their tormentors. And now their alleged leaders have driven their country to ruin. I imagine he would be on a plane to Juba right now.

JE: In a 2014 New Yorker profile, you said: “My career is not well thought-out. Every choice has been instinctive, and quite literally, impulsive, in many ways.” Is that still the case? How would you describe your career now?

SP: I got to know Elie’s son when I was a freshman counselor at Yale and he was a freshman. I loved seeing the way Elie related to his boy and later to his grandkids. He gave off the feeling with them as though time was standing still.

I had both my kids while working in the White House. They are now 8 and 5. They grew up with a mother who was working around the clock and never as fully present as she wished. I am right now focused on making up for lost time and making my loved ones feel as though time stands still for them.

I’m writing a book provisionally called “The Education of an Idealist.” In our first lunch when I became U.N. ambassador, I asked Elie for his advice. He said that, at some point, when I was in the U.N. Security Council, and each of the countries went around and read the stale talking points they’d been using in every prior meeting on the same topic, I should raise my hand and ask, “But what about morality in all of this?” And I said to him, “That is so not how these debates generally go; I can’t even imagine how that would go down.”

I never forgot that. As I tried to introduce the voices of individuals into these abstract debates, I would think of Elie, and I would try to puncture this bubble that we often inhabit when we are
making decisions of great magnitude. As I write my book, I’m now grappling with that question: What about morality in all of this? How can you best inject human consequences into decision-making? I believe it can be done.

JE: You were quoted in The Irish Times recently, saying that you would consider running for office one day. True?

SP: The way the question was phrased was “would you consider?” Consider? Sure. Having been a writer and a teacher and an advocate on the outside for my whole career before working for [President] Obama, I’ve never felt so privileged and so useful as I did as a public servant. If I had the chance to serve my country again in some form, or if I could make a difference, in my community, in my own home state, I would be very interested in doing it. For now I’m focused on making up for lost time with my two beautiful children and trying to sort through what I have learned over these last years.

JE: But you are active on Twitter.

SP: I’m trying to stay off it, because it’s bad for my health! My quality of life plummets about 10% every time I open my Twitter feed. All that is on Twitter is basically “Donald Trump did this terrible thing today,” or “Donald Trump was prevented from doing this terrible thing today.” The latter is what passes for good news.

That said, even as I hunker down and try to get my book done, it is hard not to raise one’s voice against the cruelty and coldness and the recklessness of much of what’s being done.

It’s heartbreaking. If those who are making these decisions could just experience the pain they are causing to others for a minute — the pain of being separated from loved ones who are being deported; the pain of fearing you are going to lose your health insurance; the pain of racism, of discrimination — if that was happening to them, would they be making the decisions they are making?

People who have the privilege of serving in government are empowered to do things that affect other people’s destinies. That’s a huge responsibility. And it’s a responsibility being born recklessly right now. Elie consistently raised his voice against cruelty — it is incumbent on all of us to follow his lead and do all we can to help those we can help and to combat the hate and extremism that have gathered force.
Why Elie Wiesel’s ‘Night’ Still Matters So Much To Me

- And All Of Us

By Samantha Power

Forward

September 12, 2017


Words tend to fail us most in two circumstances — in the face of profound evil and of transcendent decency. When Elie Wiesel first tried to describe his experience in the camps, he later wrote, “I watched helplessly as language became an obstacle.” We who have the honor to speak about Elie have the opposite challenge, finding words that capture the fierce and magical essence of this marvelous man. Elie gave friendship with the intensity of a young man fresh out of college—with innocence and adamant conviction that that friendship would be an eternal bond, which, in Elie’s case, it usually was. He used to quote someone who said in French, “Ma patrie, c’est les amis.” “My friends are my homeland.”

It was Elie’s belief in friendship that relates so powerfully to the miracle of his joyfulness. Of course, we must consider the context from which that joy somehow emerged. None of us will ever comprehend the depravity of what Elie experienced during the Holocaust. He tried to help us see and feel that pain, but he knew our limits. Nor can most of us fathom the aloneness that Elie experienced after he was liberated from Buchenwald on April 11, 1945. Imagine the 16-year-old boy who walked out of those gates. A boy with A-7713 tattooed on his arm. A boy who, as far as he knew, had lost his entire family, and who — when he gazed at himself in the mirror for the first time since being sent to the concentration camp — saw a corpse staring back at him. “The slightest wind would blow me over,” he later said.

Many of us have been struck by the fact that it took Elie 10 years to prepare himself to put into words the horrors of what had been done to him and to his family and to his people. A whole 10 years before he could begin to write. And when he did so, in the spring of 1955, this wise old man
who had been to hell and back was just 26 years old. What must it have been like for this man, in his Paris lodgings, to rouse the demons — to hear once again what he called the “silent cries”? “While I had many things to say,” he would later write, “I did not have the words to say them…. How was one to rehabilitate and transform words betrayed and perverted by the enemy? Hunger — thirst — fear — transport — selection — fire — chimney… I would pause at every sentence, and start over and over again. I would conjure up other verbs, other images, other silent cries. It still was not right.”

He reimmersed himself in that period, into the darkness of night. The approach that came most naturally to him was blunt and unsparing. What he bore witness to — and thus relived — were the horrors inflicted upon him, but also his own most searing moments of dehumanization, when he could not bring himself to help the person whose companionship had helped keep him alive in Auschwitz and later, on the death march — his father. As he eventually wrote, “He had called out to me and I had not answered.”

In the original text, which Elie wrote in Yiddish, he had added, “I shall never forgive myself.” Elie Wiesel carried all of this.

It can be hard to imagine that there was a time when the prevailing wisdom was not to bear witness. But that is precisely what it was like when Elie was writing. Survivors did not speak about their past — even to their own children. Here in the United States, there were no memorials to the 6 million Jews who had been killed. The word “Holocaust” did not even appear in The New York Times until 1959. Even in Europe — where the mass murder had taken place and entire Jewish communities had been wiped out — the topic was hardly mentioned. It was against this wall of silence that Elie wrote. And then the man whose life’s mission would be to combat indifference laid his heart out to the world, presented his experiences, his story, and they reacted with indifference. Although he had cut the original Yiddish version from more than 800 pages to a little more than 100, all the major publishing houses turned the book down. The renowned French novelist François Mauriac resolved to help Elie. “No one is interested in the death camps anymore,” publishers told Mauriac. “It just won’t sell.” When Elie went in search of an American publisher, he later recalled, their rejection letters often noted that American readers “seemed to prefer optimistic books.”

All who have read “Night” are haunted, perhaps above all, by Moishe the Beadle. Moishe was among the first wave of foreign Jews deported from Elie’s town of Sighet, who were transported by train to a forest in Poland, where they were forced to dig their own graves at gunpoint, and then executed en masse by the Gestapo. Moishe survived, wounded, faking his death, and eventually made his way back to Sighet, where he told his neighbors what he
had witnessed. “Jews, listen to me!” he yells outside the synagogue, weeping. “That’s all I ask of you. No money. No pity. Just listen to me!” But no one listens. Moishe is ignored — dismissed as a madman. How cruel was it, then, that young Elie Wiesel, who was taunted by his perpetrators that nobody would ever know or care what had happened to him and his people, how cruel was it that he encountered a world that again seemed indifferent to what he had gone through? When he was trying to place his manuscript, did he feel somehow like Moishe the Beadle, a man who possessed the truth, but was ignored? And yet none of this appears to have diminished the determination of Elie Wiesel. “Night” of course did eventually find its publishers, and after several years, its readership did begin to grow, at first gradually, and then exponentially.

Arguably no single work did so much to lift the silence that had enveloped survivors, and bring what happened in the “Kingdom of Night” out into the light, for all to see. And yet. Injustice was still rampant. Genocide denial against the Armenians, the horrors of his lifetime — Pol Pot, Bosnia, Rwanda, Darfur, Syria in his later years. He lived to see more and more people bear witness to unspeakable atrocities, but he also saw that indifference remained too widespread. Amid all the pain and disappointment of Elie’s remarkable life, how is it that the darkness did not envelop him, or shield him from the sun? How is it that the light in Elie Wiesel’s gaze was every bit as defining as his life’s experiences? “What is abnormal,” Elie once told Oprah Winfrey, “is that I am normal. That I survived the Holocaust and went on to love beautiful girls, to talk, to write, to have toast and tea and live my life — that is what is abnormal.” Elie raged against indifference to injustice, to be sure, but he also savored the gifts of life with ferocious zeal. “We know that every moment is a moment of grace,” he once said, “every hour is an offering; not to share them would mean to betray them.”

Maybe it was because Elie had such a strong sense of purpose on his journey — to help those who could still be helped. A duty to his neighbor. To the stranger, the stranger that he once was. He called it his 11th commandment: “Thou shalt not stand idly by… . You must speak up. You must defend. You must tell the victims, … ‘You are not alone, somebody cares.’”

Through the years, Elie ventured out to the most unlikely, isolated places. There was Elie in a tiny village along the Thai border with Cambodia, meeting with refugees who had just escaped the Khmer Rouge. There was Elie, crossing the jungle in Nicaragua on foot and in a kayak, to reach the Miskito Indians who had been driven from their land. “I,” Elie reflected later, “who have been known to lose my way in my own neighborhood and don’t know how to swim,” traveled all that way to bear witness to their displacement and see how he could help. Now one might think that in these encounters Elie found only suffering, but he did not. He found meaning. Abe Foxman remembered visiting a school program in Tel Aviv that Elie and Marion had helped set up for undocumented children from Sudan — one of many such initiatives they created — and Abe remembers seeing Elie singing and dancing with the kids, in pure, almost childlike joy. Elie Wiesel often wrote of the anger within him. But what he projected most effortlessly was his love. Jews, Elie would often say, are a people of unparalleled gratitude — so much so, he pointed out, that they begin the day by thanking God for opening their eyes. Elie’s greatest joy came in the time he spent with those closest to him,
his wife, Marion, and his son, Elisha. A few years ago, when he was recovering from heart surgery, Elie was visited by his beloved grandson, Elijah, then just 5 years old. Here is how Elie describes the encounter: “I hug my grandson and tell him, ‘Every time I see you, my life becomes a gift.’ Elijah observes me closely as I speak and… responds: ‘Grandpa, you know that I love you, and I see you are in pain. Tell me: If I loved you more, would you be in less pain?’”

Elie writes, “I am convinced God at that moment is smiling as He contemplates His creation.” I am so very sad that my children will not have the chance to talk metaphysics with the master. But let me offer another reason that God is smiling today. As our nation goes through difficult days, “Night” is a book that is firmly ingrained in that small canon of literature that kids and young adults read when they are growing up in America. Alongside Atticus Finch and Scout, one of the narrators that will have an early shot at shaping our children’s moral universe is 16-year-old Elie. So, while the void is enormous — above all, for Marion, Elisha, and the rest of the family — and the void is enormous for our world, I too am filled with profound joy knowing that my 7-year-old boy and my 4-year-old girl — like Elie’s grandkids, and their children after them — will wade into big questions for the first time with Elie Wiesel as their guide. That they will be less alone for having Elie with them. That “Night” will be one of the works that lay the scaffolding for their moral architecture. All because Elie Wiesel was optimistic enough to keep going — and to find the strength to shine his light on us all.
Samantha Power: The Campaigner
Chapter Study Questions

1. How did Samantha Power begin her career?
2. Samantha Power moved to the United States as a nine-year-old girl from Ireland. What effect do you think this had on her and her life?
3. What did Power do from 1998 to 2002 at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government?
4. When was Samantha Power announced as the new United States Ambassador to the United Nations?
5. What are some of Power’s views on Israel?
6. What are some awards Power has won in her career?
7. Who was Elie Wiesel?
8. Why did Samantha Power decide to honor Elie Wiesel at a dinner she hosted after she became the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations?
9. How do you believe Elie Wiesel affected Power?
III. Life Before the United Nations

1. On a Mission to Shine a Spotlight on Genocide; Samantha Power’s
2. Mind Leaps From Bosnia to Iraq
3. Remember Rwanda, but Take Action in Sudan
4. Bystanders to Genocide
5. Winning the Pulitzer Prize
6. Publishers Weekly Review on A Problem From Hell
7. San Francisco Chronicle Review A Problem From Hell
8. The Telegraph Book Review on A Problem From Hell
9. Study Questions
On a Mission To Shine A Spotlight On Genocide; Samantha Power's Mind Leaps From Bosnia to Iraq

By Celestine Bohlen
The New York Times
February 5, 2003

By her own definition Samantha Power is a child of Bosnia. Not literally: born in Ireland in 1970, she came to the United States when she was 9. With her billowy red hair and long-legged stride, she exudes a purposeful all-American energy that is far from the bleakness of the Balkans.

But Bosnia is where she came of age, she says, just as a generation before hers was marked by Vietnam, and another was defined by World War II.

"Our view of American power was born" in Bosnia, said Ms. Power, author of "A Problem From Hell," about American responses to genocide in the last century that has prompted new debates about the moral responsibilities that go with American power.

She came to Bosnia in 1993, joining the swarms of freelance reporters drawn to the unfolding war.

The story there was shocking -- a widening arc of atrocities against victims targeted not for what they had done, but for who they were -- all taking place on a continent where genocide was never supposed to happen again. But more shocking for this 23-year-old, one year out of Yale University, was that the American government seemed unwilling to stop it.
The final blow came in Srebrenica, a doomed town that had been designated a "safe haven" by the United Nations and its international peacekeepers, where in July 1995 an estimated 7,000 Muslim men and boys were massacred by Bosnian Serbs.

Ms. Power then realized that newspaper articles -- however grisly, however accurate -- do not change policy. She left the region in anger and frustration. "It wasn't about me, Samantha," she said. "It was about impotence." Ms. Power's response was to embark on what was to become a 610-page book, with a title borrowed from the phrase once uttered by Warren Christopher, the former secretary of state. She began as a reporter, and ended up with a mission.

There is an intensity in just about everything Ms. Power does, including the way she speaks. She weaves ideas together so fast that sometimes she has to jot down what she has just said, to remind herself how she made the leap from one subject to another.

She grew up with sports -- her mother was an Irish squash champion -- and her first ambition was to be a sports broadcaster.

Returning to the United States in the mid-1990's Ms. Power was struck by this country's rediscovery of the horrors of the Holocaust, through books, films and newly opened museums. The words "never again" had become a political commonplace. But to her ears, they seemed a mockery of the policy failures she had witnessed in Bosnia.

When she went looking for books to explain this discrepancy, she could not find any, so she decided to write one herself.

"It was a totally innocent book," she said. "This was not a graduate-school thesis. I just wanted to find out the answer to the question: What was the American response and why?"

Her friends in this period described her obsession as "all genocide, all the time." A die-hard Red Sox fan (is there any other kind?) who attended 45 games last season, she found herself at a party talking to her idol, the pitcher Pedro Martínez. Only later did she realize that she hadn't let him get a word in, as she bombarded him with accounts of Rwanda and Bosnia.

The book has been praised for its mix of scholarship and journalism. It starts with an account of a futile effort by Henry Morgenthau, then the United States ambassador to Turkey, to persuade Washington to stop the killing of Armenians by the Ottoman Turks in 1915 and moves on to the compelling and little-known story of Raphael Lemkin, a Jewish linguist from Poland whose family was killed in the Holocaust and who waged an obsessive battle to put genocide -- a word he coined -- on the international agenda.

But the crux of "A Problem From Hell" is an account of how American foreign policy -- despite the Holocaust -- stayed largely silent in the face of the atrocities in Cambodia, Iraq, Bosnia and most recently and dramatically in Rwanda.
United States pushed for the withdrawal of United Nations troops from Rwanda as the slaughter of 800,000 Tutsis got under way.

In the case of Bosnia, the United States did take action -- albeit belatedly, and through NATO -- and later in Kosovo led NATO in a bombing campaign to force the Serbs to stop their atrocities against the rebellious ethnic Albanians there.

Ms. Power, now 32, wrote the book in five years, traveling to the Balkans and other site of genocide and managing to graduate from Harvard Law School in 1999. In 2001 her first publisher, Random House, dropped the book when, by her account, she refused to make it "more personal, more polemical." New Republic/Basic Books published the work last spring.

By the time "A Problem From Hell" came out, its analysis of Washington's paralysis in the face of genocide seemed like an echo from the past. The terrorist attacks of September 2001 had reshaped the world and made national security the overriding foreign policy priority.

"Someone said the other day that genocide is so 1990's," Ms. Power said in a borrowed office in New York, where the United Nations Security Council was wrangling over the United States' apparent intention to wage war against Iraq. "There is a way in which nonintervention now seems to be a moot point."

While the Bush administration is ready to intervene in Iraq in the name of national security, there is no indication that humanitarian intervention, as cited in Kosovo by the Clinton administration, is still a feature of American policy.

And yet Ms. Power's book, which has been nominated for several prizes, has stirred debate in foreign policy circles as diplomats and experts deal with the question of when and how American power, military and diplomatic, should be deployed on behalf of humanitarian goals.

Richard Holbrooke, the former United Nations ambassador and architect of the Dayton accords that ended the Bosnian war, has declared it a "breakthrough book"; he has distributed copies around the foreign policy circuit, including one to the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan.

"It is not about moralism as foreign policy, it is about moral values in foreign policy," Mr. Holbrooke said. He likened Ms. Power to Maude Gonne, the fiery Irish nationalist who was W. B. Yeats's longtime love and muse. (Ms. Power was recently featured in an magazine advertisement for the luxury car Infiniti promoting a book about projects and people trying to change the world. Ms. Power said she hesitated before appearing in the ad, but went ahead on the theory that it would put her theories "into the mainstream.")
Ms. Power bridles at critics who interpret the book as a simplistic call for military intervention in cases of humanitarian crises. Her point, she said, is not that the United States failed to intervene in Cambodia, Iraq or Rwanda, but that it failed to do anything at all.

"If you think of foreign policy as a toolbox, there are a whole range of options -- you can convene allies, impose economic sanctions, expel ambassadors, jam hate radio," she said. "There is always something you can do, but if you look at most of these cases, you see that the toolbox stays closed even when the violations are bad, really bad, even when they are in the red zone."

In the case of Rwanda, for instance, genocide never came up at any cabinet meeting, and the word was banned at the State Department. "Be careful," said one document found by Ms. Power. "Legal at State was worried about this yesterday -- Genocide finding could commit (the U.S. Government) to actually 'do something.'"

Ms. Power now teaches at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University. A colleague there, Michael Ignatieff, said her book "has had a big echo." He said, "it raises such disturbing questions about how bureaucracies advertently and inadvertently conspire to deny evil, and to construe themselves to be helpless against evil."

Everyone, Ms. Power included, agrees that humanitarian intervention is never simple. By its very definition, it implies a violation of another country's sovereignty, which can have a destabilizing effect and lead to unintended consequences; for instance, intervention did not stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, where the Albanians have pushed out most Serbs, Roma and Gorani, a Muslim minority.

Politics and history must be taken into account: after the Vietnam War, Americans had no stomach for any involvement in Cambodia, no matter how horrible the crimes of the Pol Pot regime. Many attribute Washington's passivity to the genocide in Rwanda in April 1994 to the public's horrified response to the botched humanitarian mission in Somalia the year before.

Anthony Lake, who was President Clinton's national security adviser, now admits that the United States failed in Rwanda. "It was a failure of the international community, and we are the leaders of that community," he said, adding that he hopes Ms. Power's book will stimulate debate about how best to intervene in humanitarian crises, including the largely unnoticed civil war in Southern Sudan, which by his estimate has cost two million lives.

In The London Review of Books, Ms. Power's book was cited as an example of how humanitarian intervention as embraced by American liberals helped lay the groundwork for the Bush administration's policy of pre-emptive intervention, as now foreseen for Iraq. "Having supported unilateralist intervention outside the U.N. framework during the 1990's, liberals and progressives are simply unable to make a credible case against Bush today," wrote Stephen Holmes, a professor at New York University.
But Ms. Power questions the legitimacy of the Bush administration's approach. "Because it adheres to international law in such a selective way, it lacks the legitimacy to stand as the military guardian of human rights," she said. "A unilateral attack would make Iraq a more humane place, but the world a more dangerous place."

Ms. Power argues that Iraq exemplifies America's failure to recognize that responding to genocide is in the national interest. In 1989, she noted, the United States doubled its aid budget to Iraq, months after Saddam Hussein had used chemical weapons against his Kurdish citizens, as well as against Iranian soldiers.

Such policies lead to the credibility gap that she said the United States is facing today as it tries to convince world public opinion of its motives for a pending invasion of Iraq.

"You can't allow these kinds of crimes to go unnoticed, and not have them come back and reflect on us," she said.
Remember Rwanda, but Take Action in Sudan

By Samantha Power
The New York Times
April 6, 2004

Ten years ago this week, Rwandan Hutu extremists embarked on a genocidal campaign in which they murdered some 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus -- a genocide more efficient than that of the Nazis.

On this anniversary, Western and United Nations leaders are expressing their remorse and pledging their resolve to prevent future humanitarian catastrophes. But as they do so, the Sudanese government is teaming up with Arab Muslim militias in a campaign of ethnic slaughter and deportation that has already left nearly a million Africans displaced and more than 30,000 dead. Again, the United States and its allies are bystanders to slaughter, seemingly no more prepared to prevent genocide than they were a decade ago.

The horrors in the Darfur region of Sudan are not "like" Rwanda, any more than those in Rwanda were "like" those ordered by Hitler. The Arab-dominated government in Khartoum has armed nomadic Arab herdsmen, or Janjaweed, against rival African tribes. The government is using aerial bombardment to strafe villages and terrorize civilians into flight. And it is denying humanitarian access to some 700,000 people who are trapped in Darfur.

The Arab Muslim marauders and their government sponsors do not yet seem intent on exterminating every last African Muslim in their midst. But they do seem determined to wipe out black life in the region. The only difference between Rwanda and Darfur, said Mukesh Kapila, the former United Nations' humanitarian coordinator for Sudan, "is the numbers of dead, murdered, tortured, raped."

A radio exchange between a Sudanese ground commander and a pilot overhead (taped by a British journalist in February) captures the aims of the attackers:

Commander: We've found people still in the village.

Pilot: Are they with us or against us?

Commander: They say they will work with us.

Pilot: They're liars. Don't trust them. Get rid of them.

And later:
Pilot: Now the village is empty and secure for you. Any village you pass through you must burn. That way, when the villagers come back they'll have a surprise waiting for them.

The lessons of Rwanda are many. The first is that those intent on wiping out an inconvenient minority have a habit of denying journalists and aid workers access and of pursuing bad-faith negotiations. Thus far the Sudanese government has pursued both approaches, and Western officials have been far too trusting of their assurances.

A second lesson is that outside powers cannot wait for confirmation of genocide before they act. In 1994 the Clinton administration spent more time maneuvering to avoid using the term "genocide" than it did using its resources to save lives. In May 1994, an internal Pentagon memo warned against using the term "genocide" because it could commit the United States "to actually do something." In the case of Sudan, American officials need not focus on whether the killings meet the definition of genocide set by the 1948 Genocide Convention; they should focus instead on trying to stop them.

A third lesson is that even when the United States decides not to respond militarily, American leadership is indispensable. This is especially true because Europe continues to avoid intervening in violent humanitarian crises. And it remains true despite the Bush administration's unpopularity abroad. The United States often takes an all-or-nothing approach: if it doesn't send troops, it tends to foreclose other policy options.

In Sudan, this tendency has been compounded by the administration's reluctance to risk undermining the peace process it has spearheaded between Sudan's government and the rebels in the south. While President Bush is understandably eager to show he can make peace as well as war, he must stand up to Sudan's government during these difficult negotiations.

After all, regimes that resort to ethnic killing and deportation as a tool of statecraft rarely keep their word. An important predictor of Sudan's reliability as an ally in the war on terrorism and as a party to the American-brokered peace accord is its treatment of African Muslims in Darfur.

What would standing up to Sudan entail? The administration has several options.

On the economic and diplomatic front, the United States has already demonstrated its clout in Sudan, which is desperate to see American sanctions lifted. So far, Secretary of State Colin Powell has rightly described the humanitarian crisis as a "catastrophe." But the White House and the Pentagon have been mostly mute. President Bush must use American leverage to demand that the government in Khartoum cease its aerial attacks, terminate its arms supplies to the Janjaweed and punish those militia accused of looting, rape and murder. The president made a phone call last week to Sudan's president, Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir, but one ritual conversation hardly counts as pressure. Mr. Bush should keep calling until humanitarian workers and investigators are
permitted free movement in the region, a no-fly zone is declared and the killings are stopped, and he should dispatch Mr. Powell to the Chad-Sudan border to signal America's resolve.

The Bush administration can't do this alone. Ten thousand international peacekeepers are needed in Darfur. President Bush will have to press Sudan to agree to a United Nations mission -- and he will also need United Nations member states to sign on. The Europeans can help by urging the Security Council to refer the killings to the newly created International Criminal Court. Though the United States has been hostile to the court, this is one move it should not veto, as an investigation by the court could deter future massacres.

President Clinton has said that one of the greatest mistakes of his presidency was not doing more to prevent the Rwandan genocide. When he visited Rwanda in 1998, he tried to explain America's failure to respond: "It may seem strange to you here, especially the many of you who lost members of your family, but all over the world there were people like me sitting in offices, day after day after day, who did not fully appreciate the depth and the speed with which you were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror."

Today, roughly 1,000 miles north of Rwanda, tens of thousands of Africans are herded onto death marches, and Western leaders are again sitting in offices. How sad it is that it doesn't even seem strange.

09/08/2016

Ambassador Power and representatives from the UN Security Council traveled to South Sudan on September 2-5.

From UN Security Council in South Sudan
Bystanders to Genocide

By Samantha Power
The Atlantic
September 2001 Issue

The author's exclusive interviews with scores of the participants in the decision-making, together with her analysis of newly declassified documents, yield a chilling narrative of self-serving caution and flaccid will—and countless missed opportunities to mitigate a colossal crime.
I. People Sitting in Offices

In the course of a hundred days in 1994 the Hutu government of Rwanda and its extremist allies very nearly succeeded in exterminating the country's Tutsi minority. Using firearms, machetes, and a variety of garden implements, Hutu militiamen, soldiers, and ordinary citizens murdered some 800,000 Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu. It was the fastest, most efficient killing spree of the twentieth century.

A few years later, in a series in *The New Yorker*, Philip Gourevitch recounted in horrific detail the story of the genocide and the world's failure to stop it. President Bill Clinton, a famously avid reader, expressed shock. He sent copies of Gourevitch's articles to his second-term national-security adviser, Sandy Berger. The articles bore confused, angry, searching queries in the margins. "Is what he's saying true?" Clinton wrote with a thick black felt-tip pen beside heavily underlined paragraphs. "How did this happen?" he asked, adding, "I want to get to the bottom of this." The President's urgency and outrage were oddly timed. As the terror in Rwanda had unfolded, Clinton had shown virtually no interest in stopping the genocide, and his Administration had stood by as the death toll rose into the hundreds of thousands.

Why did the United States not do more for the Rwandans at the time of the killings? Did the President really not know about the genocide, as his marginalia suggested? Who were the people in his Administration who made the life-and-death decisions that dictated U.S. policy? Why did they decide (or decide not to decide) as they did? Were any voices inside or outside the U.S. government demanding that the United States do more? If so, why weren't they heeded? And most crucial, what could the United States have done to save lives?

So far people have explained the U.S. failure to respond to the Rwandan genocide by claiming that the United States didn't know what was happening, that it knew but didn't care, or that regardless of what it knew there was nothing useful to be done. The account that follows is based on a three-year investigation involving sixty interviews with senior, mid-level, and junior State Department, Defense Department, and National Security Council officials who helped to shape or inform U.S. policy. It also reflects dozens of interviews with Rwandan, European, and United Nations officials and with peacekeepers, journalists, and nongovernmental workers in Rwanda. Thanks to the National Security Archive (www.nsarchive.org), a nonprofit organization that uses the Freedom of Information Act to secure the release of classified U.S. documents, this account also draws on hundreds of pages of newly available government records. This material provides a clearer picture than was previously possible of the interplay among people, motives, and events. It reveals that the U.S. government knew enough about the genocide early on to save lives, but passed up countless opportunities to intervene.

In March of 1998, on a visit to Rwanda, President Clinton issued what would later be known as the "Clinton apology," which was actually a carefully hedged acknowledgment. He spoke to the crowd assembled on the tarmac at Kigali Airport: "We come here today partly in recognition of
the fact that we in the United States and the world community did not do as much as we could have and should have done to try to limit what occurred" in Rwanda.

This implied that the United States had done a good deal but not quite enough. In reality the United States did much more than fail to send troops. It led a successful effort to remove most of the UN peacekeepers who were already in Rwanda. It aggressively worked to block the subsequent authorization of UN reinforcements. It refused to use its technology to jam radio broadcasts that were a crucial instrument in the coordination and perpetuation of the genocide. And even as, on average, 8,000 Rwandans were being butchered each day, U.S. officials shunned the term "genocide," for fear of being obliged to act. The United States in fact did virtually nothing "to try to limit what occurred." Indeed, staying out of Rwanda was an explicit U.S. policy objective.

With the grace of one grown practiced at public remorse, the President gripped the lectern with both hands and looked across the dais at the Rwandan officials and survivors who surrounded him. Making eye contact and shaking his head, he explained, "It may seem strange to you here, especially the many of you who lost members of your family, but all over the world there were people like me sitting in offices, day after day after day, who did not fully appreciate the depth and the speed with which you were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror."

Clinton chose his words with characteristic care. It was true that although top U.S. officials could not help knowing the basic facts—thousands of Rwandans were dying every day—that were being reported in the morning papers, many did not "fully appreciate" the meaning. In the first three weeks of the genocide the most influential American policymakers portrayed (and, they insist, perceived) the deaths not as atrocities or the components and symptoms of genocide but as wartime "casualties"—the deaths of combatants or those caught between them in a civil war.

Yet this formulation avoids the critical issue of whether Clinton and his close advisers might reasonably have been expected to "fully appreciate" the true dimensions and nature of the massacres. During the first three days of the killings U.S. diplomats in Rwanda reported back to Washington that well-armed extremists were intent on eliminating the Tutsi. And the American press spoke of the door-to-door hunting of unarmed civilians. By the end of the second week informed nongovernmental groups had already begun to call on the Administration to use the term "genocide," causing diplomats and lawyers at the State Department to begin debating the word's applicability soon thereafter. In order not to appreciate that genocide or something close to it was under way, U.S. officials had to ignore public reports and internal intelligence and debate.

The story of U.S. policy during the genocide in Rwanda is not a story of willful complicity with evil. U.S. officials did not sit around and conspire to allow genocide to happen. But whatever their convictions about "never again," many of them did sit around, and they most certainly did allow genocide to happen. In examining how and why the United States failed Rwanda, we see
that without strong leadership the system will incline toward risk-averse policy choices. We also see that with the possibility of deploying U.S. troops to Rwanda taken off the table early on—and with crises elsewhere in the world unfolding—the slaughter never received the top-level attention it deserved. Domestic political forces that might have pressed for action were absent. And most U.S. officials opposed to American involvement in Rwanda were firmly convinced that they were doing all they could—and, most important, all they should—in light of competing American interests and a highly circumscribed understanding of what was "possible" for the United States to do.

One of the most thoughtful analyses of how the American system can remain predicated on the noblest of values while allowing the vilest of crimes was offered in 1971 by a brilliant and earnest young foreign-service officer who had just resigned from the National Security Council to protest the 1970 U.S. invasion of Cambodia. In an article in *Foreign Policy*, "The Human Reality of Realpolitik," he and a colleague analyzed the process whereby American policymakers with moral sensibilities could have waged a war of such immoral consequence as the one in Vietnam. They wrote,

The answer to that question begins with a basic intellectual approach which views foreign policy as a lifeless, bloodless set of abstractions. "Nations," "interests," "influence," "prestige"—all are disembodied and dehumanized terms which encourage easy inattention to the real people whose lives our decisions affect or even end.

Policy analysis excluded discussion of human consequences. "It simply is not done," the authors wrote. "Policy—good, steady policy—is made by the 'tough-minded.' To talk of suffering is to lose 'effectiveness,' almost to lose one's grip. It is seen as a sign that one's 'rational' arguments are weak."

In 1994, fifty years after the Holocaust and twenty years after America's retreat from Vietnam, it was possible to believe that the system had changed and that talk of human consequences had become admissible. Indeed, when the machetes were raised in Central Africa, the White House official primarily responsible for the shaping of U.S. foreign policy was one of the authors of that 1971 critique: Anthony Lane, President Clinton's first-term national-security adviser. The genocide in Rwanda presented Lake and the rest of the Clinton team with an opportunity to prove that "good, steady policy" could be made in the interest of saving lives.
II. The Peacekeepers

Rwanda was a test for another man as well: Romeo Dallaire, then a major general in the Canadian army who at the time of the genocide was the commander of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda. If ever there was a peacekeeper who believed wholeheartedly in the promise of humanitarian action, it was Dallaire. A broad-shouldered French-Canadian with deep-set sky-blue eyes, Dallaire has the thick, calloused hands of one brought up in a culture that prizes soldiering, service, and sacrifice. He saw the United Nations as the embodiment of all three.

Before his posting to Rwanda Dallaire had served as the commandant of an army brigade that sent peacekeeping battalions to Cambodia and Bosnia, but he had never seen actual combat himself. "I was like a fireman who has never been to a fire, but has dreamed for years about how he would fare when the fire came," the fifty-five-year-old Dallaire recalls. When, in the summer of 1993, he received the phone call from UN headquarters offering him the Rwanda posting, he was ecstatic. "It was answering the aim of my life," he says. "It's all you've been waiting for."

Dallaire was sent to command a UN force that would help to keep the peace in Rwanda, a nation the size of Vermont, which was known as "the land of a thousand hills" for its rolling terrain. Before Rwanda achieved independence from Belgium, in 1962, the Tutsi, who made up 15
percent of the populace, had enjoyed a privileged status. But independence ushered in three decades of Hutu rule, under which Tutsi were systematically discriminated against and periodically subjected to waves of killing and ethnic cleansing. In 1990 a group of armed exiles, mainly Tutsi, who had been clustered on the Ugandan border, invaded Rwanda. Over the next several years the rebels, known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front, gained ground against Hutu government forces. In 1993 Tanzania brokered peace talks, which resulted in a power-sharing agreement known as the Arusha Accords. Under its terms the Rwandan government agreed to share power with Hutu opposition parties and the Tutsi minority. UN peacekeepers would be deployed to patrol a cease-fire and assist in demilitarization and demobilization as well as to help provide a secure environment, so that exiled Tutsi could return. The hope among moderate Rwandans and Western observers was that Hutu and Tutsi would at last be able to coexist in harmony.

Hutu extremists rejected these terms and set out to terrorize Tutsi and also those Hutu politicians supportive of the peace process. In 1993 several thousand Rwandans were killed, and some 9,000 were detained. Guns, grenades, and machetes began arriving by the planeload. A pair of international commissions—one sent by the United Nations, the other by an independent collection of human-rights organizations—warned explicitly of a possible genocide.

But Dallaire knew nothing of the precariousness of the Arusha Accords. When he made a preliminary reconnaissance trip to Rwanda, in August of 1993, he was told that the country was committed to peace and that a UN presence was essential. A visit with extremists, who preferred to eradicate Tutsi rather than cede power, was not on Dallaire's itinerary. Remarkably, no UN officials in New York thought to give Dallaire copies of the alarming reports from the international investigators.

The sum total of Dallaire's intelligence data before that first trip to Rwanda consisted of one encyclopedia's summary of Rwandan history, which Major Brent Beardsley, Dallaire's executive assistant, had snatched at the last minute from his local public library. Beardsley says, "We flew to Rwanda with a Michelin road map, a copy of the Arusha agreement, and that was it. We were under the impression that the situation was quite straightforward: there was one cohesive government side and one cohesive rebel side, and they had come together to sign the peace agreement and had then requested that we come in to help them implement it."

Though Dallaire gravely underestimated the tensions brewing in Rwanda, he still felt that he would need a force of 5,000 to help the parties implement the terms of the Arusha Accords. But when his superiors warned him that the United States would never agree to pay for such a large deployment, Dallaire reluctantly trimmed his written request to 2,500. He remembers, "I was told, 'Don't ask for a brigade, because it ain't there.'"

Once he was actually posted to Rwanda, in October of 1993, Dallaire lacked not merely intelligence data and manpower but also institutional support. The small Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York, run by the Ghanaian diplomat Kofi Annan, now the UN
secretary general, was overwhelmed. Madeleine Albright, then the U.S. ambassador to the UN, recalls, "The global nine-one-one was always either busy or nobody was there." At the time of the Rwanda deployment, with a staff of a few hundred, the UN was posting 70,000 peacekeepers on seventeen missions around the world. Amid these widespread crises and logistical headaches the Rwanda mission had a very low status.

Life was not made easier for Dallaire or the UN peacekeeping office by the fact that American patience for peacekeeping was thinning. Congress owed half a billion dollars in UN dues and peacekeeping costs. It had tired of its obligation to foot a third of the bill for what had come to feel like an insatiable global appetite for mischief and an equally insatiable UN appetite for missions. The Clinton Administration had taken office better disposed toward peacekeeping than any other Administration in U.S. history. But it felt that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations needed fixing and demanded that the UN "learn to say no" to chancy or costly missions.

Every aspect of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda was run on a shoestring. UNAMIR (the acronym by which it was known) was equipped with hand-me-down vehicles from the UN's Cambodia mission, and only eighty of the 300 that turned up were usable. When the medical supplies ran out, in March of 1994, New York said there was no cash for resupply. Very little could be procured locally, given that Rwanda was one of Africa's poorest nations. Replacement spare parts, batteries, and even ammunition could rarely be found. Dallaire spent some 70 percent of his time battling UN logistics.

Dallaire had major problems with his personnel, as well. He commanded troops, military observers, and civilian personnel from twenty-six countries. Though multinationality is meant to be a virtue of UN missions, the diversity yielded grave discrepancies in resources. Whereas Belgian troops turned up well armed and ready to perform the tasks assigned to them, the poorer contingents showed up "bare-assed," in Dallaire's words, and demanded that the United Nations suit them up. "Since nobody else was offering to send troops, we had to take what we could get," he says. When Dallaire expressed concern, he was instructed by a senior UN official to lower his expectations. He recalls, "I was told, 'Listen, General, you are NATO-trained. This is not NATO.'" Although some 2,500 UNAMIR personnel had arrived by early April of 1994, few of the soldiers had the kit they needed to perform even basic tasks.

The signs of militarization in Rwanda were so widespread that even without much of an intelligence-gathering capacity, Dallaire was able to learn of the extremists' sinister intentions. In January of 1994 an anonymous Hutu informant, said to be high up in the inner circles of the Rwandan government, had come forward to describe the rapid arming and training of local militias. In what is now referred to as the "Dallaire fax," Dallaire relayed to New York the informant's claim that Hutu extremists "had been ordered to register all the Tutsi in Kigali." "He suspects it is for their extermination," Dallaire wrote. "Example he gave was that in 20 minutes his personnel could kill up to 1000 Tutsis." "Jean-Pierre," as the informant became known, had said that the militia planned first to provoke and murder a number of Belgian peacekeepers, to "thus guarantee Belgian withdrawal from Rwanda." When Dallaire notified Kofi Annan's office
that UNAMIR was poised to raid Hutu arms caches, Annan's deputy forbade him to do so. Instead Dallaire was instructed to notify the Rwandan President, Juvénal Habyarimana, and the Western ambassadors of the informant's claims. Though Dallaire battled by phone with New York, and confirmed the reliability of the informant, his political masters told him plainly and consistently that the United States in particular would not support aggressive peacekeeping. (A request by the Belgians for reinforcements was also turned down.) In Washington, Dallaire's alarm was discounted. Lieutenant Colonel Tony Marley, the U.S. military liaison to the Arusha process, respected Dallaire but knew he was operating in Africa for the first time. "I thought that the neophyte meant well, but I questioned whether he knew what he was talking about," Marley recalls.

III. The Early Killings

On the evening of April 6, 1994, Romeo Dallaire was sitting on the couch in his bungalow residence in Kigali, watching CNN with Brent Beardsley. Beardsley was preparing plans for a national Sports Day that would match Tutsi rebel soldiers against Hutu government soldiers in a soccer game. Dallaire said, "You know, Brent, if the shit ever hit the fan here, none of this stuff would really matter, would it?" The next instant the phone rang. Rwandan President Habyarimana's Mystère Falcon jet, a gift from French President François Mitterrand, had just
been shot down, with Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira aboard. Dallaire and Beardsley raced in their UN jeep to Rwandan army headquarters, where a crisis meeting was under way.

Back in Washington, Kevin Aiston, the Rwanda desk officer, knocked on the door of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Prudence Bushnell and told her that the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi had gone down in a plane crash. "Oh, shit," she said. "Are you sure?" In fact nobody was sure at first, but Dallaire's forces supplied confirmation within the hour. The Rwandan authorities quickly announced a curfew, and Hutu militias and government soldiers erected roadblocks around the capital.

Bushnell drafted an urgent memo to Secretary of State Warren Christopher. She was concerned about a probable outbreak of killing in both Rwanda and its neighbor Burundi. The memo read,

If, as it appears, both Presidents have been killed, there is a strong likelihood that widespread violence could break out in either or both countries, particularly if it is confirmed that the plane was shot down. Our strategy is to appeal for calm in both countries, both through public statements and in other ways.

A few public statements proved to be virtually the only strategy that Washington would muster in the weeks ahead.

Lieutenant General Wesley Clark, who later commanded the NATO air war in Kosovo, was the director of strategic plans and policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon. On learning of the crash, Clark remembers, staff officers asked, "Is it Hutu and Tutsi or Tutu and Hutsi?" He frantically called for insight into the ethnic dimension of events in Rwanda. Unfortunately, Rwanda had never been of more than marginal concern to Washington's most influential planners.

America's best-informed Rwanda observer was not a government official but a private citizen, Alison Des Forges, a historian and a board member of Human Rights Watch, who lived in Buffalo, New York. Des Forges had been visiting Rwanda since 1963. She had received a Ph.D. from Yale in African history, specializing in Rwanda, and she could speak the Rwandan language, Kinyarwanda. Half an hour after the plane crash Des Forges got a phone call from a close friend in Kigali, the human-rights activist Monique Mujawamariya. Des Forges had been worried about Mujawamariya for weeks, because the Hutu extremist radio station, Radio Mille Collines, had branded her "a bad patriot who deserves to die." Mujawamariya had sent Human Rights Watch a chilling warning a week earlier: "For the last two weeks, all of Kigali has lived under the threat of an instantaneous, carefully prepared operation to eliminate all those who give trouble to President Habyarimana."
Now Habyarimana was dead, and Mujawamariya knew instantly that the hard-line Hutu would use the crash as a pretext to begin mass killing. "This is it," she told Des Forges on the phone. For the next twenty-four hours Des Forges called her friend's home every half hour. With each conversation Des Forges could hear the gunfire grow louder as the militia drew closer. Finally the gunmen entered Mujawamariya's home. "I don't want you to hear this," Mujawamariya said softly. "Take care of my children." She hung up the phone.

Mujawamariya's instincts were correct. Within hours of the plane crash Hutu militiamen took command of the streets of Kigali. Dallaire quickly grasped that supporters of the Arusha peace process were being targeted. His phone at UNAMIR headquarters rang constantly as Rwandans around the capital pleaded for help. Dallaire was especially concerned about Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a reformer who with the President's death had become the titular head of state. Just after dawn on April 7 five Ghanaian and ten Belgian peacekeepers arrived at the Prime Minister's home in order to deliver her to Radio Rwanda, so that she could broadcast an emergency appeal for calm.

Joyce Leader, the second-in-command at the U.S. embassy, lived next door to Uwilingiyimana. She spent the early hours of the morning behind the steel-barred gates of her embassy-owned house as Hutu killers hunted and dispatched their first victims. Leader's phone rang. Uwilingiyimana was on the other end. "Please hide me," she begged.

Minutes after the phone call a UN peacekeeper attempted to hike the Prime Minister over the wall separating their compounds. When Leader heard shots fired, she urged the peacekeeper to abandon the effort. "They can see you!" she shouted. Uwilingiyimana managed to slip with her husband and children into another compound, which was occupied by the UN Development Program. But the militiamen hunted them down in the yard, where the couple surrendered. There were more shots. Leader recalls, "We heard her screaming and then, suddenly, after the gunfire the screaming stopped, and we heard people cheering." Hutu gunmen in the Presidential Guard that day systematically tracked down and eliminated Rwanda's moderate leadership.

The raid on Uwilingiyimana's compound not only cost Rwanda a prominent supporter of the Arusha Accords; it also triggered the collapse of Dallaire's mission. In keeping with the plan to target the Belgians which the informant Jean-Pierre had relayed to UNAMIR in January, Hutu soldiers rounded up the peacekeepers at Uwilingiyimana's home, took them to a military camp, led the Ghanaians to safety, and then killed and savagely mutilated the ten Belgians. In Belgium the cry for either expanding UNAMIR's mandate or immediately withdrawing was prompt and loud.

In response to the initial killings by the Hutu government, Tutsi rebels of the Rwandan Patriotic Front—stationed in Kigali under the terms of the Arusha Accords—surged out of their barracks and resumed their civil war against the Hutu regime. But under the cover of that war were early and strong indications that systematic genocide was taking place. From April 7 onward the Hutu-controlled army, the gendarmerie, and the militias worked together to wipe out Rwanda's Tutsi.
Many of the early Tutsi victims found themselves specifically, not spontaneously, pursued: lists of targets had been prepared in advance, and Radio Mille Collines broadcast names, addresses, and even license-plate numbers. Killers often carried a machete in one hand and a transistor radio in the other. Tens of thousands of Tutsi fled their homes in panic and were snared and butcherged at checkpoints. Little care was given to their disposal. Some were shoveled into landfills. Human flesh rotted in the sunshine. In churches bodies mingled with scattered hosts. If the killers had taken the time to tend to sanitation, it would have slowed their "sanitization" campaign.

IV. The "Last War"

The two tracks of events in Rwanda—simultaneous war and genocide—confused policymakers who had scant prior understanding of the country. Atrocities are often carried out in places that are not commonly visited, where outside expertise is limited. When country-specific knowledge is lacking, foreign governments become all the more likely to employ faulty analogies and to "fight the last war." The analogy employed by many of those who confronted the outbreak of killing in Rwanda was a peacekeeping intervention that had gone horribly wrong in Somalia.

On October 3, 1993, ten months after President Bush had sent U.S. troops to Somalia as part of what had seemed a low-risk humanitarian mission, U.S. Army Rangers and Delta special forces in Somalia attempted to seize several top advisers to the warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed. Aideed's faction had ambushed and killed two dozen Pakistani peacekeepers, and the United States was striking back. But in the firefight that ensued the Somali militia killed eighteen Americans, wounded seventy-three, and captured one Black Hawk helicopter pilot. Somali
television broadcast both a video interview with the trembling, disoriented pilot and a gory procession in which the corpse of a U.S. Ranger was dragged through a Mogadishu street.

On receiving word of these events, President Clinton cut short a trip to California and convened an urgent crisis-management meeting at the White House. When an aide began recapping the situation, an angry President interrupted him. "Cut the bullshit," Clinton snapped. "Let's work this out." "Work it out" meant walk out. Republican Congressional pressure was intense. Clinton appeared on American television the next day, called off the manhunt for Aideed, temporarily reinforced the troop presence, and announced that all U.S. forces would be home within six months. The Pentagon leadership concluded that peacekeeping in Africa meant trouble and that neither the White House nor Congress would stand by it when the chips were down.

Even before the deadly blowup in Somalia the United States had resisted deploying a UN mission to Rwanda. "Anytime you mentioned peacekeeping in Africa," one U.S. official remembers, "the crucifixes and garlic would come up on every door." Having lost much of its early enthusiasm for peacekeeping and for the United Nations itself, Washington was nervous that the Rwanda mission would sour like so many others. But President Habyarimana had traveled to Washington in 1993 to offer assurances that his government was committed to carrying out the terms of the Arusha Accords. In the end, after strenuous lobbying by France (Rwanda's chief diplomatic and military patron), U.S. officials accepted the proposition that UNAMIR could be the rare "UN winner." On October 5, 1993, two days after the Somalia firefight, the United States reluctantly voted in the Security Council to authorize Dallaire's mission. Even so, U.S. officials made it clear that Washington would give no consideration to sending U.S. troops to Rwanda. Somalia and another recent embarrassment in Haiti indicated that multilateral initiatives for humanitarian purposes would likely bring the United States all loss and no gain.

Against this backdrop, and under the leadership of Anthony Lake, the national-security adviser, the Clinton Administration accelerated the development of a formal U.S. peacekeeping doctrine. The job was given to Richard Clarke, of the National Security Council, a special assistant to the President who was known as one of the most effective bureaucrats in Washington. In an interagency process that lasted more than a year, Clarke managed the production of a presidential decision directive, PDD-25, which listed sixteen factors that policymakers needed to consider when deciding whether to support peacekeeping activities: seven factors if the United States was to vote in the UN Security Council on peace operations carried out by non-American soldiers, six additional and more stringent factors if U.S. forces were to participate in UN peacekeeping missions, and three final factors if U.S. troops were likely to engage in actual combat. In the words of Representative David Obey, of Wisconsin, the restrictive checklist tried to satisfy the American desire for "zero degree of involvement, and zero degree of risk, and zero degree of pain and confusion." The architects of the doctrine remain its strongest defenders. "Many say PDD-25 was some evil thing designed to kill peacekeeping, when in fact it was there to save peacekeeping," Clarke says. "Peacekeeping was almost dead. There was no support for it in the U.S. government, and the peacekeepers were not effective in the field." Although the directive was not publicly released until May 3, 1994, a month into the genocide, the considerations
encapsulated in the doctrine and the Administration's frustration with peacekeeping greatly influenced the thinking of U.S. officials involved in shaping Rwanda policy.

V. The Peace Processors

Each of the American actors dealing with Rwanda brought particular institutional interests and biases to his or her handling of the crisis. Secretary of State Warren Christopher knew little about Africa. At one meeting with his top advisers, several weeks after the plane crash, he pulled an atlas off his shelf to help him locate the country. Belgian Foreign Minister Willie Claes recalls trying to discuss Rwanda with his American counterpart and being told, "I have other responsibilities." Officials in the State Department's Africa Bureau were, of course, better informed. Prudence Bushnell, the deputy assistant secretary, was one of them. The daughter of a diplomat, Bushnell had joined the foreign service in 1981, at the age of thirty-five. With her agile mind and sharp tongue, she had earned the attention of George Moose when she served under him at the U.S. embassy in Senegal. When Moose was named the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, in 1993, he made Bushnell his deputy. Just two weeks before the plane crash the State Department had dispatched Bushnell and a colleague to Rwanda in an effort to contain the escalating violence and to spur the stalled peace process.

Unfortunately, for all the concern of the Americans familiar with Rwanda, their diplomacy suffered from three weaknesses. First, ahead of the plane crash diplomats had repeatedly threatened to pull out UN peacekeepers in retaliation for the parties' failure to implement Arusha. These threats were of course counterproductive, because the very Hutu who opposed power-sharing wanted nothing more than a UN withdrawal. One senior U.S. official remembers, "The first response to trouble is 'Let's yank the peacekeepers.' But that is like believing that when children are misbehaving, the proper response is 'Let's send the baby-sitter home.'"
Second, before and during the massacres U.S. diplomacy revealed its natural bias toward states and toward negotiations. Because most official contact occurs between representatives of states, U.S. officials were predisposed to trust the assurances of Rwandan officials, several of whom were plotting genocide behind the scenes. Those in the U.S. government who knew Rwanda best viewed the escalating violence with a diplomatic prejudice that left them both institutionally oriented toward the Rwandan government and reluctant to do anything to disrupt the peace process. An examination of the cable traffic from the U.S. embassy in Kigali to Washington between the signing of the Arusha agreement and the downing of the presidential plane reveals that setbacks were perceived as "dangers to the peace process" more than as "dangers to Rwandans." American criticisms were deliberately and steadfastly leveled at "both sides," though Hutu government and militia forces were usually responsible.

The U.S. ambassador in Kigali, David Rawson, proved especially vulnerable to such bias. Rawson had grown up in Burundi, where his father, an American missionary, had set up a Quaker hospital. He entered the foreign service in 1971. When, in 1993, at age fifty-two, he was given the embassy in Rwanda, his first, he could not have been more intimate with the region, the culture, or the peril. He spoke the local language—almost unprecedented for an ambassador in Central Africa. But Rawson found it difficult to imagine the Rwandans who surrounded the President as conspirators in genocide. He issued pro forma demarches over Habyarimana's obstruction of power-sharing, but the cable traffic shows that he accepted the President's assurances that he was doing all he could. The U.S. investment in the peace process gave rise to a wishful tendency to see peace "around the corner." Rawson remembers, "We were naive policy optimists, I suppose. The fact that negotiations can't work is almost not one of the options open to people who care about peace. We were looking for the hopeful signs, not the dark signs. In fact, we were looking away from the dark signs ... One of the things I learned and should have already known is that once you launch a process, it takes on its own momentum. I had said, 'Let's try this, and then if it doesn't work, we can back away.' But bureaucracies don't allow that. Once the Washington side buys into a process, it gets pursued, almost blindly." Even after the Hutu government began exterminating Tutsi, U.S. diplomats focused most of their efforts on "re-establishing a cease-fire" and "getting Arusha back on track."

The third problematic feature of U.S. diplomacy before and during the genocide was a tendency toward blindness bred by familiarity: the few people in Washington who were paying attention to Rwanda before Habyarimana's plane was shot down were those who had been tracking Rwanda for some time and had thus come to expect a certain level of ethnic violence from the region. And because the U.S. government had done little when some 40,000 people had been killed in Hutu-Tutsi violence in Burundi in October of 1993, these officials also knew that Washington was prepared to tolerate substantial bloodshed. When the massacres began in April, some U.S. regional specialists initially suspected that Rwanda was undergoing "another flare-up" that would involve another "acceptable" (if tragic) round of ethnic murder.

Rawson had read up on genocide before his posting to Rwanda, surveying what had become a relatively extensive scholarly literature on its causes. But although he expected internecine killing, he did not anticipate the scale at which it occurred. "Nothing in Rwandan culture or
history could have led a person to that forecast," he says. "Most of us thought that if a war broke out, it would be quick, that these poor people didn't have the resources, the means, to fight a sophisticated war. I couldn't have known that they would do each other in with the most economic means." George Moose agrees: "We were psychologically and imaginatively too limited."

VI. Foreigners First

David Rawson was sitting with his wife in their residence watching a taped broadcast of The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour when he heard the back-to-back explosions that signaled the destruction of President Habyarimana’s plane. As the American ambassador, he was concerned primarily for American citizens, who, he feared, could be killed or injured in any outbreak of fighting. The United States made the decision to withdraw its personnel and nationals on April 7. Penned into his house, Rawson did not feel that his presence was of any use. Looking back, he says, "Did we have a moral responsibility to stay there? Would it have made a difference? I don't know, but the killings were taking place in broad daylight while we were there. I didn't feel that we were achieving much."

Still, about 300 Rwandans from the neighborhood had gathered at Rawson's residence seeking refuge, and when the Americans cleared out, the local people were left to their fates. Rawson recalls, "I told the people who were there that we were leaving and the flag was coming down, and they would have to make their own choice about what to do ... Nobody really asked us to take them with us." Rawson says he could not help even those who worked closest to him. His chief steward, who served dinner and washed dishes at the house, called the ambassador from his home and pleaded, "We're in terrible danger. Please come and get us." Rawson says, "I had to tell him, 'We can't move. We can't come.'" The steward and his wife were killed.
Assistant Secretary Moose was away from Washington, so Prudence Bushnell, the acting assistant secretary, was made the director of the task force that managed the Rwanda evacuation. Her focus, like Rawson's, was on the fate of U.S. citizens. "I felt very strongly that my first obligation was to the Americans," she recalls. "I was sorry about the Rwandans, of course, but my job was to get our folks out ... Then again, people didn't know that it was a genocide. What I was told was 'Look, Pru, these people do this from time to time.' We thought we'd be right back."

At a State Department press conference on April 8 Bushnell made an appearance and spoke gravely about the mounting violence in Rwanda and the status of Americans there. After she left the podium, Michael McCurry, the department spokesman, took her place and criticized foreign governments for preventing the screening of the Steven Spielberg film *Schindler's List*. "This film movingly portrays ... the twentieth century's most horrible catastrophe," he said. "And it shows that even in the midst of genocide, one individual can make a difference." No one made any connection between Bushnell's remarks and McCurry's. Neither journalists nor officials in the United States were focused on the Tutsi.

On April 9 and 10, in five different convoys, Ambassador Rawson and 250 Americans were evacuated from Kigali and other points. "When we left, the cars were stopped and searched," Rawson says. "It would have been impossible to get Tutsi through." All told, thirty-five local employees of the embassy were killed in the genocide.

Warren Christopher appeared on the NBC news program *Meet the Press* the morning the evacuation was completed. "In the great tradition, the ambassador was in the last car," Christopher said proudly. "So that evacuation has gone very well." Christopher stressed that although U.S. Marines had been dispatched to Burundi, there were no plans to send them into Rwanda to restore order: they were in the region as a safety net, in case they were needed to assist in the evacuation. "It's always a sad moment when the Americans have to leave," he said, "but it was the prudent thing to do." The Republican Senate minority leader, Bob Dole, a spirited defender of Bosnia's besieged Muslims at the time, agreed. "I don't think we have any national interest there," Dole said on April 10. "The Americans are out, and as far as I'm concerned, in Rwanda, that ought to be the end of it."

Dallaire, too, had been ordered to make the evacuation of foreigners his priority. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which had rejected the field commander's proposed raid on arms caches in January, sent an explicit cable: "You should make every effort not to compromise your impartiality or to act beyond your mandate, but [you] may exercise your discretion to do [so] should this be essential for the evacuation of foreign nationals. This should not, repeat not, extend to participating in possible combat except in self-defense." Neutrality was essential. Avoiding combat was paramount, but Dallaire could make an exception for non-Rwandans.

While the United States evacuated overland without an American military escort, the Europeans sent troops to Rwanda so that their personnel could exit by air. On April 9 Dallaire watched
covetously as just over a thousand French, Belgian, and Italian soldiers descended on Kigali Airport to begin evacuating their expatriates. These commandos were clean-shaven, well fed, and heavily armed, in marked contrast to Dallaire's exhausted, hungry, ragtag peacekeeping force. Within three days of the plane crash estimates of the number of dead in the capital already exceeded 10,000.

If the soldiers ferried in for the evacuation had teamed up with UNAMIR, Dallaire would have had a sizable deterrent force. At that point he commanded 440 Belgians, 942 Bangladeshis, 843 Ghanaians, 60 Tunisians, and 255 others from twenty countries. He could also call on a reserve of 800 Belgians in Nairobi. If the major powers had reconfigured the thousand-man European evacuation force and the U.S. Marines on standby in Burundi—who numbered 300—and contributed them to his mission, he would finally have had the numbers on his side. "Mass slaughter was happening, and suddenly there in Kigali we had the forces we needed to contain it, and maybe even to stop it," he recalls. "Yet they picked up their people and turned and walked away."

The consequences of the exclusive attention to foreigners were felt immediately. In the days after the plane crash some 2,000 Rwandans, including 400 children, had grouped at the Ecole Technique Officielle, under the protection of about ninety Belgian soldiers. Many of them were already suffering from machete wounds. They gathered in the classrooms and on the playing field outside the school. Rwandan government and militia forces lay in wait nearby, drinking beer and chanting, "Pawa, pawa," for "Hutu power." On April 11 the Belgians were ordered to regroup at the airport to aid the evacuation of European civilians. Knowing they were trapped, several Rwandans pursued the jeeps, shouting, "Do not abandon us!" The UN soldiers shooed them away from their vehicles and fired warning shots over their heads. When the peacekeepers had gone out through one gate, Hutu militiamen entered through another, firing machine guns and throwing grenades. Most of the 2,000 gathered there were killed.

In the three days during which some 4,000 foreigners were evacuated, about 20,000 Rwandans were killed. After the American evacuees were safely out and the U.S. embassy had been closed, Bill and Hillary Clinton visited the people who had manned the emergency-operations room at the State Department and offered congratulations on a "job well done."
VII. Genocide? What Genocide?

Just when did Washington know of the sinister Hutu designs on Rwanda's Tutsi? Writing in *Foreign Affairs* last year, Alan Kuperman argued that President Clinton "could not have known that a nationwide genocide was under way" until about two weeks into the killing. It is true that the precise nature and extent of the slaughter was obscured by the civil war, the withdrawal of U.S. diplomatic sources, some confused press reporting, and the lies of the Rwandan government. Nonetheless, both the testimony of U.S. officials who worked the issue day to day and the declassified documents indicate that plenty was known about the killers' intentions.

A determination of genocide turns not on the numbers killed, which is always difficult to ascertain at a time of crisis, but on the perpetrators' intent: Were Hutu forces attempting to destroy Rwanda's Tutsi? The answer to this question was available early on. "By eight A.M. the morning after the plane crash we knew what was happening, that there was systematic killing of Tutsi," Joyce Leader recalls. "People were calling me and telling me who was getting killed. I knew they were going door to door." Back at the State Department she explained to her colleagues that three kinds of killing were going on: war, politically motivated murder, and genocide. Dallaire's early cables to New York likewise described the armed conflict that had resumed between rebels and government forces, and also stated plainly that savage "ethnic cleansing" of Tutsi was occurring. U.S. analysts warned that mass killings would increase. In an April 11 memo prepared for Frank Wisner, the undersecretary of defense for policy, in advance of a dinner with Henry Kissinger, a key talking point was "Unless both sides can be convinced to return to the peace process, a massive (hundreds of thousands of deaths) bloodbath will ensue."

Whatever the inevitable imperfections of U.S. intelligence early on, the reports from Rwanda were severe enough to distinguish Hutu killers from ordinary combatants in civil war. And they certainly warranted directing additional U.S. intelligence assets toward the region—to snap satellite photos of large gatherings of Rwandan civilians or of mass graves, to intercept military
communications, or to infiltrate the country in person. Though there is no evidence that senior policymakers deployed such assets, routine intelligence continued to pour in. On April 26 an unattributed intelligence memo titled "Responsibility for Massacres in Rwanda" reported that the ringleaders of the genocide, Colonel Théoneste Bagosora and his crisis committee, were determined to liquidate their opposition and exterminate the Tutsi populace. A May 9 Defense Intelligence Agency report stated plainly that the Rwandan violence was not spontaneous but was directed by the government, with lists of victims prepared well in advance. The DIA observed that an "organized parallel effort of genocide [was] being implemented by the army to destroy the leadership of the Tutsi community."

From April 8 onward media coverage featured eyewitness accounts describing the widespread targeting of Tutsi and the corpses piling up on Kigali's streets. American reporters relayed stories of missionaries and embassy officials who had been unable to save their Rwandan friends and neighbors from death. On April 9 a front-page Washington Post story quoted reports that the Rwandan employees of the major international relief agencies had been executed "in front of horrified expatriate staffers." On April 10 a New York Times front-page article quoted the Red Cross claim that "tens of thousands" were dead, 8,000 in Kigali alone, and that corpses were "in the houses, in the streets, everywhere." The Post the same day led its front-page story with a description of "a pile of corpses six feet high" outside the main hospital. On April 14 The New York Times reported the shooting and hacking to death of nearly 1,200 men, women, and children in the church where they had sought refuge. On April 19 Human Rights Watch, which had excellent sources on the ground in Rwanda, estimated the number of dead at 100,000 and called for use of the term "genocide." The 100,000 figure (which proved to be a gross underestimate) was picked up immediately by the Western media, endorsed by the Red Cross, and featured on the front page of The Washington Post. On April 24 the Post reported how "the heads and limbs of victims were sorted and piled neatly, a bone-chilling order in the midst of chaos that harked back to the Holocaust." President Clinton certainly could have known that a genocide was under way, if he had wanted to know.

Even after the reality of genocide in Rwanda had become irrefutable, when bodies were shown choking the Kagera River on the nightly news, the brute fact of the slaughter failed to influence U.S. policy except in a negative way. American officials, for a variety of reasons, shunned the use of what became known as "the g-word." They felt that using it would have obliged the United States to act, under the terms of the 1948 Genocide Convention. They also believed, understandably, that it would harm U.S. credibility to name the crime and then do nothing to stop it. A discussion paper on Rwanda, prepared by an official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and dated May 1, testifies to the nature of official thinking. Regarding issues that might be brought up at the next interagency working group, it stated,

1. Genocide Investigation: Language that calls for an international investigation of human rights abuses and possible violations of the genocide convention. Be Careful. Legal at State was worried about this yesterday—Genocide finding could commit [the U.S. government] to actually "do something." [Emphasis added.]
At an interagency teleconference in late April, Susan Rice, a rising star on the NSC who worked under Richard Clarke, stunned a few of the officials present when she asked, "If we use the word 'genocide' and are seen as doing nothing, what will be the effect on the November [congressional] election?" Lieutenant Colonel Tony Marley remembers the incredulity of his colleagues at the State Department. "We could believe that people would wonder that," he says, "but not that they would actually voice it." Rice does not recall the incident but concedes, "If I said it, it was completely inappropriate, as well as irrelevant."

The genocide debate in U.S. government circles began the last week of April, but it was not until May 21, six weeks after the killing began, that Secretary Christopher gave his diplomats permission to use the term "genocide"—sort of. The UN Human Rights Commission was about to meet in special session, and the U.S. representative, Geraldine Ferraro, needed guidance on whether to join a resolution stating that genocide had occurred. The stubborn U.S. stand had become untenable internationally.

The case for a label of genocide was straightforward, according to a May 18 confidential analysis prepared by the State Department's assistant secretary for intelligence and research, Toby Gati: lists of Tutsi victims' names and addresses had reportedly been prepared; Rwandan government troops and Hutu militia and youth squads were the main perpetrators; massacres were reported all over the country; humanitarian agencies were now "claiming from 200,000 to 500,000 lives" lost. Gati offered the intelligence bureau's view: "We believe 500,000 may be an exaggerated estimate, but no accurate figures are available. Systematic killings began within hours of Habyarimana's death. Most of those killed have been Tutsi civilians, including women and children." The terms of the Genocide Convention had been met. "We weren't quibbling about these numbers," Gati says. "We can never know precise figures, but our analysts had been reporting huge numbers of deaths for weeks. We were basically saying, 'A rose by any other name ...'"

Despite this straightforward assessment, Christopher remained reluctant to speak the obvious truth. When he issued his guidance, on May 21, fully a month after Human Rights Watch had put a name to the tragedy, Christopher's instructions were hopelessly muddied.

The delegation is authorized to agree to a resolution that states that "acts of genocide" have occurred in Rwanda or that "genocide has occurred in Rwanda." Other formulations that suggest that some, but not all of the killings in Rwanda are genocide ... e.g. "genocide is taking place in Rwanda"—are authorized. Delegation is not authorized to agree to the characterization of any specific incident as genocide or to agree to any formulation that indicates that all killings in Rwanda are genocide.

Notably, Christopher confined permission to acknowledge full-fledged genocide to the upcoming session of the Human Rights Commission. Outside that venue State Department officials were authorized to state publicly only that acts of genocide had occurred.
Christine Shelly, a State Department spokesperson, had long been charged with publicly articulating the U.S. position on whether events in Rwanda counted as genocide. For two months she had avoided the term, and as her June 10 exchange with the Reuters correspondent Alan Elsner reveals, her semantic dance continued.

Elsner: How would you describe the events taking place in Rwanda?

Shelly: Based on the evidence we have seen from observations on the ground, we have every reason to believe that acts of genocide have occurred in Rwanda.

Elsner: What's the difference between "acts of genocide" and "genocide"?

Shelly: Well, I think the—as you know, there's a legal definition of this ... clearly not all of the killings that have taken place in Rwanda are killings to which you might apply that label ... But as to the distinctions between the words, we're trying to call what we have seen so far as best as we can; and based, again, on the evidence, we have every reason to believe that acts of genocide have occurred.

Elsner: How many acts of genocide does it take to make genocide?

Shelly: Alan, that's just not a question that I'm in a position to answer.

The same day, in Istanbul, Warren Christopher, by then under severe internal and external pressure, relented: "If there is any particular magic in calling it genocide, I have no hesitancy in saying that."

VIII. "Not Even a Sideshow"

Once the Americans had been evacuated, Rwanda largely dropped off the radar of most senior Clinton Administration officials. In the situation room on the seventh floor of the State Department a map of Rwanda had been hurriedly pinned to the wall in the aftermath of the plane crash, and eight banks of phones had rung off the hook. Now, with U.S. citizens safely home, the State Department chaired a daily interagency meeting, often by teleconference, designed to coordinate mid-level diplomatic and
humanitarian responses. Cabinet-level officials focused on crises elsewhere. Anthony Lake recalls, "I was obsessed with Haiti and Bosnia during that period, so Rwanda was, in William Shawcross's words, a 'sideshow,' but not even a sideshow—a no-show." At the NSC the person who managed Rwanda policy was not Lake, the national-security adviser, who happened to know Africa, but Richard Clarke, who oversaw peacekeeping policy, and for whom the news from Rwanda only confirmed a deep skepticism about the viability of UN deployments. Clarke believed that another UN failure could doom relations between Congress and the United Nations. He also sought to shield the President from congressional and public criticism. Donald Steinberg managed the Africa portfolio at the NSC and tried to look out for the dying Rwandans, but he was not an experienced infighter and, colleagues say, he "never won a single argument" with Clarke.

The Americans who wanted the United States to do the most were those who knew Rwanda best. Joyce Leader, Rawson's deputy in Rwanda, had been the one to close and lock the doors to the U.S. embassy. When she returned to Washington, she was given a small room in a back office and told to prepare the State Department's daily Rwanda summaries, drawing on press and U.S. intelligence reports. Incredibly, despite her expertise and her contacts in Rwanda, she was rarely consulted and was instructed not to deal directly with her sources in Kigali. Once, an NSC staffer did call to ask, "Short of sending in the troops, what is to be done?" Leader's response, unwelcome, was "Send in the troops." Throughout the U.S. government Africa specialists had the least clout of all regional specialists and the smallest chance of effecting policy outcomes. In contrast, those with the most pull in the bureaucracy had never visited Rwanda or met any Rwandans. They spoke analytically of "national interests" or even "humanitarian consequences" without appearing gripped by the unfolding human tragedy. The dearth of country or regional expertise in the senior circles of government not only reduces the capacity of officers to assess the "news." It also increases the likelihood—a dynamic identified by Lake in his 1971 Foreign Policy article—that killings will become abstractions. "Ethnic bloodshed" in Africa was thought to be regrettable but not particularly unusual.

As it happened, when the crisis began, President Clinton himself had a coincidental and personal connection with the country. At a coffee at the White House in December of 1993 Clinton had met Monique Mujawamariya, the Rwandan human-rights activist. He had been struck by the courage of a woman who still bore facial scars from an automobile accident that had been arranged to curb her activities. Clinton had singled her out, saying, "Your courage is an inspiration to all of us." On April 8, two days after the onset of the killing, The Washington Post published a letter that Alison Des Forges had sent to Human Rights Watch after Mujawamariya had hung up the phone to face her fate. "I believe Monique was killed at 6:30 this morning," Des Forges had written. "I have virtually no hope that she is still alive, but will continue to try for more information. In the meantime ... please inform everyone who will care." Word of Mujawamariya's disappearance got the President's attention, and he inquired about her whereabouts repeatedly. "I can't tell you how much time we spent trying to find Monique," one U.S. official remembers. "Sometimes it felt as though she was the only Rwandan in danger." Miraculously, Mujawamariya had not been killed—she had hidden in the rafters of her home after hanging up with Des Forges, and eventually managed to talk and bribe her way to safety. She was evacuated to Belgium, and on April 18 she joined Des Forges in the United States,
where the pair began lobbying the Clinton Administration on behalf of those left behind. With Mujawamariya's rescue, reported in detail in the *Post* and *The New York Times*, the President apparently lost his personal interest in events in Rwanda.

During the entire three months of the genocide Clinton never assembled his top policy advisers to discuss the killings. Anthony Lake likewise never gathered the "principals"—the Cabinet-level members of the foreign-policy team. Rwanda was never thought to warrant its own top-level meeting. When the subject came up, it did so along with, and subordinate to, discussions of Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. Whereas these crises involved U.S. personnel and stirred some public interest, Rwanda generated no sense of urgency and could safely be avoided by Clinton at no political cost. The editorial boards of the major American newspapers discouraged U.S. intervention during the genocide. They, like the Administration, lamented the killings but believed, in the words of an April 17 *Washington Post* editorial, "The United States has no recognizable national interest in taking a role, certainly not a leading role." Capitol Hill was quiet. Some in Congress were glad to be free of the expense of another flawed UN mission. Others, including a few members of the Africa subcommittees and the Congressional Black Caucus, eventually appealed tamely for the United States to play a role in ending the violence—but again, they did not dare urge U.S. involvement on the ground, and they did not kick up a public fuss. Members of Congress weren't hearing from their constituents. Pat Schroeder, of Colorado, said on April 30, "There are some groups terribly concerned about the gorillas ... But—it sounds terrible—people just don't know what can be done about the people." Randall Robinson, of the nongovernmental organization TransAfrica, was preoccupied, staging a hunger strike to protest the U.S. repatriation of Haitian refugees. Human Rights Watch supplied exemplary intelligence and established important one-on-one contacts in the Administration, but the organization lacks a grassroots base from which to mobilize a broader segment of American society.

**IX. The UN Withdrawal**

![Image](image_url)

*Courtesy of UN*

When the killing began, Romeo Dallaire expected and appealed for reinforcements. Within hours of the plane crash he had cabled UN headquarters in New York: "Give me the means and I can do more." He was sending peacekeepers on rescue missions around the city, and he felt it was
essential to increase the size and improve the quality of the UN's presence. But the United States opposed the idea of sending reinforcements, no matter where they were from. The fear, articulated mainly at the Pentagon but felt throughout the bureaucracy, was that what would start as a small engagement by foreign troops would end as a large and costly one by Americans. This was the lesson of Somalia, where U.S. troops had gotten into trouble in an effort to bail out the beleaguered Pakistanis. The logical outgrowth of this fear was an effort to steer clear of Rwanda entirely and be sure others did the same. Only by yanking Dallaire's entire peacekeeping force could the United States protect itself from involvement down the road.

One senior U.S. official remembers, "When the reports of the deaths of the ten Belgians came in, it was clear that it was Somalia redux, and the sense was that there would be an expectation everywhere that the U.S. would get involved. We thought leaving the peacekeepers in Rwanda and having them confront the violence would take us where we'd been before. It was a foregone conclusion that the United States wouldn't intervene and that the concept of UN peacekeeping could not be sacrificed again."

A foregone conclusion. What is most remarkable about the American response to the Rwandan genocide is not so much the absence of U.S. military action as that during the entire genocide the possibility of U.S. military intervention was never even debated. Indeed, the United States resisted intervention of any kind.

The bodies of the slain Belgian soldiers were returned to Brussels on April 14. One of the pivotal conversations in the course of the genocide took place around that time, when Willie Claes, the Belgian Foreign Minister, called the State Department to request "cover." "We are pulling out, but we don't want to be seen to be doing it alone," Claes said, asking the Americans to support a full UN withdrawal. Dallaire had not anticipated that Belgium would extract its soldiers, removing the backbone of his mission and stranding Rwandans in their hour of greatest need. "I expected the ex-colonial white countries would stick it out even if they took casualties," he remembers. "I thought their pride would have led them to stay to try to sort the place out. The Belgian decision caught me totally off guard. I was truly stunned."

Belgium did not want to leave ignominiously, by itself. Warren Christopher agreed to back Belgian requests for a full UN exit. Policy over the next month or so can be described simply: no U.S. military intervention, robust demands for a withdrawal of all of Dallaire's forces, and no support for a new UN mission that would challenge the killers. Belgium had the cover it needed.

On April 15 Christopher sent one of the most forceful documents to be produced in the entire three months of the genocide to Madeleine Albright at the UN—a cable instructing her to demand a full UN withdrawal. The cable, which was heavily influenced by Richard Clarke at the NSC, and which bypassed Donald Steinberg and was never seen by Anthony Lake, was unequivocal about the next steps. Saying that he had "fully" taken into account the "humanitarian reasons put forth for retention of UNAMIR elements in Rwanda," Christopher wrote that there was "insufficient justification" to retain a UN presence.
The international community must give highest priority to full, orderly withdrawal of all UNAMIR personnel as soon as possible ... We will oppose any effort at this time to preserve a UNAMIR presence in Rwanda ... Our opposition to retaining a UNAMIR presence in Rwanda is firm. It is based on our conviction that the Security Council has an obligation to ensure that peacekeeping operations are viable, that they are capable of fulfilling their mandates, and that UN peacekeeping personnel are not placed or retained, knowingly, in an untenable situation.

"Once we knew the Belgians were leaving, we were left with a rump mission incapable of doing anything to help people," Clarke remembers. "They were doing nothing to stop the killings."

But Clarke underestimated the deterrent effect that Dallaire's very few peacekeepers were having. Although some soldiers hunkered down, terrified, others scoured Kigali, rescuing Tutsi, and later established defensive positions in the city, opening their doors to the fortunate Tutsi who made it through roadblocks to reach them. One Senegalese captain saved a hundred or so lives single-handedly. Some 25,000 Rwandans eventually assembled at positions manned by UNAMIR personnel. The Hutu were generally reluctant to massacre large groups of Tutsi if foreigners (armed or unarmed) were present. It did not take many UN soldiers to dissuade the Hutu from attacking. At the Hotel des Mille Collines ten peacekeepers and four UN military observers helped to protect the several hundred civilians sheltered there for the duration of the crisis. About 10,000 Rwandans gathered at the Amohoro Stadium under light UN cover. Brent Beardsley, Dallaire's executive assistant, remembers, "If there was any determined resistance at close quarters, the government guys tended to back off." Kevin Aiston, the Rwanda desk officer at the State Department, was keeping track of Rwandan civilians under UN protection. When Prudence Bushnell told him of the U.S. decision to demand a UNAMIR withdrawal, he turned pale. "We can't," he said. Bushnell replied, "The train has already left the station."

On April 19 the Belgian Colonel Luc Marchal delivered his final salute and departed with the last of his soldiers. The Belgian withdrawal reduced Dallaire's troop strength to 2,100. More crucially, he lost his best troops. Command and control among Dallaire's remaining forces became tenuous. Dallaire soon lost every line of communication to the countryside. He had only a single satellite phone link to the outside world.

The UN Security Council now made a decision that sealed the Tutsi's fate and signaled the militia that it would have free rein. The U.S. demand for a full UN withdrawal had been opposed by some African nations, and even by Madeleine Albright; so the United States lobbied instead for a dramatic drawdown in troop strength. On April 21, amid press reports of some 100,000 dead in Rwanda, the Security Council voted to slash UNAMIR's forces to 270 men. Albright went along, publicly declaring that a "small, skeletal" operation would be left in Kigali to "show the will of the international community."

After the UN vote Clarke sent a memorandum to Lake reporting that language about "the safety and security of Rwandans under UN protection had been inserted by US/UN at the end of the day to prevent an otherwise unanimous UNSC from walking away from the at-risk Rwandans..."
under UN protection as the peacekeepers drew down to 270." In other words, the memorandum suggested that the United States was leading efforts to ensure that the Rwandans under UN protection were not abandoned. The opposite was true.

Most of Dallaire's troops were evacuated by April 25. Though he was supposed to reduce the size of his force to 270, he ended up keeping 503 peacekeepers. By this time Dallaire was trying to deal with a bloody frenzy. "My force was standing knee-deep in mutilated bodies, surrounded by the guttural moans of dying people, looking into the eyes of children bleeding to death with their wounds burning in the sun and being invaded by maggots and flies," he later wrote. "I found myself walking through villages where the only sign of life was a goat, or a chicken, or a songbird, as all the people were dead, their bodies being eaten by voracious packs of wild dogs."

Dallaire had to work within narrow limits. He attempted simply to keep the positions he held and to protect the 25,000 Rwandans under UN supervision while hoping that the member states on the Security Council would change their minds and send him some help while it still mattered.

By coincidence Rwanda held one of the rotating seats on the Security Council at the time of the genocide. Neither the United States nor any other UN member state ever suggested that the representative of the genocidal government be expelled from the council. Nor did any Security Council country offer to provide safe haven to Rwandan refugees who escaped the carnage. In one instance Dallaire's forces succeeded in evacuating a group of Rwandans by plane to Kenya. The Nairobi authorities allowed the plane to land, sequestered it in a hangar, and, echoing the American decision to turn back the S.S. St. Louis during the Holocaust, then forced the plane to return to Rwanda. The fate of the passengers is unknown.

Throughout this period the Clinton Administration was largely silent. The closest it came to a public denunciation of the Rwandan government occurred after personal lobbying by Human Rights Watch, when Anthony Lake issued a statement calling on Rwandan military leaders by name to "do everything in their power to end the violence immediately." When I spoke with Lake six years later, and informed him that human-rights groups and U.S. officials point to this statement as the sum total of official public attempts to shame the Rwandan government in this period, he seemed stunned. "You're kidding," he said. "That's truly pathetic."

At the State Department the diplomacy was conducted privately, by telephone. Prudence Bushnell regularly set her alarm for 2:00 A.M. and phoned Rwandan government officials. She spoke several times with Augustin Bizimungu, the Rwandan military chief of staff. "These were the most bizarre phone calls," she says. "He spoke in perfectly charming French. 'Oh, it's so nice to hear from you,' he said. I told him, 'I am calling to tell you President Clinton is going to hold you accountable for the killings.' He said, 'Oh, how nice it is that your President is thinking of me.'"
The daily meeting of the Rwanda interagency working group was attended, either in person or by teleconference, by representatives from the various State Department bureaus, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, and the intelligence community. Any proposal that originated in the working group had to survive the Pentagon "chop." "Hard intervention," meaning U.S. military action, was obviously out of the question. But Pentagon officials routinely stymied initiatives for "soft intervention" as well.

The Pentagon discussion paper on Rwanda, referred to earlier, ran down a list of the working group's six short-term policy objectives and carped at most of them. The fear of a slippery slope was persuasive. Next to the seemingly innocuous suggestion that the United States "support the UN and others in attempts to achieve a cease-fire" the Pentagon official responded, "Need to change 'attempts' to 'political efforts'—without 'political' there is a danger of signing up to troop contributions."

The one policy move the Defense Department supported was a U.S. effort to achieve an arms embargo. But the same discussion paper acknowledged the ineffectiveness of this step: "We do not envision it will have a significant impact on the killings because machetes, knives and other hand implements have been the most common weapons."

Dallaire never spoke to Bushnell or to Tony Marley, the U.S. military liaison to the Arusha process, during the genocide, but they all reached the same conclusions. Seeing that no troops were forthcoming, they turned their attention to measures short of full-scale deployment which might alleviate the suffering. Dallaire pleaded with New York, and Bushnell and her team recommended in Washington, that something be done to "neutralize" Radio Mille Collines.

The country best equipped to prevent the genocide planners from broadcasting murderous instructions directly to the population was the United States. Marley offered three possibilities. The United States could destroy the antenna. It could transmit "counter-broadcasts" urging perpetrators to stop the genocide. Or it could jam the hate radio station's broadcasts. This could have been done from an airborne platform such as the Air Force's Commando Solo airplane. Anthony Lake raised the matter with Secretary of Defense William Perry at the end of April. Pentagon officials considered all the proposals non-starters. On May 5 Frank Wisner, the
undersecretary of defense for policy, prepared a memo for Sandy Berger, then the deputy national-security adviser. Wisner's memo testifies to the unwillingness of the U.S. government to make even financial sacrifices to diminish the killing.

We have looked at options to stop the broadcasts within the Pentagon, discussed them interagency and concluded jamming is an ineffective and expensive mechanism that will not accomplish the objective the NSC Advisor seeks.

International legal conventions complicate airborne or ground based jamming and the mountainous terrain reduces the effectiveness of either option. Commando Solo, an Air National Guard asset, is the only suitable DOD jamming platform. It costs approximately $8500 per flight hour and requires a semi-secure area of operations due to its vulnerability and limited self-protection.

I believe it would be wiser to use air to assist in Rwanda in the [food] relief effort …

The plane would have needed to remain in Rwandan airspace while it waited for radio transmissions to begin. "First we would have had to figure out whether it made sense to use Commando Solo," Wisner recalls. "Then we had to get it from where it was already and be sure it could be moved. Then we would have needed flight clearance from all the countries nearby. And then we would need the political go-ahead. By the time we got all this, weeks would have passed. And it was not going to solve the fundamental problem, which was one that needed to be addressed militarily." Pentagon planners understood that stopping the genocide required a military solution. Neither they nor the White House wanted any part in a military solution. Yet instead of undertaking other forms of intervention that might have at least saved some lives, they justified inaction by arguing that a military solution was required.

Whatever the limitations of radio jamming, which clearly would have been no panacea, most of the delays Wisner cites could have been avoided if senior Administration officials had followed through. But Rwanda was not their problem. Instead justifications for standing by abounded. In early May the State Department Legal Advisor's Office issued a finding against radio jamming, citing international broadcasting agreements and the American commitment to free speech. When Bushnell raised radio jamming yet again at a meeting, one Pentagon official chided her for naiveté: "Pru, radios don't kill people. People kill people!"

The Defense Department was disdainful both of the policy ideas being circulated at the working-group meetings and, memos indicate, of the people circulating them. A memo by one Defense Department aide observed that the State Department's Africa bureau had received a phone call from a Kigali hotel owner who said that his hotel and the civilians inside were about to be attacked. The memo snidely reported that the Africa bureau's proposed "solution" was "Pru Bushnell will call the [Rwandan] military and tell them we will hold them personally responsible if anything happens (!)." (In fact the hotel owner, who survived the genocide, later acknowledged
that phone calls from Washington played a key role in dissuading the killers from massacring the inhabitants of the hotel.)

However significant and obstructionist the role of the Pentagon in April and May, Defense Department officials were stepping into a vacuum. As one U.S. official put it, "Look, nobody senior was paying any attention to this mess. And in the absence of any political leadership from the top, when you have one group that feels pretty strongly about what shouldn't be done, it is extremely likely they are going to end up shaping U.S. policy." Lieutenant General Wesley Clark looked to the White House for leadership. "The Pentagon is always going to be the last to want to intervene," he says. "It is up to the civilians to tell us they want to do something and we'll figure out how to do it."

But with no powerful personalities or high-ranking officials arguing forcefully for meaningful action, mid-level Pentagon officials held sway, vetoing or stalling on hesitant proposals put forward by mid-level State Department or NSC officials. If Pentagon objections were to be overcome, the President, Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry, or Anthony Lake would have to step forward to "own" the problem, which did not happen.

The deck was stacked against Rwandans who were hiding wherever they could and praying for rescue. The American public expressed no interest in Rwanda, and the crisis was treated as a civil war requiring a cease-fire or as a "peacekeeping problem" requiring a UN withdrawal. It was not treated as a genocide demanding instant action. The top policymakers trusted that their subordinates were doing all they could do, while the subordinates worked with an extremely narrow understanding of what the United States would do.

XI. PDD-25 in Action

No sooner had most of Dallaire's forces been withdrawn, in late April, than a handful of nonpermanent members of the Security Council, aghast at the scale of the slaughter, pressed the major powers to send a new, beefed-up force (UNAMIR II) to Rwanda.

When Dallaire's troops had first arrived, in the fall of 1993, they had done so under a fairly traditional peacekeeping mandate known as a Chapter VI
deployment—a mission that assumes a cease-fire and a desire on both sides to comply with a peace accord. The Security Council now had to decide whether it was prepared to move from peacekeeping to peace enforcement—that is, to a Chapter VII mission in a hostile environment. This would demand more peacekeepers with far greater resources, more-aggressive rules of engagement, and an explicit recognition that the UN soldiers were there to protect civilians.

Two proposals emerged. Dallaire submitted a plan that called for joining his remaining peacekeepers with about 5,000 well-armed soldiers he hoped could be gathered quickly by the Security Council. He wanted to secure Kigali and then fan outward to create safe havens for Rwandans who had gathered in large numbers at churches and schools and on hillsides around the country. The United States was one of the few countries that could supply the rapid airlift and logistic support needed to move reinforcements to the region. In a meeting with UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on May 10, Vice President Al Gore pledged U.S. help with transport.

Richard Clarke, at the NSC, and representatives of the Joint Chiefs challenged Dallaire's plan. "How do you plan to take control of the airport in Kigali so that the reinforcements will be able to land?" Clarke asked. He argued instead for an "outside-in" strategy, as opposed to Dallaire's "inside-out" approach. The U.S. proposal would have created protected zones for refugees at Rwanda's borders. It would have kept any U.S. pilots involved in airlifting the peacekeepers safely out of Rwanda. "Our proposal was the most feasible, doable thing that could have been done in the short term," Clarke insists. Dallaire's proposal, in contrast, "could not be done in the short term and could not attract peacekeepers." The U.S. plan—which was modeled on Operation Provide Comfort, for the Kurds of northern Iraq—seemed to assume that the people in need were refugees fleeing to the border, but most endangered Tutsi could not make it to the border. The most vulnerable Rwandans were those clustered together, awaiting salvation, deep inside Rwanda. Dallaire's plan would have had UN soldiers move to the Tutsi in hiding. The U.S. plan would have required civilians to move to the safe zones, negotiating murderous roadblocks on the way. "The two plans had very different objectives," Dallaire says. "My mission was to save Rwandans. Their mission was to put on a show at no risk."

America's new peacekeeping doctrine, of which Clarke was the primary architect, was unveiled on May 3, and U.S. officials applied its criteria zealously. PDD-25 did not merely circumscribe U.S. participation in UN missions; it also limited U.S. support for other states that hoped to carry out UN missions. Before such missions could garner U.S. approval, policymakers had to answer certain questions: Were U.S. interests at stake? Was there a threat to world peace? A clear mission goal? Acceptable costs? Congressional, public, and allied support? A working cease-fire? A clear command-and-control arrangement? And, finally, what was the exit strategy?

The United States haggled at the Security Council and with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations for the first two weeks of May. U.S. officials pointed to the flaws in Dallaire's proposal without offering the resources that would have helped him to overcome them. On May 13 Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott sent Madeleine Albright instructions on how the United States should respond to Dallaire's plan. Noting the logistic hazards of airlifting troops
into the capital, Talbott wrote, "The U.S. is not prepared at this point to lift heavy equipment and troops into Kigali." The "more manageable" operation would be to create the protected zones at the border, secure humanitarian-aid deliveries, and "promot[e] restoration of a ceasefire and return to the Arusha Peace Process." Talbott acknowledged that even the minimalist American proposal contained "many unanswered questions":

Where will the needed forces come from; how will they be transported ... where precisely should these safe zones be created; ... would UN forces be authorized to move out of the zones to assist affected populations not in the zones ... will the fighting parties in Rwanda agree to this arrangement ... what conditions would need to obtain for the operation to end successfully?

Nonetheless, Talbott concluded, "We would urge the UN to explore and refine this alternative and present the Council with a menu of at least two options in a formal report from the [Secretary General] along with cost estimates before the Security Council votes on changing UNAMIR's mandate." U.S. policymakers were asking valid questions. Dallaire's plan certainly would have required the intervening troops to take risks in an effort to reach the targeted Rwandans or to confront the Hutu militia and government forces. But the business-as-usual tone of the American inquiry did not seem appropriate to the unprecedented and utterly unconventional crisis that was under way.

On May 17, by which time most of the Tutsi victims of the genocide were already dead, the United States finally acceded to a version of Dallaire's plan. However, few African countries stepped forward to offer troops. Even if troops had been immediately available, the lethargy of the major powers would have hindered their use. Though the Administration had committed the United States to provide armored support if the African nations provided soldiers, Pentagon stalling resumed. On May 19 the UN formally requested fifty American armored personnel carriers. On May 31 the United States agreed to send the APCs from Germany to Entebbe, Uganda. But squabbles between the Pentagon and UN planners arose. Who would pay for the vehicles? Should the vehicles be tracked or wheeled? Would the UN buy them or simply lease them? And who would pay the shipping costs? Compounding the disputes was the fact that Department of Defense regulations prevented the U.S. Army from preparing the vehicles for transport until contracts had been signed. The Defense Department demanded that it be reimbursed $15 million for shipping spare parts and equipment to and from Rwanda. In mid-June the White House finally intervened. On June 19, a month after the UN request, the United States began transporting the APCs, but they were missing the radios and heavy machine guns that would be needed if UN troops came under fire. By the time the APCs arrived, the genocide was over—halted by Rwandan Patriotic Front forces under the command of the Tutsi leader, Paul Kagame.
XII. The Stories We Tell

It is not hard to conceive of how the United States might have done things differently. Ahead of the plane crash, as violence escalated, it could have agreed to Belgian pleas for UN reinforcements. Once the killing of thousands of Rwandans a day had begun, the President could have deployed U.S. troops to Rwanda. The United States could have joined Dallaire’s beleaguered UNAMIR forces or, if it feared associating with shoddy UN peacekeeping, it could have intervened unilaterally with the Security Council’s backing, as France eventually did in late June. The United States could also have acted without the UN’s blessing, as it did five years later in Kosovo. Securing congressional support for U.S. intervention would have been extremely difficult, but by the second week of the killing Clinton could have made the case that something approximating genocide was under way, that a supreme American value was imperiled by its occurrence, and that U.S. contingents at relatively low risk could stop the extermination of a people.

Alan Kuperman wrote in Foreign Affairs that President Clinton was in the dark for two weeks; by the time a large U.S. force could deploy, it would not have saved "even half of the ultimate victims." The evidence indicates that the killers’ intentions were known by mid-level officials and knowable by their bosses within a week of the plane crash. Any failure to fully appreciate the genocide stemmed from political, moral, and imaginative weaknesses, not informational ones. As for what force could have accomplished, Kuperman's claims are purely speculative. We cannot know how the announcement of a robust or even a limited U.S. deployment would have affected the perpetrators' behavior. It is worth noting that even Kuperman concedes that belated intervention would have saved 75,000 to 125,000—no small achievement. A more serious challenge comes from the U.S. officials who argue that no amount of leadership from the White House would have overcome congressional opposition to sending U.S. troops to Africa. But even if that highly debatable point was true, the United States still had a variety of options. Instead of leaving it to mid-level officials to communicate with the Rwandan leadership behind the scenes, senior officials in the Administration could have taken control of the process. They could have publicly and frequently denounced the slaughter. They could have branded the crimes "genocide" at a far earlier stage. They could have called for the expulsion of the Rwandan delegation from the Security Council. On the telephone, at the UN, and on the Voice of America they could have threatened to prosecute those complicit in the genocide, naming names when possible. They could have deployed Pentagon assets to jam—even temporarily—the crucial, deadly radio broadcasts.
Instead of demanding a UN withdrawal, quibbling over costs, and coming forward (belatedly) with a plan better suited to caring for refugees than to stopping massacres, U.S. officials could have worked to make UNAMIR a force to contend with. They could have urged their Belgian allies to stay and protect Rwandan civilians. If the Belgians insisted on withdrawing, the White House could have done everything within its power to make sure that Dallaire was immediately reinforced. Senior officials could have spent U.S. political capital rallying troops from other nations and could have supplied strategic airlift and logistic support to a coalition that it had helped to create. In short, the United States could have led the world.

Why did none of these things happen? One reason is that all possible sources of pressure—U.S. allies, Congress, editorial boards, and the American people—were mute when it mattered for Rwanda. American leaders have a circular and deliberate relationship to public opinion. It is circular because public opinion is rarely if ever aroused by foreign crises, even genocidal ones, in the absence of political leadership, and yet at the same time, American leaders continually cite the absence of public support as grounds for inaction. The relationship is deliberate because American leadership is not absent in such circumstances: it was present regarding Rwanda, but devoted mainly to suppressing public outrage and thwarting UN initiatives so as to avoid acting.

Strikingly, most officials involved in shaping U.S. policy were able to define the decision not to stop genocide as ethical and moral. The Administration employed several devices to keep down enthusiasm for action and to preserve the public's sense—and, more important, its own—that U.S. policy choices were not merely politically astute but also morally acceptable. First, Administration officials exaggerated the extremity of the possible responses. Time and again U.S. leaders posed the choice as between staying out of Rwanda and "getting involved everywhere." In addition, they often presented the choice as one between doing nothing and sending in the Marines. On May 25, at the Naval Academy graduation ceremony, Clinton described America's relationship to ethnic trouble spots: "We cannot turn away from them, but our interests are not sufficiently at stake in so many of them to justify a commitment of our folks."

Second, Administration policymakers appealed to notions of the greater good. They did not simply frame U.S. policy as one contrived in order to advance the national interest or avoid U.S. casualties. Rather, they often argued against intervention from the standpoint of people committed to protecting human life. Owing to recent failures in UN peacekeeping, many humanitarian interventionists in the U.S. government were concerned about the future of America's relationship with the United Nations generally and peacekeeping specifically. They believed that the UN and humanitarianism could not afford another Somalia. Many internalized the belief that the UN had more to lose by sending reinforcements and failing than by allowing the killings to proceed. Their chief priority, after the evacuation of the Americans, was looking after UN peacekeepers, and they justified the withdrawal of the peacekeepers on the grounds that it would ensure a future for humanitarian intervention. In other words, Dallaire's peacekeeping mission in Rwanda had to be destroyed so that peacekeeping might be saved for use elsewhere.
A third feature of the response that helped to console U.S. officials at the time was the sheer flurry of Rwanda-related activity. U.S. officials with a special concern for Rwanda took their solace from mini-victories—working on behalf of specific individuals or groups (Monique Mujawamariya; the Rwandans gathered at the hotel). Government officials involved in policy met constantly and remained "seized of the matter"; they neither appeared nor felt indifferent. Although little in the way of effective intervention emerged from mid-level meetings in Washington or New York, an abundance of memoranda and other documents did.

Finally, the almost willful delusion that what was happening in Rwanda did not amount to genocide created a nurturing ethical framework for inaction. "War" was "tragic" but created no moral imperative.

What is most frightening about this story is that it testifies to a system that in effect worked. President Clinton and his advisers had several aims. First, they wanted to avoid engagement in a conflict that posed little threat to American interests, narrowly defined. Second, they sought to appease a restless Congress by showing that they were cautious in their approach to peacekeeping. And third, they hoped to contain the political costs and avoid the moral stigma associated with allowing genocide. By and large, they achieved all three objectives. The normal operations of the foreign-policy bureaucracy and the international community permitted an illusion of continual deliberation, complex activity, and intense concern, even as Rwandans were left to die.

One U.S. official kept a journal during the crisis. In late May, exasperated by the obstructionism pervading the bureaucracy, the official dashed off this lament:

A military that wants to go nowhere to do anything—or let go of their toys so someone else can do it. A White House cowed by the brass (and we are to give lessons on how the armed forces take orders from civilians?). An NSC that does peacekeeping by the book—the accounting book, that is. And an assistance program that prefers whites (Europe) to blacks. When it comes to human rights we have no problem drawing the line in the sand of the dark continent (just don't ask us to do anything—agonizing is our specialty), but not China or anyplace else business looks good.

We have a foreign policy based on our amoral economic interests run by amateurs who want to stand for something—hence the agony—but ultimately don't want to exercise any leadership that has a cost.

They say there may be as many as a million massacred in Rwanda. The militias continue to slay the innocent and the educated ... Has it really cost the United States nothing?
XIII. A Continuum of Guilt

Because this is a story of nondecisions and bureaucratic business as usual, few Americans are haunted by the memory of what they did in response to genocide in Rwanda. Most senior officials remember only fleeting encounters with the topic while the killings were taking place. The more reflective among them puzzle occasionally over how developments that cast the darkest shadow over the Clinton Administration's foreign-policy record could have barely registered at the time. But most say they have not talked in any detail among themselves about the events or about the system's weaknesses (and perverse strengths). Requests for a congressional investigation have gone ignored.

According to several advisers, toward the end of his term of office Clinton himself snapped at members of his foreign-policy team, angry with them for not steering him toward a moral course. He is said to have convinced himself that if he had known more, he would have done more. In his 1998 remarks in Kigali he pledged to "strengthen our ability to prevent, and if necessary to stop, genocide." "Never again," he declared, "must we be shy in the face of evidence." But the incentive structures within the U.S. government have not changed. Officials will still suffer no sanction if they do nothing to curb atrocities. The national interest remains narrowly constructed to exclude stopping genocide. Indeed, George W. Bush has been open about his intention to keep U.S. troops away from any future Rwandas. "I don't like genocide," Bush said in January of 2000. "But I would not commit our troops." Officials in the Bush Administration say the United States is as unprepared and unwilling to stop genocide today as it was seven years ago. "Genocide could happen again tomorrow," one said, "and we wouldn't respond any differently."
Anthony Lake, who used to call himself "the national-security adviser to the free world," today teaches international relations at Georgetown University. He wonders, as he should, how he and his colleagues could have done so little at the time of the Rwandan genocide. Much of Lake's identity remains entwined with the ideas in his 1971 *Foreign Policy* article. He cannot quite understand how a White House that, he insists, was finally sensitive to the "human reality of realpolitik" could have stood by during one of the gravest crimes of the twentieth century. "One scenario is that I knew what was going on and I blocked it out in order to not deal with the human consequences," he says. "Here I'm absolutely convinced that I didn't do that, but maybe I did and it was so deep that I didn't realize it. Another scenario is that I didn't give it enough time because I didn't give a damn about Africa, which I don't believe because I know I do. My sin must have been in a third scenario. I didn't own it because I was busy with Bosnia and Haiti, or because I thought we were doing all we could ..."

Lake is further confounded by his slow processing of the moral stakes of the genocide. After the Rwandan Patriotic Front seized control, in July, several million Hutu refugees, including many of those responsible for the genocide, fled to Zaire and Tanzania. With a humanitarian crisis looming, Lake took control, spearheading a multilateral aid effort. "There are people dying," his colleagues remember his saying. "The President wants to do this, and we don't care what it takes." In December of 1994 Lake visited putrid mass graves in Rwanda. He does not understand how, after 800,000 people were killed, he could have felt angry but not at all responsible. "What's so strange is that this didn't become a 'how did we screw this up?' issue until a couple years later," he says. "The humanitarian-aid mission did not feel like a guilt mission."

Since senior officials in the U.S. government hadn't felt responsible when the killings were actually happening, it should not be altogether surprising that most didn't feel responsible after the fact. With the potential for an American military presence dismissed out of hand, Rwanda policy was formulated and debated heatedly by U.S. officials further down the chain. Because Lake never took control of the policy, the sense of responsibility he eventually acquired, although genuine, seems superimposed. He has an academic understanding that under the principle of command responsibility, those at the top must answer even for policies they do not remember consciously crafting. But lurking at the margins of Lake's consciousness seems to be an awareness that in light of press coverage at the time, he must have simply chosen to look away. And as disengaged as he was from the policy, he probably qualifies as the most engaged U.S. official in the Clinton Cabinet. "I'm not going to wallow," he says, "because if you blew it you should not wallow or ask for public forgiveness. But in a way I'm as guilty as anybody else, because to the degree that I didn't care about Africa, it would be understandable, but since I was more inclined to care, I don't know why I didn't."

Lake's guilt is of a second order—guilt over an absence of guilt. What about the other officials involved in Washington's Rwanda policy—how do they view their performance in retrospect? Today they have three main options.

They can defend the U.S. policy. This is the position of Richard Clarke, who believes, all things considered, that he and his colleagues did everything they could and should have done. "Would I
have done the same thing again?" Clarke asks. "Absolutely. What we offered was a peacekeeping force that would have been effective. What [the UN] offered was exactly what we said it would be—a force that would take months to get there. If the UN had adopted the U.S. [outside-in] proposal, we might have saved some lives ... The U.S. record, as compared to everyone else's record, is not something we should run away from ... I don't think we should be embarrassed. I think everyone else should be embarrassed by what they did, or did not do."

Another position holds that no matter what any one person did at the time, there were larger forces at work: genocide would have consumed Rwanda no matter what, and American decision-makers in the White House or on Capitol Hill would never have countenanced the risks required to make a real difference. Radio jamming and other technical fixes were merely palliatives aimed at soothing guilty consciences. This is the view adopted by many Pentagon officials who worked on the issue day-to-day.

The least-inviting option leaves those involved questioning their performances and wondering what they should have done differently: Saved even one life by pushing harder? Chosen a telling moment for a high-profile resignation? "Maybe the only way to draw attention to this was to run naked through the building," Prudence Bushnell says. "I'm not sure anybody would have noticed, but I wish I had tried."

Africa specialists are the ones most affected by the Rwandan genocide. David Rawson, the former ambassador to Rwanda, retired in 1999. He lives with his wife in Michigan and has begun to write about his experiences. He still believes that efforts to pursue a cease-fire were worthwhile, and that "both sides" have a lot to answer for. But he acknowledges, "In retrospect, perhaps we were—as diplomats always are, I suppose—so focused on trying to find some agreement that we didn't look hard enough at the darker side." Predisposed toward state actors, trusting of negotiation and diplomacy, and courtly toward his interlocutors, Rawson, the diplomat, was outmatched.

Donald Steinberg, the NSC staffer who managed the NSC's Africa directorate, felt a deep emotional attachment to the continent. He had tacked the photos of two six-year-old African girls he had sponsored above his desk at the White House. But when he began seeing the bodies clogging the Kagera River, he had to take the photos down, unable to bear the reminder of innocent lives being extinguished every minute. The directorate, which was tiny, had little influence on policy. It was, in the parlance, "rolled" by Richard Clarke. "Dick was a thinker," one colleague says. "Don was a feeler. They represented the duality of Bill Clinton and his presidency, which was torn between the thinkers, who looked out for interests, and the feelers, who were moved by values. As we all know, in the end it was always going to be the thinkers who won out." After the genocide, according to friends and colleagues, Steinberg threw himself into the humanitarian relief effort, where at last he might make a difference. But eventually he plummeted into depression. He asked himself again and again, if only he had been at the White House longer ... if only he had known how to pull the right levers at the right time ... if only he had ... ? Now deputy director of policy planning at the State Department, Steinberg has told friends that his work from here on out is "repayment for a very large bill that I owe."
Susan Rice, Clarke's co-worker on peacekeeping at the NSC, also feels that she has a debt to repay. "There was such a huge disconnect between the logic of each of the decisions we took along the way during the genocide and the moral consequences of the decisions taken collectively," Rice says. "I swore to myself that if I ever faced such a crisis again, I would come down on the side of dramatic action, going down in flames if that was required." Rice was subsequently appointed NSC Africa director and, later, assistant secretary of state for African affairs; she visited Rwanda several times and helped to launch a small program geared to train selected African armies so that they might be available to respond to the continent's next genocide. The American appetite for troop deployments in Africa had not improved.

Prudence Bushnell will carry Rwanda with her permanently. During the genocide, when she went walking in the woods near her home in Reston, Virginia, she would see Rwandan mothers cowering with their children behind the trees, or stacked in neat piles along the bike path. After the genocide, when the new President of Rwanda visited Washington and met Bushnell and others, he leaned across the table toward her, eyes blazing, and said, "You, madame, are partially responsible for the genocide, because we told you what was going to happen and you did nothing." Haunted by these memories and admonitions, when Bushnell was later appointed ambassador to Kenya and saw that her embassy was insecure, she was much more assertive, and pleaded repeatedly with Washington for security to be upgraded—requests that were, notoriously, ignored. The bombing of the U.S. embassy in Kenya will forever be encapsulated in American minds by the image of a bloodied Bushnell staggering away from the explosion with a towel pressed to her wounds.

Currently serving as ambassador to Guatemala, Bushnell can muster a black humor about the way death and killing keep hounding her. Like Steinberg, she is trying to make peace with her inability to have secured even the tamest commitments from her colleagues in the bureaucracy. "For a long time I couldn't live with it, but now I think I can look back and say, 'I knew what was happening, I tried to stop what was happening, and I failed.' That is not a source of guilt, but it is a tremendous source of shame and sadness."

And then, finally, there is Romeo Dallaire. It is both paradoxical and natural that the man who probably did the most to save Rwandans feels the worst. When he returned to Canada, in August of 1994, he behaved initially as if he had just completed a routine mission. As the days passed, though, he began to show signs of distress. He carried a machete around and lectured cadets on post-traumatic stress disorder; he slept sparingly; and he found himself nearly retching in the supermarket, transported back to Rwandan markets and the bodies strewn within them. When the international war-crimes tribunal called him to testify, he plunged back into the memories and his mental health worsened. Dallaire was told by his superiors that he would have to choose between leaving the "Rwanda business" behind him or leaving his beloved armed forces. For Dallaire only one answer was possible: "I told them I would never give up Rwanda," he says. "I was the force commander and I would complete my duty, testifying and doing whatever it takes to bring these guys to justice." In April of 2000 Dallaire was forced out of the Canadian armed services and given a medical discharge.
Dallaire had always said, "The day I take my uniform off will be the day that I will also respond to my soul." But since becoming a civilian he has realized that his soul is not readily retrievable. "My soul is in Rwanda," he says. "It has never, ever come back, and I'm not sure it ever will." He carries the guilt of the genocide with him, and he feels that the eyes and the spirits of those killed are constantly watching him. He says he can barely stand living and has attempted suicide.

In June of last year a brief Canadian news-wire story reported that Dallaire had been found unconscious on a park bench in Hull, Quebec, drunk and alone. He had consumed a bottle of scotch on top of his daily dose of pills for post-traumatic stress disorder. He was on a death mission. Dallaire sent a letter to the Canadian Broadcast Corporation thanking them for their sensitive coverage of this episode. On July 3, 2000, the letter was read on the air.

Thank you for the very kind thoughts and wishes.

There are times when the best medication and therapist simply can't help a soldier suffering from this new generation of peacekeeping injury. The anger, the rage, the hurt, and the cold loneliness that separates you from your family, friends, and society's normal daily routine are so powerful that the option of destroying yourself is both real and attractive. That is what happened last Monday night. It appears, it grows, it invades, and it overpowers you.

In my current state of therapy, which continues to show very positive results, control mechanisms have not yet matured to always be on top of this battle. My doctors and I are still [working to] establish the level of serenity and productivity that I yearn so much for. The therapists agree that the battle I waged that night was a solid example of the human trying to come out from behind the military leader's ethos of "My mission first, my personnel, then myself." Obviously, the venue I used last Monday night left a lot to be desired and will be the subject of a lot of work over the next while.

Dallaire remained a true believer in Canada, in peacekeeping, in human rights. The letter went on:

This nation, without any hesitation nor doubt, is capable and even expected by the less fortunate of this globe to lead the developed countries beyond self-interest, strategic advantages, and isolationism, and raise their sights to the realm of the pre-eminence of humanism and freedom ... Where humanitarianism is being destroyed and the innocent are being literally trampled into the ground ... the soldiers, sailors, and airpersons ... supported by fellow countrymen who recognize the cost in human sacrifice and in resources will forge in concert with our politicians ... a most unique and exemplary place for Canada in the league of nations, united under the United Nations Charter.

I hope this is okay.
Thanks for the opportunity.
Warmest regards, Dallaire
Samantha Power wins Pulitzer Prize

Harvard University
April 10, 2003

Kennedy School lecturer wins for "A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide"

Samantha Power, lecturer in public policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, was awarded the 2003 Pulitzer Prize in general nonfiction for her book “A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide,” which examines U.S. foreign policy toward genocide in the 20th century.

Power said that she “literally staggered” when she heard her book had won the award. “I had difficulty speaking, and anyone who knows me knows how unusual that is.”

She said that regarding the book’s subject, the timing of the award couldn’t be better. “There’s never been a more important time to think about America’s role in the world, about U.S. foreign policy, and about responsible citizenship.”
Personally, however, the award comes at a strange time. Only a few days before, she had learned of the death of Michael Kelly, Washington Post columnist and editor-at-large for The Atlantic Monthly, who was killed in a vehicle accident in Iraq. Kelly was Power’s first editor when she was working as a journalist in Bosnia.

“It’s not inevitable that this book would break out in this way, and I think a good deal of the credit goes to Mike.”

Power, who founded the Kennedy School’s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy and is now a faculty affiliate there, covered the wars in the former Yugoslavia as a reporter for US News and World Report and The Economist. In 1996 she joined the International Crisis Group as a political analyst, helping launch the organization in Bosnia.

Power’s experience in Yugoslavia and the initial reluctance of the U.S. to get involved made her wonder about our response to genocide and how it measured up to our rhetoric. She found that again and again authorities failed to act, downplaying the severity of the atrocities or pleading ignorance after it was too late. And yet within these dismal sagas, Power finds cause for hope. In addition to documenting the moral failures of those in authority, the book celebrates the efforts of individuals who persisted in speaking out against genocide, including Henry Morgenthau, U.S. ambassador to the Ottoman empire, who urged the Wilson administration to help the Armenians; Raphael Lemkin, who coined the word genocide and fought to have it declared a crime by the UN; Sen. William Proxmire, who urged the U.S. to ratify the UN’s anti-genocide convention; Peter Galbraith, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, who called for the U.S. to stop aid to Saddam Hussein after the Iraqi leader used poison gas against the Kurds in 1988.

“Congratulations to Samantha Power for winning the Pulitzer Prize,” said President Lawrence H. Summers. “‘A Problem From Hell’ exemplifies public policy research at its best – analysis of history that will make it less likely that the world will sit by for future genocides.”

“A Problem From Hell’ is a model of what research at the Carr Center should stand for.

Samantha has brought detailed analysis, a sense of historical context, and passionate moral concern to the issue of why the U.S. so often fails to stop mass atrocity. Her award honors years of scholarship and hard work, and we are all proud to have her as a colleague,” said Michael Ignatieff, director of the Carr Center and professor of the practice of human rights.

Harvard faculty members have now won 43 Pulitzer Prizes.
Nonfiction Book Review: A PROBLEM FROM HELL: America and the Age of Genocide

Publishers Weekly
February 25, 2002

A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide
By Samantha Power

Power, a former journalist for *U.S. News and World Report* and the *Economist* and now the executive director of Harvard's Carr Center for Human Rights, offers an uncompromising and disturbing examination of 20th-century acts of genocide and U.S. responses to them. In clean, unadorned prose, Power revisits the Turkish genocide directed at Armenians in 1915–1916, the Holocaust, Cambodia's Khmer Rouge, Iraqi attacks on Kurdish populations, Rwanda, and Bosnian "ethnic cleansing," and in doing so, argues that U.S. intervention has been shamefully inadequate. The emotional force of Power's argument is carried by moving, sometimes almost unbearable stories of the victims and survivors of such brutality. Her analysis of U.S. politics—what she casts as the State Department's unwritten rule that nonaction is better than action with a PR backlash; the Pentagon's unwillingness to see a moral imperative; an isolationist right; a suspicious left and a population unconcerned with distant nations—aims to show how ingrained inertia is, even as she argues that the U.S. must reevaluate the principles it applies to foreign policy choices. In the face of firsthand accounts of genocide, invocations of geopolitical considerations and studied and repeated refusals to accept the reality of genocidal campaigns simply fail to convince, she insists. But Power also sees signs that the fight against genocide has made progress. Prominent among those who made a difference are Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jew who invented the word *genocide* and who lobbied the U.N. to make genocide the subject of an international treaty, and Senator William Proxmire, who for 19 years spoke every day on the floor of the U.S. Senate to urge the U.S. to ratify the U.N. treaty inspired by Lemkin's work. This is a well-researched and powerful study that is both a history and a call to action.
A call to action / Researcher examines U.S. role in the atrocities of the 20th century

Steve Kettmann
San Francisco Chronicle
April 28, 2002

A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide
By Samantha Power

Back in July 1995, Samantha Power learned a painful lesson in the limits of good intentions, enduring the sort of numbing disappointment that has turned many others toward moral paralysis and passivity.

Power was reporting from Bosnia for the Washington Post and phoned her editor to argue for a story about the 40,000 Muslim men, women and children being encircled by hostile Serb forces in the U.N.'s so-called "safe haven" of Srebrenica. Power, like others on the scene, sensed a humanitarian disaster in the making.

As she notes in retrospect in "A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide," "A morning story in the Washington Post might shame U.S. policymakers into responding."

But the Post said no. When Srebrenica falls, then we have a story, she was told. So the U.S. government was not shamed into pushing for significant air cover to help the ragtag collection of Dutch "blue helmets" trying to protect the Bosnians. A massacre ensued, one in which many thousands -- 7,000, by Power's account -- were killed.

It is not pleasant reading, being reminded of such horrors. But there is something profoundly uplifting and even encouraging in the intellectual project that Power embarked upon as a way to come to terms with her own small role in failing to stop what could have been stopped.

Power, now executive director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, set about meticulously studying the U.S. and international responses to what she sees as the most egregious genocides of the last century. This is not a list that will appear on any "Jeopardy" program, but it ought to: the death of an estimated 1 million Armenians hounded from their homes by Turkey during World War I; the Holocaust; Pol Pot's reign of terror in Cambodia; Saddam Hussein's campaign, back when he was a U.S. ally, against...
Iraqi Kurds; the gruesome extermination of Tutsis by machete-wielding Hutus in Rwanda; and Serb atrocities in Bosnia and elsewhere.

Power's main conclusion is deceptively simple, but no less important for that: U.S. leaders have consistently avoided taking action to prevent genocide not out of any mistaken set of assumptions but rather because inaction was dictated by rational political calculus.

"One of the most important conclusions I have reached, therefore, is that the U.S. record is not one of failure," she writes in her conclusion. "It is one of success. Troubling though it is to acknowledge, U.S. officials worked the system and the system worked."

That might sound cynical to some, and maybe it is, but Power's point is to encourage imaginative, hard-working approaches that shift the terms of the debate over genocide and humanitarian intervention rather than just sitting back and hoping that politicians not known for moral courage will suddenly display that quality.

The message carries added weight, coming as it does at the end of a study that does a masterful job of conveying important, clear and faultlessly non-hysterical information and interpretation on so many dark episodes in recent human history.

Power follows two major narrative strategies here, both of which are much appreciated: she keeps it simple and straightforward, and she uses a string of memorable characters to tell the story.

Few Americans know the story of an unkempt Polish immigrant named Raphael Lemkin, but more will now: Lemkin, a Jew, not only coined the term "genocide," he devoted decades of frantic effort to lobbying the United Nations to pass its convention on genocide and for individual countries to adopt it. Lemkin, a human rights lawyer who warned about the Nazis in the '30s and lost family members to the Holocaust, lived a heroic life and laid down the framework for all subsequent efforts to crack down on crimes against humanity using international law.

Another of the admirable oddballs who emerges is Peter Galbraith, son of the famous economist, who was widely disparaged in Washington for such crimes as actually caring about human rights horrors and, apparently, not combing his hair the right way. Galbraith, as a staff member for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, traveled to Iraq and to regions where Hussein had purged the landscape of all villages where Kurds had lived. He also had the good sense to bring back a bunch of dead bees, seeking proof of Iraqi chemical weapons use,
and earned snickers from inside-the-Beltway types who would never dare venture outside the district -- or outside of conventional wisdom.

Galbraith did make a difference, as Lemkin did before him, and as Power surely does with this book. A warning is in order: This can be depressing, even haunting reading at times. Even a reviewer can find himself succumbing to the horrific, nightmarish totality of what man has inflicted on his fellow man.

But Power is bright and alert enough to cast aside cant and posturing and make the obvious point that efforts to mobilize against genocide have saved lives. The United States clearly saved lives with its Kosovo air campaign, she notes, and the general trend toward accountability highlighted by the War Crimes Tribunal at the Hague must also count as real progress.

If it's only a beginning, and far from a hedge against yet unimagined acts of genocide, that is in no way an argument against pursuing an informed, engaged, imaginative approach to contemplating this worst of all international problems. Power does not preach, and she does not pontificate. What she does, gently but insistently, is to prod.

"George Bernard Shaw once wrote 'The reasonable man adapts himself to the world,' " she writes. " 'The unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on the unreasonable man.' After a century of doing so little to prevent, suppress, and punish genocide, Americans must join and thereby legitimate the ranks of the unreasonable."
Look shocked but look away

Noel Malcolm
The Telegraph Book Review
27 July 2003

A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide
By Samantha Power

Noel Malcolm reviews 'A Problem from Hell': America and the Age of Genocide by Samantha Power

If insecticide kills insects, and infanticide means the murder of small children, what is the meaning of "genocide"? The word "genos" is Greek for "race"; so it looks as if genocide should mean exterminating an entire racial group. Many people, even without the benefit of a classical education, jump to that conclusion, and react indignantly when they hear the "g" word used to describe mere large-scale ethnic cleansing or sporadic mass murder. But they are wrong.

This is a word with a very unusual history. Unlike most words, it was deliberately invented and, soon after its invention, enshrined in law. The inventor was Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jewish intellectual who had escaped from Nazi-occupied Poland and travelled to America, where he pursued his twin passions of philology and international law. Lemkin spent much of the war trying to get the US authorities to understand the enormity of what was happening to European Jewry. He compiled a chilling dossier of Nazi decrees, which he published, with a legal commentary, in 1944. And in this book (Axis Rule in Occupied Europe) he presented, for the first time, the new word he had coined.

In such a context, the word might well have been intended to mean the extermination of an entire race. But that is not the meaning Lemkin gave it. Long before the war, he had already tried to draft a treaty outlawing the destruction of national cultures and the forcible assimilation of national groups; such offences as these were also meant to be covered by his new word, "genocide". And when his term was legally defined by the UN Genocide Convention in 1948, it covered a whole range of actions: "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group" might include, for example, "causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group".

Samantha Power paints a fascinating portrait of Lemkin in her Pulitzer Prize-winning book, A Problem from Hell. She describes the heroic (and occasionally comic) monomania of his later years, as he turned himself into a one-man international lobbying organisation in the UN, trying to get the Convention ratified by the requisite number of countries. She also tells the story of another quixotic individual, Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin, who vowed in 1967 to carry on Lemkin's campaign, and made daily speeches on the subject thereafter - 3,211 of them - until the Senate finally agreed to ratify the Genocide Convention.
Yet all this is just the curtain-raiser to the main body of this substantial and highly impressive work, which surveys the reactions of successive US governments to a series of genocides and attempted genocides in the latter part of the 20th century: first Cambodia (where ethnic and religious minorities, as well as "class enemies", were singled out for slaughter), then Iraq (the Kurds), then Bosnia, Rwanda and (arguably) Kosovo.

The question she finds herself asking, again and again, is this: why, when the concept of genocide had become prominently fixed in international law, when information about events in remote parts of the world was more available than ever before, and when the US was indisputably the most powerful state in the world, was so little done, so late, by American governments?

But this is not, it should be emphasised, a general treatise on "humanitarian intervention". Power keeps her focus firmly on the issue of genocide - the extreme case which all signatories of the Convention (and that included the US after 1988) were obliged to take action to prevent or stop. One small but significant part of the answer to her question is precisely the fact that the Genocide Convention carried with it such obligations. As a result, American officials tried desperately hard to avoid using the "g" word. Half-way through the Rwandan genocide, in which 800,000 people were murdered, a confidential US government memo warned: "Be careful. Legal at State (ie the legal adviser at the State Department) was worried about this - Genocide finding could commit the US Government to actually 'do something'."

Behind the refusal to use the word, there often lay a refusal to believe the facts. Perversely, the grossness of the grossest crimes becomes almost its own alibi: while the odd atrocity in the heat of war is believable, systematic mass-murder is so hard to comprehend that it can sound like fiction. And there are always the "useful idiots" who will do the murderers' propaganda for them on a voluntary basis: the Leftists who praised the progressive social policies of the Khmer Rouge, those (of Left and Right) who insisted that the Bosnian Muslims were merely shelling themselves, or those who denied the existence of mass graves in Kosovo.

Samantha Power analyses the reactions of American officialdom, and finds the same syndromes recurring each time. First the officials argue that any attempt to stop the killings will be futile; then they argue that it will be counter-productive. The diplomats, naturally enough, always prefer diplomacy, which means treating the murderers with respect and constantly trying to split the difference between them and their victims. The US Ambassador to Iraq in the 1980s, April Glaspie (who praised Saddam Hussein's "remarkably moderate and mollifying mode of presentation" on the subject of gassed Kurds), does not come well out of this story.

And yet, however badly the American politicians and diplomats may have performed, they are trumped again and again by the officials of the United Nations. It was the UN, not the US, that refused to request NATO air strikes against the Serb forces advancing on Srebrenica; and when that town had fallen, and 7,000 of its men and boys were being led away and machine-gunned, it was the UN Secretary General who said "No, I don't believe that this represents a failure."

Samantha Power thinks that a proper use of air power could have saved Srebrenica. She also argues, convincingly, that just a few thousand extra UN troops in Rwanda could have saved tens
of thousands of lives. But she is not making a case for automatic military intervention in all such cases. As she points out, there is a whole spectrum of measures that Western governments can take, from denunciation and trade sanctions all the way to invasion: the Rwandan radio station which whipped up the killing frenzy, for example, could have been silenced by airborne jamming.

Abstract arguments for or against "interventionism" are, in other words, arguments on a false basis. Governments act and interact in innumerable different ways; even the effective use of words can be an intervention that influences behavior. Whenever we look back at what happened in the concentration camps and the killing fields, most of us wish that we had done more - while knowing full well that we could not have done everything. The "all or nothing" argument favors, in the end, only those who preferred to do nothing.
Life Before the United Nations
Study Questions

1. What kind of moral responsibilities do you think America has in the world that Power refers to in “On a Mission to Shine a Spotlight on Genocide; Samantha Power’s Mind Leaps From Bosnia to Iraq”?
2. How old was Samantha Power when she came out of Yale and came to Bosnia?
3. Why is humanitarian intervention not always simple?
4. What are the lessons we learned in Rwanda that should guide us in taking steps in helping areas dealing with human rights issues as stated in “Remember Rwanda, but Take Action in Sudan”?
5. Why does the U.S. fear using the term “genocide”?
6. Who is Romeo Dallaire? What did he do?
7. Do you think countries around the world want and/or expect American intervention? Why or why not?
8. What do you think about American intervention in other countries?
9. Why did the UN want to withdraw from the Rwandan genocide?
10. Why do you think the U.S. intervened in Kosovo and not Rwanda?
11. When was Samantha Power awarded the Pulitzer Prize?
12. What acts of genocide does Power cover in her book A Problem From Hell?
IV. United States Ambassador to the United Nations

1. Full transcript: Remarks by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at a Security Council Session on Ukraine
2. Samantha Power: U.S. Won’t Commit to Veto of Palestinian State Resolution
3. “Are you truly incapable of shame?” Samantha Power Blasts Assad Regime, Allies
4. U.S. Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power’s Full Speech at the Security Council on Israel
5. Samantha Power’s Scathing Speech on Russia
6. In South Sudan, Mass Killings, Rapes and the Limits of U.S. Diplomacy
7. Study Questions
Full transcript: Remarks by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at a Security Council Session on Ukraine

By Foreign Staff
The Washington Post
August 28, 2014

Below is the full transcript of remarks made by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at a Security Council Session on Ukraine, August 28, 2014.

Mr. President, representatives on this Council, this is our 24th session to try to rein in Russia’s aggressive acts in Ukraine. Every single one of those sessions has sent a straight-forward, unified message: Russia, stop this conflict. Russia is not listening.

We said it when Russia flagrantly violated international law in occupying Crimea. We said it after the shocking downing of Malaysian Airlines flight 17, which took the lives of innocent men, women, children, and infants from 11 countries. And we say it today, as Russia’s soldiers, tanks, air defense, and artillery support and fight alongside separatists as they open a new front in a crisis manufactured in and fueled by Russia.

But Russia is not listening.
Instead of listening, instead of heeding the demands of the international community and the rules of the international order, at every step, Russia has come before this Council to say everything except the truth. It has manipulated. It has obfuscated. It has outright lied. So we have learned to measure Russia by its actions and not by its words.

In the last 48 hours, Russia’s actions have spoken volumes.

On August 26 – just this Tuesday – after meeting with Ukrainian President Poroshenko in Minsk, Belarus, President Putin spoke of the need to quote “end bloodshed as soon as possible.” End quote. Yet the same day, satellite imagery show(s) Russian combat units – combat units – southeast of Donetsk, in eastern Ukraine. That same day in Luhansk, Ukraine detained regular Russian Army personnel from the 9th brigade.

In response, Russia claimed the soldiers had wandered into Ukrainian territory “by mistake.” This, supposedly, in a time of conflict along one of the most carefully watched borders in the world.

The day after those talks, Russia fired Grad rockets from inside Russia at Ukrainian positions in Novoazovsk, and then attacked with two columns of Russian armored vehicles and tanks. Russian armored vehicles and Uragan multiple rocket launchers are positioned on the outskirts of that town as we speak.

Russia’s force along the border is the largest it has been since it began redeploying forces there in late May, and includes significant numbers of combat aircraft and helicopters. Russian unmanned aircraft routinely cross into Ukrainian airspace.

Other Russian deployments into Ukrainian territory include advanced artillery and air defense systems not found in the Ukrainian inventory. These artillery systems have shelled Ukrainian positions outside Luhansk City in conjunction with the recent separatist counteroffensive.

One of the separatist leaders that Russia has armed and backed said openly that three or four thousand Russian soldiers have joined their cause. He was quick to clarify that these soldiers were on vacation. But a Russian soldier who chooses to fight in Ukraine on his summer break is still a Russian soldier. And the armored Russian military vehicle he drives there is not his personal car.

Meanwhile, in Russia, family members of Russian soldiers are holding funerals for their loved ones who have been killed in the fighting in Ukraine. They’re demanding answers for how they were killed. Journalists who try to cover these funerals are harassed and threatened by armed men. Yet, still, according to the Russian government, the soldiers were never there. They were never in Crimea either, until Russia announced that those soldiers who were never there had annexed Crimea.

The last 48 hours fit into a well-established pattern for Russia. Each step has paved the way for the one that followed. And yet in spite of all of these outrageous actions, Ukraine has repeatedly sought a political solution to this crisis. It has repeatedly sought a path to de-escalation. Despite
this pattern, President Poroshenko showed up in Minsk to meet with President Putin. In contrast, President Putin was still unwilling to acknowledge the most basic facts we all know: that Russia has armed, equipped, and now joined illegal separatists fighting in Ukraine. Serious negotiations are needed, urgently needed. But Russia has to stop lying and has to stop fueling this conflict.

The mask is coming off. In these acts – these recent acts – we see Russia’s actions for what they are: a deliberate effort to support, and now fight alongside, illegal separatists in another sovereign country.

Now, Russia has claimed that Ukraine is not interested in a ceasefire, but let’s be clear: we have every interest in a ceasefire, as do the Ukrainians, as long as it is a real one. But Russian separatists not only have no interest in observing a ceasefire, but they cynically use the time to rearm and wait for additional soldiers and supplies to flow across the border from Russia.

In the face of these deeply alarming actions, the most important question for us now is not what we should say to Russia. The most important question is what we should do to make Russia listen.

The United States has, throughout this crisis, and in close coordination with our European partners, the EU and the G7, exerted targeted, effective pressure so that this message is heard, so that Russia begins to de-escalate, rather than escalate, so that the reasonable peace plan put forward by President Poroshenko is adopted and implemented. And in the face of Russia’s continued aggression and blatant disregard for the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, we will continue to work closely with our G7 and European partners to ratchet up the consequences on Russia.

Now, I understand that there are real costs felt by citizens of countries when their governments take these actions. It has costs for businesses that trade with Russia and sell to Russian markets, from small-scale farmers to big factories. Those costs are considerable, and nobody should take them lightly.

But let’s be clear: if unchecked, the damage that Russia’s blatant disregard for the international order poses is much, much greater. These rules and principles that have taken generations to build, with unparalleled investment – countless lives have been lost to establish and defend these principles. And every single one of us has a stake in defending them. A threat to the order – the international order – is a threat to all of our peace and security.

These are the rules that Russia is flouting when it illegally seizes territory and arms, equips, and fights alongside illegal groups in neighboring countries.

Ukraine is one of roughly a dozen countries that share a border with Russia. Let me close with a couple questions: How can we tell those countries that border Russia that their peace and sovereignty is guaranteed if we do not make our message heard on Ukraine? Why should they believe it will be different if tomorrow, President Putin decides to start supporting armed separatists and allowing soldiers “on vacation” to fight in their countries? And, just as important, what message are we sending to other countries with similarly alarming ambitions around the
world, when we let Russia violate these rules without sufficient consequences? In the face of this threat, the cost of inaction is unacceptable.

Thank you.
Samantha Power: US Won't Commit to Veto of Palestinian State Resolution

By Teresa Welsh
U.S. News & World Report
June 16, 2015

Comments by the U.S. ambassador to the U.N. had some lawmakers questioning the Obama administration's commitment to Israel.

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power during a hearing of the House Foreign Relations Committee on Wednesday on Capitol Hill. Brendan Smialowski/AFP/Getty Images

The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations on Tuesday refused to categorically say if the U.S. would veto a potential Security Council resolution calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state, prompting concern from congressional lawmakers over the Obama administration’s continuing commitment to Israel.
Asked directly during a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing whether the U.S. would exercise its veto power to turn back such a resolution, Samantha Power was noncommittal.

"I really am going to resist making blanket declarations on hypothetical resolutions. Our position, again, I think has been very clear for some time," Power said, when pressed on the issue. "I have said, again, we would oppose anything that was designed to punish Israel or undermine Israel's security. But I think, again, it's perilous. There's no resolution in front of us."

The lack of a firm answer prompted concern from several members of the committee from both sides of the aisle amid a rocky relationship between President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The two leaders have publicly disagreed regarding how to approach a peace process and ongoing nuclear negotiations with Iran, which Netanyahu vehemently opposes.

Obama said in a recent interview with an Israeli television station the U.S. will have to re-evaluate "how we approach defending Israel on the international stage around the Palestinian issue."

"I understand that this re-evaluation will not affect our security relationship with Israel. The president made that clear," said Rep. Eliot Engel of New York, the ranking Democrat on the committee. "But, frankly, those remarks are troubling. Re-evaluating the way we defend Israel on the international stage could have ominous consequences, and it is obviously very concerning for those of us that seek to strengthen the U.S.-Israel relationship."

The U.S. is a steadfast ally of Israel's, but questions continue from both Democrats and Republicans as well as diplomats regarding the Obama administration's support.

Former Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Michael Oren wrote in a Wall Street Journal op-ed on Tuesday that Obama has made mistakes in the Israeli-U.S. relationship "deliberately" and that he was responsible for abandoning two core principles of the alliance: no public disagreements and no surprises.

"The past six years have seen successive crises in U.S.-Israeli relations, and there is a need to set the record straight. But the greater need is to ensure a future of minimal mistakes and prevent further erosion of our vital alliance," Oren wrote. "Israel has no alternative to America as a source of security aid, diplomatic backing and overwhelming popular support. The U.S. has no substitute for the state that, though small, remains democratic, militarily and technologically robust, strategically located and unreservedly pro-American."

Power's remarks come amid renewed international frustration even from staunch U.S. allies with the lack of progress in the decades-old peace process. France and Great Britain as recently as April urged the Security Council to establish a framework for an agreement.

The ambassador on Tuesday emphasized that the U.S. has regularly supported and protected Israel from actions in the U.N. In December, the U.S. rallied support in the Security Council against what Power called a "deeply unbalanced" resolution introduced by Jordan that would have imposed a timeline on an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement and required Israeli
withdrawal from occupied territories. U.S. officials ensured that supporters of the resolution would fall short in a Security Council vote, sparing Power from having to exercise America's veto.

Grant Rumley, research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, says Power's comments are "a departure point [from past U.S. policy], but it’s not a recent departure point." He says the U.S. has indicated it would allow the French to bring forward a similar resolution to the one that failed last year.

"Her comments today are further reinforcing this notion that whenever that resolution gets to the Security Council – if nothing changes between then – the U.S. is probably not going to veto," Rumley says.

The U.S. in May also blocked a resolution at the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that would have required Israel to rid itself of its nuclear stockpile due to a ban on such arms in the Middle East.

"The United States and the Obama administration have consistently opposed the delegitimation of Israel. We've also consistently pushed for legitimation of Israel across the U.N. system," Power said Tuesday. "We uniformly oppose one-sided actions designed to punish Israel and we will continue to do so. I want to be very clear. In most cases, in many cases at least, we are actually able to build coalitions and prevent things from coming up to a vote."

Despite these assurances, Power said "now is a moment in which it's not exactly clear how progress towards two-state solution is likely to be made."

Rep. Ed Royce, R-Calif., chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said the U.S. must support negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians rather than supporting Palestinian efforts to dictate the conditions of peace through the U.N.

"The reason so many members brought the issue up, including me in my opening statement, was for us to make this point to the administration," Royce tells U.S. News. "We think it's important that this issue be resolved between Israel and the Palestinian people and that the United Nations, given its bias against Israel – it’s very problematic … to have that become a platform for trying to reach a peaceful agreement."
“Are you truly incapable of shame?” Samantha Power Blasts Assad Regime, Allies

By Lauren Said-Moorhouse
CNN
December 14, 2016

(CNN) Samantha Power, the United States ambassador to the United Nations, unleashed a scathing attack on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his allies on Tuesday.

Power slammed her Syrian, Iranian and Russian counterparts for the humanitarian crisis unfolding in Aleppo, in a speech at a UN Security Council Emergency Briefing on Syria.

"To the Assad regime, Russia, and Iran -- three Member States behind the conquest of and carnage in Aleppo -- you bear responsibility for these atrocities. By rejecting UN-ICRC evacuation efforts, you are signaling to those militia who are massacring innocents to keep doing what they are doing," Power said.

"Denying or obfuscating the facts, as you will do today -- saying up is down, black is white -- will not absolve you. When one day there is a full accounting of the horrors committed in this assault of Aleppo -- and that day will come, sooner or later -- you will not be able to say you did not know what was happening. You will not be able to say you were not involved. We all know what is happening. And we all know you are involved.

"Aleppo will join the ranks of those events in world history that define modern evil, that stain our conscience decades later. Halabja, Rwanda, Srebrenica, and, now, Aleppo."
"To the Assad regime, Russia, and Iran, your forces and proxies are carrying out these crimes. Your barrel bombs and mortars and airstrikes have allowed the militia in Aleppo to encircle tens of thousands of civilians in your ever-tightening noose. It is your noose. Three Member States of the UN contributing to a noose around civilians.

"Are you truly incapable of shame? Is there literally nothing that can shame you? Is there no act of barbarism against civilians, no execution of a child that gets under your skin?"

Vitaly Churkin, Russia's ambassador to the UN, responded by accusing Power of acting like "Mother Teresa" despite America's "track record" in the Middle East.

"I wouldn't want to remind this Western trio [France, US, UK] which called for today's meeting and carried it out in a raised voice, about your role in the creation of ISIS as a result of US and UK intervention in Iraq," Churkin said.

"I don't want to remind these three countries about their role in unwinding the Syrian crisis, which led to such difficult consequences, and let terrorists spread in Syria and Iraq.

"The weirdest speech to me was the one by the US representative which built her statement as if she is Mother Teresa herself. Please, remember which country you represent. Please, remember the track record of your country."

In recent days Syrian regime forces have undertaken a final bloody push to reclaim Aleppo from rebel forces, which have held the city for the last four years. But as the fighting has intensified, multiple reports have emerged accusing pro-government forces of carrying out mass executions.

The Syrian government has not commented on the reported killings, which include executions of women and children in formerly rebel-held areas, in state-run media.

CNN has not been able to independently verify reports of executions.

The UN Security Council meeting came as a Turkey-brokered ceasefire between government troops, regime-aligned militia and rebel forces in Aleppo was announced on Tuesday.

But activists said Wednesday that the ceasefire had already failed with shelling resuming on several rebel-held neighborhoods.

Additionally, a planned civilian evacuation from bombarded areas of eastern Aleppo has been stalled, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.
The full text of Samantha Power's address to the Security Council concerning the resolution against Israeli settlements.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Let me begin with a quote: “The United States will not support the use of any additional land for the purpose of settlements during the transitional period. Indeed, the immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks. Further settlement activity is in no way necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated.”
This was said in 1982 by President Ronald Reagan. He was speaking about a new proposal that he was launching to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While ultimately, of course, President Reagan’s proposal was not realized, his words are still illuminating in at least two respects.

First, because they underscore the United States’ deep and long-standing commitment to achieving a comprehensive and lasting peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. That has been the policy of every administration, Republican and Democrat, since before President Reagan and all the way through to the present day.

Second, because President Reagan’s words highlight the United States’ long-standing position that Israeli settlement activity in territories occupied in 1967 undermines Israel’s security, harms the viability of a negotiated two-state outcome, and erodes prospects for peace and stability in the region. Today, the Security Council reaffirmed its established consensus that settlements have no legal validity. The United States has been sending the message that the settlements must stop – privately and publicly – for nearly five decades, through the administrations of Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and now Barack Obama. Indeed, since 1967, the only president who had not had at least one Israeli-Palestinian-related Security Council resolution pass during his tenure is Barack Obama. So our vote today is fully in line with the bipartisan history of how American Presidents have approached both the issue – and the role of this body.

Given the consistency of this position across U.S. administrations, one would think that it would be a routine vote for the U.S. to allow the passage of a resolution with the elements in this one, reaffirming the long-standing U.S. position on settlements, condemning violence and incitement, and calling for the parties to start taking constructive steps to reverse current trends on the ground. These are familiar, well-articulated components of U.S. policy.

But in reality this vote for us was not straightforward, because of where it is taking place – at the United Nations. For the simple truth is that for as long as Israel has been a member of this institution, Israel has been treated differently from other nations at the United Nations. And not only in decades past – such as in the infamous resolution that the General Assembly adopted in 1975, with the support of the majority of Member States, officially determining that, “Zionism is a form of racism” – but also in 2016, this year. One need only look at the 18 resolutions against Israel adopted during the UN General Assembly in September; or the 12 Israel-specific resolutions adopted this year in the Human Rights Council – more than those focused on Syria, North Korea, Iran, and South Sudan put together – to see that in 2016 Israel continues to be treated differently from other Member States.

Like U.S. administrations before it, the Obama Administration has worked tirelessly to fight for Israel’s right simply to be treated just like any other country – from advocating for Israel to
finally be granted membership to a UN regional body, something no other UN Member State had been denied; to fighting to ensure that Israeli NGOs are not denied UN accreditation, simply because they are Israeli, to getting Yom Kippur finally recognized as a UN holiday; to pressing this Council to break its indefensible silence in response to terrorist attacks on Israelis. As the United States has said repeatedly, such unequal treatment not only hurts Israel, it undermines the legitimacy of the United Nations itself.

The practice of treating Israel differently at the UN matters for votes like this one. For even if one believes that the resolution proposed today is justified – or, even more, necessitated – by events on the ground, one cannot completely separate the vote from the venue.

And Member States that say they are for the two-state solution must ask themselves some difficult questions. For those states that are quick to promote resolutions condemning Israel, but refuse to recognize when innocent Israelis are the victims of terrorism – what steps will you take to stop treating Israel differently? For those states that passionately denounce the closures of crossings in Gaza as exacerbating the humanitarian situation, but saying nothing of the resources diverted from helping Gaza’s residents to dig tunnels into Israeli territory so that terrorists can attack Israelis in their homes – what will you do to end the double-standard that undermines the legitimacy of this institution?

Member States should also ask themselves about the double standards when it comes to this Council taking action. Just this morning we came together, as a Council, and we were unable to muster the will to act to stop the flow of weapons going to killers in South Sudan, who are perpetrating mass atrocities that the UN has said could lead to genocide. We couldn’t come together just to stem the flow of arms. Earlier this month, this Council could not muster the will to adopt the simplest of resolutions calling for a seven-day pause in the savage bombardment of innocent civilians, hospitals, and schools in Aleppo. Yet when a resolution on Israel comes before this Council, members suddenly summon the will to act.

It is because this forum too often continues to be biased against Israel; because there are important issues that are not sufficiently addressed in this resolution; and because the United States does not agree with every word in this text, that the United States did not vote in favor of the resolution. But it is because this resolution reflects the facts on the ground – and is consistent with U.S. policy across Republican and Democratic administration throughout the history of the State of Israel – that the United States did not veto it.

The United States has consistently said we would block any resolution that we thought would undermine Israel’s security or seek to impose a resolution to the conflict. We would not have let this resolution pass had it not also addressed counterproductive actions by the Palestinians such
as terrorism and incitement to violence, which we’ve repeatedly condemned and repeatedly raised with the Palestinian leadership, and which, of course, must be stopped. Unlike some on the UN Security Council, we do not believe that outside parties can impose a solution that has not been negotiated by the two parties. Nor can we unilaterally recognize a future Palestinian state. But it is precisely our commitment to Israel’s security that makes the United States believe that we cannot stand in the way of this resolution as we seek to preserve a chance of attaining our long-standing objective: two states living side-by-side in peace and security. Let me briefly explain why.

The settlement problem has gotten so much worse that it is now putting at risk the very viability of that two-state solution. The number of settlers in the roughly 150 authorized Israeli settlements east of the 1967 lines has increased dramatically. Since the 1993 signing of the Oslo Accords – which launched efforts that made a comprehensive and lasting peace possible – the number of settlers has increased by 355,000. The total settler population in the West Bank and East Jerusalem now exceeds 590,000. Nearly 90,000 settlers are living east of the separation barrier that was created by Israel itself. And just since July 2016 – when the Middle East Quartet issued a report highlighting international concern about a systematic process of land seizures, settlement expansions, and legalizations – Israel has advanced plans for more than 2,600 new settlement units. Yet rather than dismantling these and other settler outposts, which are illegal even under Israeli law, now there is new legislation advancing in the Israeli Knesset that would legalize most of the outposts – a factor that propelled the decision by this resolution’s sponsors to bring it before the Council.

The Israeli Prime Minister recently described his government as “more committed to settlements than any in Israel’s history,” and one of his leading coalition partners recently declared that “the era of the two-state solution is over.” At the same time, the Prime Minister has said that he is still committed to pursuing a two-state solution. But these statements are irreconcilable. One cannot simultaneously champion expanding Israeli settlements and champion a viable two-state solution that would end the conflict. One has to make a choice between settlements and separation.

In 2011, the United States vetoed a resolution that focused exclusively on settlements, as if settlements were they only factor harming the prospects of a two-state solution. The circumstances have changed dramatically. Since 2011, settlement growth has only accelerated. Since 2011, multiple efforts to pursue peace through negotiations have failed. And since 2011, President Obama and Secretary Kerry have repeatedly warned – publically and privately – that the absence of progress toward peace and continued settlement expansion was going to put the two-state solution at risk, and threaten Israel’s stated objective to remain both a Jewish State and a democracy. Moreover, unlike in 2011, this resolution condemns violence, terrorism and incitement, which also poses an extremely grave risk to the two-state solution. This resolution
reflects trends that will permanently destroy the hope of a two-state solution if they continue on their current course.

The United States has not taken the step of voting in support of this resolution because the resolution is too narrowly focused on settlements, when we all know – or we all should know – that many other factors contribute significantly to the tensions that perpetuate this conflict. Let us be clear: even if every single settlement were to be dismantled tomorrow, peace still would not be attainable without both sides acknowledging uncomfortable truths and making difficult choices. That is an indisputable fact. Yet it is one that is too often overlooked by members of the United Nations and by members of this Council.

For Palestinian leaders, that means recognizing the obvious: that in addition to taking innocent lives – the incitement to violence, the glorification of terrorists, and the growth of violent extremism erodes prospects for peace, as this resolution makes crystal clear. The most recent wave of Palestinian violence has seen terrorists commit hundreds of attacks – including driving cars into crowds of innocent civilians and stabbing mothers in front of their children. Yet rather than condemn these attacks, Hamas, other radical factions, and even certain members of Fatah have held up the terrorists as heroes, and used social media to incite others to follow in their murderous footsteps. And while President Abbas and his party’s leaders have made clear their opposition to violence, terrorism, and extremism, they have too often failed to condemn specific attacks or condemn the praised heaped upon the perpetrators.

Our vote today does not in any way diminish the United States’ steadfast and unparalleled commitment to the security of Israel, the only democracy in the Middle East. We would not have let this resolution pass had it not also addressed counterproductive actions by Palestinians. We have to recognize that Israel faces very serious threats in a very tough neighborhood. Israelis are rightfully concerned about making sure there is not a new terrorist haven next door. President Obama and this administration have shown an unprecedented commitment to Israel’s security because that is what we believe in.

Our commitment to that security has never wavered, and it never will. Even with a financial crisis and budget deficits, we’ve repeatedly increased funding to support Israel’s military. And in September, the Obama administration signed a Memorandum of Understanding to provide $38 billion in security assistance to Israel over the next 10 years – the largest single pledge of military assistance in U.S. history to any country. And as the Israeli Prime Minister himself has noted, our military and intelligence cooperation is unprecedented. We believe, though, that continued settlement building seriously undermines Israel’s security.

Some may cast the U.S. vote as a sign that we have finally given up on a two-state solution. Nothing could be further from the truth. None of us can give up on a two-state solution. We
continue to believe that that solution is the only viable path to provide peace and security for the state of Israel, and freedom and dignity for the Palestinian people. And we continue to believe that the parties can still pursue this path, if both sides are honest about the choices, and have the courage to take steps that will be politically difficult. While we can encourage them, it is ultimately up to the parties to choose this path, as it always has been. We sincerely hope that they will begin making these choices before it is too late.

I thank you.
Samantha Power's Scathing Speech on Russia

By Sarah Begley
TIME
January 17, 2017

U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Samantha Power gave her final major speech of her tenure on Tuesday, addressing the Atlantic Council in remarks that eschewed softball subjects in favor of what she described as “a major threat facing our great nation: Russia.”

Power has not hesitated to get tough on Russia in recent months. Commenting on the tragedy in Aleppo in December, she said, “To the Assad regime, Russia, and Iran — three Member States behind the conquest of and carnage in Aleppo — you bear responsibility for these atrocities … Are you truly incapable of shame? Is there literally nothing that can shame you? Is there no act of barbarism against civilians, no execution of a child that gets under your skin?”

Her remarks on Tuesday touched again on Syria, and also addressed Russia’s efforts to “interfere in our presidential election, with the goals of undermining public faith in the U.S. democratic process.”

Read the full remarks here

Thank you. I’ve had the privilege of serving in the Obama administration for eight years. First in the White House, and for the last three and a half years, as the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. I’ve never had a more meaningful job. Now I have just three days left.

This is my last major speech as a member of this Administration. And much as I would have liked to use it to urge others to go into public service, or to make the pragmatic case for
strengthening the United Nations – I feel that the circumstances require me to focus on a much more immediate subject, a major threat facing our great nation: Russia.

Before getting to the core threat posed by Russia, I want to stress that some of the most rewarding and impactful work I have done at the UN has come in the times when my Russian counterpart and I have been able to cooperate. Back in 2013, together we negotiated a resolution to get the most dangerous chemical weapons out of Syria. Russia was a key pillar in imposing sanctions on Iran for its illicit nuclear program – sanctions that were essential to bringing Iran to the table, so we could forge an agreement that cut off Iran’s pathways to a nuclear bomb. And Russia worked constructively with the rest of the Security Council to select the best candidate for a new UN Secretary-General – a leader with tremendous experience and vision.

While people tend to look to the Cold War as the paradigm for understanding the nature of U.S.-Russia relations, the reality is that for pivotal parts of our shared history, U.S. and Russian interests have frequently aligned. We fought together in both of the 20th century’s world wars. Indeed, had it not been for the colossal sacrifices made by the Soviet Union in World War Two – in which they lost more than 20 million people, many times more than any other nation, friend or foe – the war would have dragged on much longer, millions more Americans and people of other Allied countries would likely have lost their lives, and fascism may well have prevailed in large parts of the world. Not to mention that the post-World War Two order may never have been built. Russia’s immense contribution in that war is part of their proud history of standing up to imperialist powers, from the Mongols in the 16th century to Napoleon in the 19th century. In addition, many of the challenges that Russia faces today – from violent extremism and China’s territorial expansionist aims, to national industries and jobs that have been rendered obsolete by globalization – are ones we also face here in the United States. So it is very much in our interest to try to solve problems with Russia. Dialogue between us is absolutely imperative.

Having said that, anyone who has seen my debates in the UN Security Council with Russia knows that I and my government have long had serious concerns about its government’s aggressive and destabilizing actions. The argument I want to make today goes beyond any particular action Russia has taken to its broader strategy, and what that means for the security of the United States.

Today, I will set out how the Russian Government under President Putin is taking steps that are weakening the rules-based order that we have benefitted from for seven decades. Our values, our security, our prosperity, and our very way of life are tied to this order. And we – and by we, I mean the United States and our closest partners – must come together to prevent Russia from succeeding.

This means better understanding and educating our public about how Russia is challenging this order. This means reaffirming our commitment to the rules and institutions that have long undergirded this order, as well as developing new tools to counter the tactics Russia is using to undermine it. And this means addressing the vulnerabilities within our democracy that Russia’s attacks have exposed and exacerbated. To do this, we cannot let Russia divide us. If we confront this threat together, we will adapt and strengthen the order on which our interests depend.

Terms like “international order” can seem pretty abstract, so let me be concrete about what is threatened by Russia’s actions. The order enshrined in the UN Charter and other key
international agreements in the aftermath of the Second World War was built on the understanding that all our nations would be more secure if we bound ourselves to a set of rules. These included the rule that the borders between sovereign states should be respected. That even in times of war, some weapons and tactics should never be used. That while forms of government might vary from one nation to another, certain human rights were inalienable and necessary to check state power. And that the nations that break these rules should be held accountable.

Now, as we all know, a lot has changed in the seven decades since that order was created. When the United Nations was founded, there were just 51 member states, a fraction of today’s 193; some great contemporary powers were not yet independent nations; and many countries that did exist did not have a say, much less an equal voice, in developing its rules. In addition, some of the threats we face today, such as violent terrorist groups and cyber-attacks, would have been unimaginable to the architects of that system. So there are many reasons why the rules-based order conceived in 1945 is not perfectly tailored to the challenges that we as an international community face in 2017. And it is reasonable to think that we need to update those rules, with more voices at the table, some of which we will not agree with. Yet evolve as the system may, the vast majority of countries recognize that we all benefit from having rules of the road that constrain certain kinds of behavior to enhance our shared security – rules that must not be rewritten by force.

Now, I acknowledge there are times when actions the United States takes in the interest of defending our security and that of our allies can be seen by other nations as offensive moves that threaten their security, and we need to be alert to this, which is why dialogue is so important. And some may argue – not unfairly – that our government has not always lived up to the rules we invoke. As President Obama made clear when he entered office, while the United States strives to lead by example, there are still times when we have fallen short. Yet, under President Obama’s leadership, we have shown our commitment to investing in and abiding by the rules-based international order. The same cannot be said for the Russian Government today.

For years, we have seen Russia take one aggressive and destabilizing action after another.

We saw it in March 2014 – not long after mass peaceful protests in Ukraine brought to power a government that favored closer ties with Europe – when Russia dispatched its soldiers to the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea. The “little green men,” as they came to be called – for Russia denied any ties to them – rammed through a referendum at the barrel of a gun, which Mr. Putin then used to justify his sham annexation of Crimea.

We saw it months later in eastern Ukraine, where Russia armed, trained, and fought alongside separatists. Again, Russia denied any role in the conflict it manufactured, again flouting the international obligation to respect the territorial integrity of its neighbor.
We saw it also in Russia’s support for Bashar al-Assad’s brutal war in Syria – support it maintained, even as the Assad regime blocked food and medicine from reaching civilians in opposition-held areas – civilians who were so desperate that they had resorted to eating leaves. Even as photographs emerged of countless prisoners who had been tortured to death in Assad’s prisons – their bodies tagged with serial numbers. Even as the Assad regime repeatedly used chemical weapons to kill its own people.

We saw it in 2015, when Russia went further by joining the assault on the Syrian people, deploying its own troops and planes in a campaign that hit hospitals, schools, and the brave Syrian first-responders who were trying to dig innocent civilians out of the rubble. And with each transgression, not only were more innocent civilians killed, maimed, starved, and uprooted, but the rules that make all our nations more secure – including Russia – were eroded.

We saw it in Russia’s efforts to undercut the credibility of international institutions like the UN. For example, in an emergency UN Security Council meeting last month, then-Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon told the member states that the Assad regime forces and Iranian militias were reportedly disappearing men as they took parts of eastern Aleppo. In response, the representative of Russia – which was providing air cover for the offensive – not only claimed that Russian investigations had uncovered “not a single report of ill treatment or violations of international humanitarian law against civilians of eastern Aleppo,” but also accused the Secretary-General of basing his information on “fake news.” Minutes later, Syria’s representative echoed Russia’s line, holding up as proof what he claimed was a photograph of a Syrian government soldier helping an elderly woman. The only problem was that the photo was taken six months earlier, in June 2016. In Fallujah, Iraq.

In this same period, we also saw Russia’s systematic efforts to sow doubt and division in democracies, and drive a wedge between the United States and our closest allies. Russia has done this by supporting illiberal parties like France’s National Front, which has a xenophobic, anti-Muslim platform. When the National Front was having trouble raising funds for its 2014 campaign, a Russian bank with ties to the Kremlin stepped in to loan the party more than $11 million. While that may seem like a small amount compared to the budgets of U.S. national campaigns, it was roughly a third of what the party was aiming to raise, and the National Front made significant gains in that election. With national elections coming up in France this year, the National Front has said that it is looking again to Russian financing for help. Little surprise that the party’s leader has repeatedly attempted to legitimize Russia’s attempted land grab of Crimea.

Russia has also used hacking to sow distrust in the democratic processes of some of our closest allies, and undermine the policies of their governments. Consider the case of Germany. According to German intelligence agencies, groups linked to the Russian government carried out a massive May 2015 attack targeting the German Parliament, energy companies, telecoms, and even universities. And just last month, Germany’s domestic intelligence agency reported an alarming spike in “aggressive and increased cyber-spying and cyber-operations that could potentially endanger German government officials, members of parliament, and employees of democratic parties,” which the agency attributed to Russian hackers. The head of Germany’s foreign intelligence service said the perpetrators’ aim is “delegitimizing the democratic process.”

In other instances, Russia’s interference in democratically elected governments has been far more direct. Late last year, officials in Montenegro said they uncovered a plot to violently
disrupt the country’s elections, topple the government, install a new administration loyal to Moscow, and perhaps even assassinate the Prime Minister. Montenegro’s Prime Minister had been pushing for the country to join NATO, a move Russia openly opposed. The plotters reportedly told investigators that they had been funded and equipped by Russian officials, who had also helped plan the attack.

It is in this context that one must view the Russian Government’s latest efforts to interfere in America’s democracy.

As our intelligence community found, we know that the Russian government sought to interfere in our presidential election, with the goals of undermining public faith in the U.S. democratic process, denigrating one candidate, and helping the other candidate. Our intelligence agencies assess that the campaign was ordered by President Putin, and implemented by a combination of Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and government-paid trolls. We know that, in addition to hacking the Democratic National Committee and senior Democratic Party officials, Russia also hacked U.S. think tanks and lobbying groups. And we know Russia hacked elements of multiple state and local electoral boards, although our intelligence community’s assessment is that Russia did not compromise vote tallies. But think for just a moment about what that means: Russia not only tried to influence our election, but to access the very systems by which we vote.

At first glance these interventions by Russia in different parts of the world can appear unrelated. That is because the common thread running through them cannot be found in anything that Russia is for – but rather in what Russia is against. Not in the rules it follows, but in the ones it breaks. Russia’s actions are not standing up a new world order. They are tearing down the one that exists. This is what we are fighting against – having defeated the forces of fascism and communism, we now confront the forces of authoritarianism and nihilism.

There are multiple theories as to why the Russian Government would undermine a system that it played a crucial role in helping build, and that has fostered unparalleled advances in human liberty and development. Perhaps it is to distract the Russian people from the rampant corruption that has consumed so much of the wealth produced by the nation’s oil and gas, preventing it from benefitting average citizens. Perhaps it is because our rules-based order rests on principles – such as accountability and the rule of law – that are at odds with Russia’s style of governing. Perhaps it is to regain a sense of its past glory, or to get back at the countries that it blames for the break-up of the Soviet Union, which President Putin has called the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century.”

It is not my aim today to speculate on which, if any, of these motives lies behind the Russian Government’s actions, which not only threaten our democracy, but the entire order upon which our security and prosperity depends. It is instead to ask: What are we going to do to address this threat?

First, we must continue to work in a bipartisan fashion to determine the full extent of Russia’s interference in our recent elections, identify the vulnerabilities of our democratic system, and come up with targeted recommendations for preventing future attacks. The Congressional hearings initiated last week, the bipartisan inquiry announced on January 13 by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Joint Analysis Report on Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and
Harassment, and the Joint Intelligence Report prepared at the request of President Obama, are all important steps toward achieving these crucial objectives.

The purpose of such efforts is not to challenge the outcome of any races in our recent election. The purpose is to identify the gaps in our defenses that Russia exploited – as well as other gaps that may not have been seized upon in this attack, but that Russia or others could take advantage of in the future. And the purpose is to determine the steps needed to close such gaps and strengthen the resilience of our system. Because it would be deeply naïve – even negligent – to think that those who have discovered vulnerabilities in our system would not try to exploit them again and again. And not just Russia, but all the governments and non-State actors who see undermining our democracy as a way to advance their interests. Indeed, it already has happened repeatedly – as we know, there were also hacks in our presidential elections in 2008 and 2012.

That these efforts be bipartisan is absolutely essential. Allowing politics to get in the way of determining the full extent of Russia’s meddling and how best to protect our democracy would undermine our core national security interests. It is healthy for our parties to debate issues such as how to expand our middle class or what role our nation should play in the world. What is not healthy is for a party or its leaders to cast doubt on a unanimous, well-documented assessment of our intelligence community that a foreign government is seeking to harm our country.

Second, we have to do a better job of informing our citizens about the seriousness of the threat the Russian Government poses. Here too, our unity is crucial. When we send conflicting messages about a threat Russia poses, it sends a mixed message to the American people. A recent poll found that 37 percent of Republicans hold a favorable view of President Putin, up from just 10 percent in July 2014. That is an alarmingly high proportion for a leader that has had journalists, human rights activists, and opposition politicians murdered, ridiculed our constitutional safeguards, and tried to tip the scales in our elections. I know some have said that this focus on Russia is simply the party that lost the recent presidential election being “sore losers,” but it should worry every American that a foreign government interfered in our democratic process. It’s not about the leader we chose – it’s about who gets to choose that leader. That privilege should belong only to Americans.

We must also forcefully reject the false equivalency between the work that the U.S. Government and the Russian Government are doing in other countries. There is a world of difference between supporting free and fair elections, and investing in independent institutions that advance human rights, accountability, and transparency – as we do; and trying to sow distrust in democratic processes, misinform citizens, and swing elections toward illiberal parties, as Russia is doing.

Third, we must reassure our allies that we have their backs, and ensure that Russia pays a price for breaking the rules.

That means maintaining our robust support for NATO, and make clear our nation’s steadfast commitment to treat an attack on any NATO member as an attack on us all. We expect all our NATO allies to do their part in keeping the Alliance strong, which includes meeting the pledge made in 2014 to spend at least two percent of their GDP on defense – a commitment we in the Obama Administration have pushed relentlessly for them to fulfill. We also need to increase cooperation and intelligence sharing to deter, detect, and defend against the next generation of
hacks and cyber threats, particularly as France, Germany, and the Netherlands look forward to national elections this year.

That also means maintaining the sanctions placed on Russia, including those imposed by President Obama in response to Russia’s meddling in our election. Now, some have argued that the most effective way to get Russia to start playing by the rules that undergird the international order is actually by easing sanctions. If only we reduce the pressure, they claim, Russia will stop lashing out against the international order. But they have it backwards: easing punitive measures on the Russian Government when they haven’t changed their behavior will only embolden Russia – sending the message that the best way to gain international acceptance of its destabilizing actions is simply to wait us out. And that will not only encourage more dangerous actions by Russia, but also by other rule-breakers like Iran and North Korea, which are constantly testing how far they can move the line without triggering a response.

Similarly flawed is the argument that the United States should put recent transgressions aside and announce another “reset” with Russia. Yes, the Obama Administration tried this approach in our first term. But 2017 is not 2009. In 2009, Dimitri Medvedev was president of Russia, and we were able to find common ground on issues such as counterterrorism, arms control, and the war in Afghanistan. More important, in 2009, Russia was not occupying Crimea, fueling an ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, and bombing hospitals and first responders in Syria. Nor, most importantly, had Russia interfered directly in a U.S. election.

Yet it would be a mistake to think that all we need to do to defend ourselves and our allies against the threat Russia poses is to rely on the same tools we have been using; that if we just close the gaps in our defenses, inform our public, maintain or even ratchet up sanctions, and shore up NATO, we will be able to protect the rules-based order. Because Russia has an edge in one respect. It is easier to break institutions down than build them up. It is easier to sow skepticism than earn people’s trust. Making up fake news is easier than reporting the facts required for real news. Put simply, in international affairs in 2017, it’s often easier to be bad than good.

Let me give just one example. On September 19th, 2016, a humanitarian convoy of the Arab Red Crescent was bombed in the Syrian city of Urem al-Kubra, killing at least 10 civilians, and destroying 18 trucks filled with food and medicine intended for desperate Syrian civilians. Because the strikes were carried out in a region where only the Assad regime and its Russian allies were flying, the attack was widely reported as likely being carried out by the regime or Russian forces. Yet rather than accept any responsibility – rather than even try to get to the bottom of what had happened, the Russian Government did what it always does in the face of atrocities with which it is associated: deny and lie.
Russia’s Ministry of Defense initially said no airstrikes had been carried out in the area by Russian or Syrian planes, and that its expert analysis of video footage of the strike showed that the aid convoy had been destroyed by a fire. Then President Putin’s press secretary said that terrorists had been firing rockets nearby, suggesting they were the ones who had struck the convoy. Then Russia claimed a U.S. drone had been detected above the convoy just minutes before it was struck – contradicting its initial assessment that the convoy had not been hit from the air. Two days. Three stories. All false.

Yet Russia’s willingness to lie turned reporting on the attack into an “on the one hand, on the other hand” story, even in respected outlets like the New York Times, the BBC, and CNN. And Russian Government-controlled networks like RT played a critical role in this effort, rapidly disseminating those lies while questioning the accounts of eyewitnesses. As RT’s own editor once said, “Not having our own foreign broadcasting is the same as not having a Ministry of Defense. When there is no war, it looks like we don’t need it. However, when there is a war, it is critical.” In other words, lying is a strategic asset. It didn’t matter whether Russia’s accounts were accurate or even consistent; all that mattered was that Russia injected enough counterclaims into the news cycle to call into question who was responsible. By the time the UN issued a report on the incident more than three months later, concluding that the convoy had been struck by an airstrike that could only have been carried out by the Assad regime or Russia, the finding and Russia’s cover-up received almost no attention. Deny and lie.

At times, it can start to feel that the only way to outmaneuver an adversary unbounded by the truth is to beat them at their own game. But that would be deeply misguided. If we try to meet the Russian government in its upside-down world – where right is left and black is white – we will have helped them achieve their goal, which is creating a world where all truth is relative, and where trust in the integrity of our democratic system is lost.

We don’t need to gin up our own propaganda networks, bankroll our own army of trolls, and inundate social media platforms with even more fake news targeting our adversaries. We have to fight misinformation with information. Fiction with facts. But documenting and spreading facts – just like manufacturing fake news – takes resources. A report by the UK Parliament found that the Russian Government spent between $600 million and $1 billion a year on propaganda arms like RT. So we need to be spending at least as much – and arguably much more – on training and equipping independent reporters, protecting journalists who are under attack, and finding ways to get around the censors and firewalls that repressive governments use to block their citizens from getting access to critical voices.
This brings me to the fourth and final way to address the threat Russia poses to the rules-based international order: we must continue to seek ways to engage directly with the Russian people—and—coming back to where I started today—their government.

It can be easy to forget that virtually all the tactics the Russian Government is using to undermine democracy abroad are ones they fine-tuned on the Russian people, to devastating effect. After all, when Russian soldiers are killed fighting in a conflict in eastern Ukraine that their Government denies it has any role in—it’s Russian mothers, widows, and orphans who are denied the benefits and recognition they deserve as the family members of slain soldiers. The mafias that the Russian Government uses to sow corruption abroad profit most off the backs of the Russian people. And it is Russian journalists and human rights defenders who have been harassed, beaten, and even killed for uncovering their government’s abuses.

So we must be careful to distinguish between the Russian Government and the Russian people. We cannot let America’s relationship with a nation of more than 140 million people—people who have made remarkable contributions to the world, who have a proud, rich history and culture, and whom we fervently wish to see prosper—be defined solely by the nefarious actions of a tiny subset in their Government. And yet we have less contact with ordinary Russians than at any time in decades. This is no accident; in the past few years, the Russian Government has closed 28 U.S. Government-funded “American Corners,” which offered free libraries, language training, and events about American culture to Russian citizens, and shuttered the American Center in Moscow, which hosted over 50,000 Russian visitors per year. It has also expelled U.S. Government-supported and independent non-profits, such as the National Endowment for Democracy and the Open Society Foundation, which had spent decades fostering civil society and the rule of law in Russia. As the Kremlin closes off these outlets for reaching the Russian people, we must find others to take their place.

We also cannot give up engaging with the Russian Government. We should do this in part because collaborating on issues of shared interest will allow us to show, not just tell, what we know to be true—that our nations have a lot more to gain by working to build up a system of shared rules and principles than tear it down. And in part because by working together, we may be able to rebuild the respect and trust needed to tackle to the unprecedented global threats that we face today—many of which we cannot solve without one another’s help.

Let me conclude. In 1796, our nation’s first president, George Washington, used his Farewell Address to issue a stark warning to the American people about the danger of foreign governments trying to interfere in our democracy. He told his audience: “Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens), the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government.”

More than 220 years later, Washington’s warning feels strikingly relevant. For if anything, the vulnerabilities that Washington saw, in his words, “to tamper with domestic factions, to practice the arts of seduction, to mislead public opinion, to influence or awe the public councils,” have only multiplied with modern technology. And unlike in 1796, it is no longer enough for us simply to protect our own democracy against foreign interference; we also have to protect the integrity of the entire rules-based international order, on whose foundations our security and prosperity rest.
Yet while so much has changed since Washington issued his warning, the essence of the threat has not. It goes to the creation of America itself – a nation born out of a simple, yet revolutionary idea: that it was the American people, ordinary citizens – and not a government, domestic or foreign – who should enjoy the right to shape our nation’s path. That is a right that we have had to fight to defend throughout our history. And while in recent decades we may have felt confident that no power would dare try to take that right away from us, we have again been reminded that they will try.

Just as the threat is fundamentally unchanged since Washington’s time, so is our most effective way to confront it. And that is by renewing the faith of the American people in our democracy. Our democracy’s vitality has long depended on sustaining the belief among our citizens that a government by and for the people is the best way to keep themselves and their loved ones safe, to preserve the freedoms they value most, and to expand their opportunities. It is not that we have a perfect system, but a perfectible system – one that the American people always have the power to improve, to renew, to make their own. That faith is the engine that has powered our republic since its creation, and it is the reason other nations still look to America as a model.

And it is precisely that faith that the Russian Government’s interference is intended to shake. The Kremlin’s aim is to convince our people that the system is rigged; that all facts are relative; that ordinary people who try to improve their communities and their country are wasting their time. In the place of faith, they offer cynicism. In the place of engagement – indifference.

But the truth is that the Russian Government’s efforts to cast doubt on the integrity of our democracy would not have been so effective if some of those doubts had not already been felt by many Americans. By citizens who are asking whether our system still offers a way to fix the everyday problems they face, and whether our society still gives them reason to hope that they can improve their lives for the better. In this way, the attack has cast a light on a growing sense of divisiveness, distrust, and disillusionment.

But we know not only what we are against; we know what we are for. So just as we are clear-eyed about the threat Russia poses from the outside, and unified in confronting it, we must also dedicate ourselves to restoring citizens’ faith in our democracy on the inside – which always has been the source of America’s strength, and always will be our best defense against any foreign power that tries to do us harm.

I thank you.
In South Sudan, Mass Killings, Rapes and the Limits of U.S. Diplomacy

By Somini Sengupta
The New York Times
January 18, 2017

Samantha Power, center, the American ambassador to the United Nations, and members of the Security Council visited displaced people in Wau, South Sudan, last year. Credit Justin Lynch/Associated Press

UNITED NATIONS — Samantha Power had just boarded a United States Air Force plane on her way home from a three-country tour in Africa when the calls began to come in from Washington. South Sudan, the world’s newest country, had just erupted in civil war along ethnic lines.

That was in December 2013. Ms. Power had taken over as the American ambassador to the United Nations three months earlier, and she wanted to fly immediately to Juba, the capital of South Sudan. What she would do there wasn’t clear, though, and after a series of intense exchanges with Washington, it was decided she would come home.

The back-and-forth was a harbinger of the difficulties Ms. Power would face in trying to avert what the United Nations has said could become a genocide.
Today, the Obama administration’s South Sudan strategy is in tatters. Tens of thousands of people have been killed, the United Nations says, and rape has been rampant. The starkest diplomatic defeat for the United States came late last month. Ms. Power was unable to persuade the United Nations Security Council to impose an arms embargo on South Sudan and sanctions on key leaders.

“Council members who didn’t support this resolution are taking a big gamble that South Sudan’s leaders will not instigate a catastrophe,” Ms. Power said, citing the world’s failure to respond to genocide in Rwanda in 1994. But poor timing, bad judgment and a lack of a unified strategy have hampered the administration’s own efforts to avert a catastrophe, many advocates, aid workers and former United States officials say. In turn, it has drawn attention to the limits of American influence — that, too, in a country whose independence from Sudan the United States supported enthusiastically.

It is also a reminder of how challenging it has been for Ms. Power in particular to put into effect the idea that she is best known for: using diplomacy to prevent mass atrocities.

During her three-year tenure, Ms. Power has used her pulpit at the United Nations to denounce human rights abusers, particularly the United States’ rivals. She has used her last days on the job to promote the Obama administration’s diplomatic successes, including dismantling Syria’s chemical weapons and imposing new sanctions on North Korea.

During her three-year tenure as ambassador, Ms. Power has advanced gay rights, pushed the United Nations to do more to stop sexual abuse by peacekeepers and championed the rights of civil society groups. One of her most lauded achievements came early in her term, when she persuaded the rest of the administration to authorize a peacekeeping force to stop mass atrocities in the Central African Republic, a country where the United States had little to gain.

On Syria, she has come under greatest scrutiny because she has had to explain American inaction in the face of atrocities, including the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons. On Syria, too, she has spoken out most forcefully against Russia. Once, she walked out of the Security Council as the Russian ambassador, Vitaly I. Churkin, was speaking; another time, she accused the Kremlin of “barbarism” for its airstrikes on Aleppo.

She used her last speech as ambassador, on Tuesday, to inveigh against what she called Russia’s “aggressive and destabilizing actions,” from its annexation of Crimea to its meddling in the American presidential election. It served as a warning to President-elect Donald J. Trump without ever naming him. “Russia’s actions are not standing up a new world order,” she said at the Atlantic Council in Washington. “They are tearing down the one that exists.”

For all her impassioned rhetoric, though, Ms. Power has been criticized for using the Security Council more as theater, rather than a platform to resolve conflicts.
In large part, many of her supporters and critics say, her ability to get things done has been limited not just by the widening chasm with Russia but also by her inability to rally the rest of the administration, including on Yemen and South Sudan.

Ms. Power “often made a difference” on issues like the Central African Republic, and gay rights, said Philippe Bolopion, deputy director for global advocacy for Human Rights Watch. But, he added: “Unfortunately, under her watch, atrocities have raged on. While it is unfair to blame any particular individual, the Obama administration was inexplicably gun-shy on sanctions in South Sudan, all too willing to give a pass to Saudi Arabia or Israel for serious violations, and less than creative in overcoming Russia’s obstructionism on Syria.”

In her final words to the Security Council on Wednesday, Ms. Power called the failure to stop mass atrocities in Syria and South Sudan “haunting.”

As for the future, Ms. Power has expressed confidence that South Sudan’s conflict will stay on the Trump administration’s radar. Her would-be successor, Nikki R. Haley, criticized the performance of the United Nations peacekeeping mission during her Senate confirmation hearing on Wednesday, without saying what role the United States should play in stopping the slaughter there.

The outbreak of fighting in South Sudan in December 2013 quickly cleaved along ethnic lines, between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir versus those supporting his former vice president, Riek Machar. Mr. Kiir is a member of the Dinka community, and Mr. Machar is Nuer. At the time, many advocates knowledgeable about the region pressed the United States to get tougher with South Sudan’s leaders. John Prendergast, a former Africa expert in the Clinton administration who now runs an advocacy group called the Enough Project, said he had recommended targeted sanctions as early as January 2014. By that summer, after United Nations investigators chronicled human rights abuses “on a massive scale,” Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International backed an arms embargo.

Several former American officials said the administration had misjudged the rivalry between Mr. Kiir and Mr. Machar. They also said Susan Rice, the national security adviser, had been reluctant to put too much pressure on them, and in particular to impose an arms embargo. “There are some differences in Washington,” is how Princeton N. Lyman, a former American envoy to South Sudan, put it in March 2015. Some of it, he said later, stemmed from a “lingering sympathy” for the leaders they had empowered.

Asked recently about the differences within the White House, a senior administration official said only that “the U.S. position on this was based on a consensus decision within the interagency process.”

By May 2015, with no peace deal in sight, the African Union asked the Security Council to impose an arms embargo.

A peace deal was signed, only to be broken, repaired and broken again.
In November 2015, the African Union issued a harrowing report that documented massacres, rapes and a sharply deteriorating humanitarian situation.

On the ground, things got worse. By the summer of 2016, after full-scale fighting broke out in Juba, United Nations investigators documented a spate of ethnic killings and said that government troops had been responsible for mass rapes, including of children.

Still, there was no arms embargo and no targeted sanctions against the top leadership. Instead, Ms. Power turned her attention to rallying the Security Council to authorize a surge of 4,000 peacekeepers from neighboring countries to secure Juba.

That effort, said Kate Almquist Knopf, the director of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, underscored a lack of political strategy. By then, she said, it should have been plain to everyone that Mr. Kiir and Mr. Machar were unlikely to honor any peace deal.

In September, on a trip to Juba, Ms. Power won a promise from South Sudan’s government to allow additional peacekeepers to enter the country.

Their deployment has been delayed by bureaucratic impediments, a lack of visas and conflicting statements by ministers, according to the United Nations chief.

In November, the United Nations’ special adviser for genocide, Adama Dieng, issued the starkest warning: He urged the council to take action to stop what he regarded as steps to genocide.

By then, Ms. Power had won the rest of the Obama administration’s backing to pursue sanctions and an arms embargo. Ms. Rice expressed her support on Twitter, writing, “time is past for an arms embargo & sanctions against those stoking ethnic violence in #SouthSudan.”

But by that time, the African members of the council were not keen to impose sanctions. Russia called the resolution “senseless.” Even some United States allies were reluctant to support it. Ms. Power issued grave warnings about “the human cost of imposing no cost for attacking civilians.”

Her remarks echoed the dilemma at the heart of her book.

“We have all been bystanders to genocide,” she wrote. “The crucial question is why.”
United States Ambassador to the United Nations
Chapter Study Questions

1. Why does Samantha Power believe it is important to stand up to Russia and its actions towards Ukraine?
2. What do you think is the best thing to do regarding Russia, its relation to the U.S., and its relations with other countries?
3. What are some of Power’s views on Israel?
4. During her days as an ambassador what kind of steps did Samantha Power take in promoting peace and resolving international conflicts? Would you have done something different? Why or why not?
5. What kind of advancements has Power made in the U.S. and abroad during her time as an ambassador to the UN?
6. How long has Samantha Power served the Obama administration?
7. How have America’s and Russia’s interests aligned in the past? Do you think Russia is a threat to America? Why or why not?
8. If you were an ambassador to the United Nations, how would you deal with some of the problems we face today?
v. *Life After the United Nations*

1. Samantha Power Returns to Harvard
2. Writing a Memoir
3. Foreign Propaganda
4. Study Questions
Samantha Power Returns to Harvard

Harvard
April 13, 2017

Former ambassador named to joint faculty appointment at HLS and HKS
Samantha Power, who served as the 28th U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations from 2013 until 2017, has been named to a joint faculty appointment at Harvard Law School (HLS) and Harvard Kennedy School (HKS), the deans of the two Schools announced Thursday. The appointment begins immediately.

Power will serve as the Anna Lindh Professor of the Practice of Global Leadership and Public Policy at the Kennedy School, where she was the founding executive director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy in 1998. She will serve as professor of practice at the Law School, where she earned her J.D. in 1999. For the 2017-18 academic year, Power will be a fellow at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study.

“I am very excited to return to Harvard, as I believe it is essential that we do all we can to ensure that graduates have the skills they need to succeed in messy geopolitical and multilateral environments,” said Power. “Given the daunting challenges we confront — whether from terrorism, rising nationalism, climate change, or mass atrocities — it is essential that we in academia draw lessons from experience, devise practical approaches, and prepare the next generation to improve their communities, their countries, and the world.”

Power became ambassador to the United Nations after serving for four years as President Barack Obama’s special assistant for multilateral affairs and human rights on the National Security Council. At the U.N., Power negotiated the toughest sanctions in a generation against North Korea, became the public face of U.S. opposition to Russian actions in
Ukraine and Syria, lobbied to help secure the release of political prisoners around the world, and spearheaded U.N. reforms, including in peacekeeping.

“From her work at the highest levels of diplomacy and human rights to her accomplishments as a prize-winning author, riveting speaker, and inspiring teacher, Samantha Power is a quadruple threat!” said Dean Martha Minow of the Law School. “As she joins the faculty of her alma mater and the faculty of the Kennedy School, her experiences, perceptions, and commitments will offer invaluable illumination of laws, policies, politics, ideals, and realities essential to the pursuit of justice, human rights, and international relations.”

“Samantha Power’s record of public service speaks volumes about her knowledge of and commitment to diplomacy, human rights, international justice, and the rule of law,” said Dean Douglas Elmendorf of the Kennedy School. “We welcome her back to the Kennedy School, where she will contribute significantly to our research, teaching, and practice on those crucial issues.”

In 1998, Power joined the Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs as project director of the Human Rights Initiative, which became the Carr Center. Prior to her academic career, she worked as a foreign correspondent, contributing to The New Yorker, The New Republic, and The New York Review of Books.

Power won a Pulitzer Prize in 2003 for “‘A Problem from Hell’: America and the Age of Genocide.” She is also the author of the New York Times best-seller “Sergio: One Man’s Fight to Save the World” (2007), and the editor, with Derek Chollet, of “The Unquiet American: Richard Holbrooke in the World” (2012). In 2004 and 2015 Time magazine named her one of the 100 most influential people in the world.

At the Kennedy School, Power will be affiliated with both the Carr Center and the Belfer Center, where she will serve as senior member, board member, and director of the new International Peace and Security Project.

An Irish immigrant, Power came to the United States at age 9. She earned her B.A. from Yale University before going to Harvard Law.
Samantha Power is Writing a Memoir

By Helena Andrews-Dyer
The Washington Post
April 25, 2017

Samantha Power, then U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, right, and her husband, Cass Sunstein, arrive at a state dinner in honor of French President François Hollande on Feb. 11, 2014. (Andrew Harrer/Bloomberg News)

Samantha Power, a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations — the youngest person to ever hold that position — is writing a memoir that will track her CV from well-known U.S. foreign policy critic to the world body.

According to the Associated Press, Power’s new book, “The Education of an Idealist,” will be published by HarperCollins, but the memoir’s release date is still TBA. In “The Education,” Power plans to chronicle her attempts to live up to her own ideals as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations during the Obama administration, from 2013 to 2017.

“I am looking forward to stepping back to explore the highs and lows, and to share ideas for how, even in troubled times, we can each do our part to shape a more humane future,” Power said in a statement.
Recently she used social media to that aim when she tweeted about the Armenian genocide.

*I am very sorry that, during our time in office, we in the Obama administration did not recognize the #Armenian Genocide — Samantha Power (@SamanthaJP) April 24, 2017*

On Monday, which marked the 102nd anniversary of the eradication of more than 1 million Armenians during the last days of the Ottoman Empire (now Turkey), President Trump stopped short of calling it genocide, referring instead to the “dark chapter” in history. President Barack Obama also never characterized the mass killings as genocide during his time in the White House.

In one of her first public speeches since the end of her tenure at the United Nations, Power took aim at the state of foreign policy under the Trump administration, particularly the Syrian refugee crisis.

“People are feeling so oppressed, like the odds are stacked against doing what’s smart as well as what’s right, but I think that others have conquered much steeper odds with less company,” Power said. “We can accomplish more. We just have to throw ourselves into the task, mobilize compassion and — let’s say — make America good again.”

Power’s new book comes in a tidal wave of former Obama administration titles. Former deputy chief of staff Alyssa Mastromonaco’s first book, “Who Thought This Was a Good Idea? And Other Questions You Should Have Answers to When You Work in the White House,” was released in March 2017. Former vice president Joseph R. Biden Jr. plans to write two new books, and his wife, Jill Biden, has one in the works. The Obamas signed a joint book deal for $65 million.
Life After the United Nations
Chapter Study Questions

1. What does Samantha Power plan to do after leaving the United Nations?
2. How does Power still remain an influential figure in media and foreign relations?
3. What will Power’s memoir be about?
4. How do you think Samantha Power’s work in the United Nations will affect the upcoming ambassadors and the world in the future?
5. What are the dangers of propaganda as stated by Power?
VI. A History of Genocide

1. Armenian Genocide
2. The Holocaust
3. Cambodian Genocide
4. Rwandan Genocide
5. Bosnian Genocide
6. Darfur, Sudan Genocide
7. Our World in Data: Genocides
8. Study Questions
Armenian Genocide

www.history.com
2010

In 1915, leaders of the Turkish government set in motion a plan to expel and massacre Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire. Though reports vary, most sources agree that there were about 2 million Armenians in the Ottoman Empire at the time of the massacre. By the early 1920s, when the massacres and deportations finally ended, some 1.5 million Turkey’s Armenians were dead, with many more forcibly removed from the country. Today, most historians call this event a genocide—a premeditated and systematic campaign to exterminate an entire people. However, the Turkish government does not acknowledge the enormity or scope of these events. Despite pressure from Armenians and social justice advocates throughout the world, it is still illegal in Turkey to talk about what happened to Armenians during this era.

THE ROOTS OF GENOCIDE: THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The Armenian people have made their home in the Caucasus region of Eurasia for some 3,000 years. For some of that time, the kingdom of Armenia was an independent entity—at the beginning of the 4th century AD, for instance, it became the first nation in the world to make Christianity its official religion—but for the most part, control of the region shifted from one
empire to another. During the 15th century, Armenia was absorbed into the mighty Ottoman Empire.

Did You Know?

American news outlets have also been reluctant to use the word “genocide” to describe Turkey’s crimes. The phrase “Armenian genocide” did not appear in the New York Times until 2004.

The Ottoman rulers, like most of their subjects, were Muslim. They permitted religious minorities like the Armenians to maintain some autonomy, but they also subjected Armenians, who they viewed as “infidels,” to unequal and unjust treatment. Christians had to pay higher taxes than Muslims, for example, and they had very few political and legal rights.

In spite of these obstacles, the Armenian community thrived under Ottoman rule. They tended to be better educated and wealthier than their Turkish neighbors, who in turn tended to resent their success. This resentment was compounded by suspicions that the Christian Armenians would be more loyal to Christian governments (that of the Russians, for example, who shared an unstable border with Turkey) than they were to the Ottoman caliphate.

These suspicions grew more acute as the Ottoman Empire crumbled. At the end of the 19th century, the despotic Turkish Sultan Abdul Hamid II—obsessed with loyalty above all, and infuriated by the nascent Armenian campaign to win basic civil rights—declared that he would solve the “Armenian question” once and for all. “I will soon settle those Armenians,” he told a reporter in 1890. “I will give them a box on the ear which will make them…relinquish their revolutionary ambitions.”

THE FIRST ARMENIAN MASSACRE

Between 1894 and 1896, this “box on the ear” took the form of a state-sanctioned pogrom. In response to large scale protests by Armenians, Turkish military officials, soldiers and ordinary men sacked Armenian villages and cities and massacred their citizens. Hundreds of thousands of Armenians were murdered.

THE RISE OF THE YOUNG TURKS

In 1908, a new government came to power in Turkey. A group of reformers who called themselves the “Young Turks” overthrew Sultan Abdul Hamid and established a more modern constitutional government. At first, the Armenians were hopeful that they would have an equal place in this new state, but they soon learned that what the nationalistic Young Turks wanted most of all was to “Turkify” the empire. According to this way of thinking, non-Turks—and especially Christian non-Turks—were a grave threat to the new state.
WORLD WAR I

In 1914, the Turks entered World War I on the side of Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. (At the same time, Ottoman religious authorities declared jihad, or holy war, against all Christians except their allies.) Military leaders began to argue that the Armenians were traitors: If they thought they could win independence if the Allies were victorious, this argument went, the Armenians would be eager to fight for the enemy. As the war intensified, Armenians organized volunteer battalions to help the Russian army fight against the Turks in the Caucasus region. These events, and general Turkish suspicion of the Armenian people, led the Turkish government to push for the “removal” of the Armenians from the war zones along the Eastern Front.

GENOCIDE BEGINS

On April 24, 1915, the Armenian genocide began. That day, the Turkish government arrested and executed several hundred Armenian intellectuals. After that, ordinary Armenians were turned out of their homes and sent on death marches through the Mesopotamian desert without food or water. Frequently, the marchers were stripped naked and forced to walk under the scorching sun until they dropped dead. People who stopped to rest were shot. At the same time, the Young Turks created a “Special Organization,” which in turn organized “killing squads” or “butcher battalions” to carry out, as one officer put it, “the liquidation of the Christian elements.” These killing squads were often made up of murderers and other ex-convicts. They drowned people in rivers, threw them off cliffs, crucified them and burned them alive. In short order, the Turkish countryside was littered with Armenian corpses. Records show that during this “Turkification” campaign government squads also kidnapped children, converted them to Islam and gave them to Turkish families. In some places, they raped women and forced them to join Turkish “harems” or serve as slaves. Muslim families moved into the homes of deported Armenians and seized their property.
In 1922, when the genocide was over, there were just 388,000 Armenians remaining in the Ottoman Empire.

THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE TODAY

After the Ottomans surrendered in 1918, the leaders of the Young Turks fled to Germany, which promised not to prosecute them for the genocide. (However, a group of Armenian nationalists devised a plan, known as Operation Nemesis, to track down and assassinate the leaders of the genocide.) Ever since then, the Turkish government has denied that a genocide took place. The Armenians were an enemy force, they argue, and their slaughter was a necessary war measure. Today, Turkey is an important ally of the U.S. and other Western nations, and so their governments have likewise been reluctant to condemn the long-ago killings. In March 2010, a U.S. Congressional panel at last voted to recognize the genocide.
The Holocaust

www.history.com
2009

The word “Holocaust,” from the Greek words “holos” (whole) and “kaustos” (burned), was historically used to describe a sacrificial offering burned on an altar. Since 1945, the word has taken on a new and horrible meaning: the mass murder of some 6 million European Jews (as well as members of some other persecuted groups, such as Gypsies and homosexuals) by the German Nazi regime during the Second World War. To the anti-Semitic Nazi leader Adolf Hitler, Jews were an inferior race, an alien threat to German racial purity and community. After years of Nazi rule in Germany, during which Jews were consistently persecuted, Hitler’s “final solution”—now known as the Holocaust—came to fruition under the cover of world war, with mass killing centers constructed in the concentration camps of occupied Poland.


BEFORE THE HOLOCAUST: HISTORICAL ANTI-SEMITISM & HITLER’S RISE TO POWER

Anti-Semitism in Europe did not begin with Adolf Hitler. Though use of the term itself dates only to the 1870s, there is evidence of hostility toward Jews long before the Holocaust—even as far back as the ancient world, when Roman authorities destroyed the Jewish temple in Jerusalem and forced Jews to leave Palestine. The Enlightenment, during the 17th and 18th centuries, emphasized religious toleration, and in the 19th century Napoleon and other European rulers enacted legislation that ended long-standing restrictions on Jews. Anti-Semitic feeling
endured, however, in many cases taking on a racial character rather than a religious one.

**Did You Know?**

*Even in the early 21st century, the legacy of the Holocaust endures. Swiss government and banking institutions have in recent years acknowledged their complicity with the Nazis and established funds to aid Holocaust survivors and other victims of human rights abuses, genocide or other catastrophes.*

The roots of Hitler’s particularly virulent brand of anti-Semitism are unclear. Born in Austria in 1889, he served in the German army during World War I. Like many anti-Semites in Germany, he blamed the Jews for the country’s defeat in 1918. Soon after the war ended, Hitler joined the National German Workers’ Party, which became the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP), known to English speakers as the Nazis. While imprisoned for treason for his role in the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923, Hitler wrote the memoir and propaganda tract “Mein Kampf” (My Struggle), in which he predicted a general European war that would result in “the extermination of the Jewish race in Germany.” Hitler was obsessed with the idea of the superiority of the “pure” German race, which he called “Aryan,” and with the need for “Lebensraum,” or living space, for that race to expand. In the decade after he was released from prison, Hitler took advantage of the weakness of his rivals to enhance his party’s status and rise from obscurity to power. On January 20, 1933, he was named chancellor of Germany. After President Paul von Hindenburg’s death in 1934, Hitler anointed himself as “Fuhrer,” becoming Germany’s supreme ruler.

**NAZI REVOLUTION IN GERMANY, 1933-1939**

The twin goals of racial purity and spatial expansion were the core of Hitler’s worldview, and from 1933 onward they would combine to form the driving force behind his foreign and domestic policy. At first, the Nazis reserved their harshest persecution for political opponents such as Communists or Social Democrats. The first official concentration camp opened at Dachau (near Munich) in March 1933, and many of the first prisoners sent there were Communists. Like the network of concentration camps that followed, becoming the killing grounds of the Holocaust, Dachau was under the control of Heinrich Himmler, head of the elite Nazi guard, the Schutzstaffel (SS), and later chief of the German police. By July 1933, German concentration camps (Konzentrationslager in German, or KZ) held some 27,000 people in “protective custody.” Huge
Nazi rallies and symbolic acts such as the public burning of books by Jews, Communists, liberals and foreigners helped drive home the desired message of party strength.

In 1933, Jews in Germany numbered around 525,000, or only 1 percent of the total German population. During the next six years, Nazis undertook an “Aryanization” of Germany, dismissing non-Aryans from civil service, liquidating Jewish-owned businesses and stripping Jewish lawyers and doctors of their clients. Under the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, anyone with three or four Jewish grandparents was considered a Jew, while those with two Jewish grandparents were designated Mischlinge (half-breeds). Under the Nuremberg Laws, Jews became routine targets for stigmatization and persecution. This culminated in Kristallnacht, or the “night of broken glass” in November 1938, when German synagogues were burned and windows in Jewish shops were smashed; some 100 Jews were killed and thousands more arrested. From 1933 to 1939, hundreds of thousands of Jews who were able to leave Germany did, while those who remained lived in a constant state of uncertainty and fear.

BEGINNING OF WAR, 1939-1940

In September 1939, the German army occupied the western half of Poland. German police soon forced tens of thousands of Polish Jews from their homes and into ghettos, giving their confiscated properties to ethnic Germans (non-Jews outside Germany who identified as German), Germans from the Reich or Polish gentiles. Surrounded by high walls and barbed wire, the Jewish ghettos in Poland functioned like captive city-states, governed by Jewish Councils. In addition to widespread unemployment, poverty and hunger, overpopulation made the ghettos breeding grounds for disease such as typhus.

Meanwhile, beginning in the fall of 1939, Nazi officials selected around 70,000 Germans institutionalized for mental illness or disabilities to be gassed to death in the so-called Euthanasia Program. After prominent German religious leaders protested, Hitler put an end to the program in August 1941, though killings of the disabled continued in secrecy, and by 1945 some 275,000 people deemed handicapped from all over Europe had been killed. In hindsight, it seems clear that the Euthanasia Program functioned as a pilot for the Holocaust.
TOWARDS THE “FINAL SOLUTION”, 1940-1941

Throughout the spring and summer of 1940, the German army expanded Hitler’s empire in Europe, conquering Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and France. Beginning in 1941, Jews from all over the continent, as well as hundreds of thousands of European Gypsies, were transported to the Polish ghettos. The German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 marked a new level of brutality in warfare. Mobile killing units called Einsatzgruppen would murder more than 500,000 Soviet Jews and others (usually by shooting) over the course of the German occupation.

A memorandum dated July 31, 1941, from Hitler’s top commander Hermann Goering to Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the SD (the security service of the SS), referred to the need for an Endlösung (final solution) to “the Jewish question.” Beginning in September 1941, every person designated as a Jew in German-held territory was marked with a yellow star, making them open targets. Tens of thousands were soon being deported to the Polish ghettos and German-occupied cities in the USSR. Since June 1941, experiments with mass killing methods had been ongoing at the concentration camp of Auschwitz, near Krakow. That August, 500 officials gassed 500 Soviet POWs to death with the pesticide Zyklon-B. The SS soon placed a huge order for the gas with a German pest-control firm, an ominous indicator of the coming Holocaust.

HOLOCAUST DEATH CAMPS, 1941-1945

Beginning in late 1941, the Germans began mass transports from the ghettos in Poland to the concentration camps, starting with those people viewed as the least useful: the sick, old and weak and the very young. The first mass gassings began at the camp of Belzec, near Lublin, on March 17, 1942. Five more mass killing centers were built at camps in occupied Poland, including Chelmno, Sobibor, Treblinka, Majdanek and the largest of all, Auschwitz-Birkenau. From 1942 to 1945, Jews were deported to the camps from all over Europe, including German-controlled territory as well as those countries allied with Germany. The heaviest deportations took place during the summer and fall of 1942, when more than 300,000 people were deported from the Warsaw ghetto alone.

Though the Nazis tried to keep operation of camps secret, the scale of the killing made this virtually impossible. Eyewitnesses brought reports of Nazi atrocities in Poland to the Allied governments, who were harshly criticized after the war for their failure to respond, or to publicize news of the mass slaughter. This lack of action was likely mostly due to the Allied
focus on winning the war at hand, but was also a result of the general in comprehension with which news of the Holocaust was met and the denial and disbelief that such atrocities could be occurring on such a scale. At Auschwitz alone, more than 2 million people were murdered in a process resembling a large-scale industrial operation. A large population of Jewish and non-Jewish inmates worked in the labor camp there; though only Jews were gassed, thousands of others died of starvation or disease. During the summer of 1944, even as the events of D-Day (June 6, 1944) and a Soviet offensive the same month spelled the beginning of the end for Germany in the war, a large proportion of Hungary’s Jewish population was deported to Auschwitz, and as many as 12,000 Jews were killed every day.

Still from Night and Fog (dir. Alain Resnais)

NAZI RULE COMES TO AN END, AS HOLOCAUST CONTINUES TO CLAIM LIVES, 1945

By the spring of 1945, German leadership was dissolving amid internal dissent, with Goering and Himmler both seeking to distance themselves from Hitler and take power. In his last will and political testament, dictated in a German bunker that April 29, Hitler blamed the war on “International Jewry and its helpers” and urged the German leaders and people to follow “the strict observance of the racial laws and with merciless resistance against the universal poisoners of all peoples”–the Jews. The following day, he committed suicide. Germany’s formal surrender in World War II came barely a week later, on May 8, 1945.

German forces had begun evacuating many of the death camps in the fall of 1944, sending inmates under guard to march further from the advancing enemy’s front line. These so-called “death marches” continued all the way up to the German surrender, resulting in the deaths of some 250,000 to 375,000 people. In his classic book “Survival in Auschwitz,” the Italian Jewish author Primo Levi described his own state of mind, as well as that of his fellow inmates in
Auschwitz on the day before Soviet troops arrived at the camp in January 1945: “We lay in a world of death and phantoms. The last trace of civilization had vanished around and inside us. The work of bestial degradation, begun by the victorious Germans, had been carried to conclusion by the Germans in defeat.”

AFTERMATH & LASTING IMPACT OF THE HOLOCAUST

The wounds of the Holocaust—known in Hebrew as Shoah, or catastrophe—were slow to heal. Survivors of the camps found it nearly impossible to return home, as in many cases they had lost their families and been denounced by their non-Jewish neighbors. As a result, the late 1940s saw an unprecedented number of refugees, POWs and other displaced populations moving across Europe. In an effort to punish the villains of the Holocaust, the Allies held the Nuremberg Trials of 1945-46, which brought Nazi atrocities to horrifying light. Increasing pressure on the Allied powers to create a homeland for Jewish survivors of the Holocaust would lead to a mandate for the creation of Israel in 1948.

Over the decades that followed, ordinary Germans struggled with the Holocaust’s bitter legacy, as survivors and the families of victims sought restitution of wealth and property confiscated during the Nazi years. Beginning in 1953, the German government made payments to individual Jews and to the Jewish people as a way of acknowledging the German people’s responsibility for the crimes committed in their name.
Cambodian Genocide

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Who?
The Cambodian Genocide refers to the attempt of Khmer Rouge party leader “Pol Pot” to nationalize and centralize the peasant farming society of Cambodia virtually overnight, in accordance with the Chinese Communist agricultural model. This resulted in the gradual devastation of over 25% of the country’s population in just three short years.

Where?
Cambodia, a country in Southeast Asia, is less than half the size of California, with its present day capital in Phnom Penh. In 1953, Cambodia gained its independence from France, after nearly 100 years of colonialist rule. As the Vietnam War progressed, Cambodia’s elected Prime Minister Norodom Sihanouk adopted an official policy of neutrality. Sihanouk was ousted in 1970 by a military coup led by his own Cambodian General Lon Nol, a testament to the turbulent political climate of Southeast Asia during this time. In the years preceding the genocide, the population of Cambodia was just over 7 million, almost all of whom were Buddhists. The country borders Thailand to its west and northwest, Laos to its northeast, and Vietnam to its east and southeast. The south and southwest borders of Cambodia are coastal shorelines on the Gulf of Thailand.

When?
The actions of the Khmer Rouge government which actually constitute “genocide” began shortly after their seizure of power from the government of Lon Nol in 1975, and lasted until the Khmer Rouge was overthrown by the Vietnamese in 1978. The genocide itself emanated from a harsh climate of political and social turmoil. This atmosphere of communal unrest in Cambodia arose during the French decolonization of Southeast Asia in the early 1950s, and continued to devastate the region until the late 1980s.
BACKGROUND OF CAMBODIA
Cambodia, a Southeast Asian country less than half the size of California, was the center of the ancient kingdom of Khmer with its capital city Angkor. Cambodia gained its independence from France in 1953, after nearly 100 years of colonial rule. Power was given to Cambodia’s Prince Sihanouk but in 1970, he was deposed in a military coup led by his own Cambodian Lieutenant-General Lon Nol, a response to the turbulent political climate of Southeast Asia during this time. Lon Nol was made president of the new Khmer Republic while Prince Sihanouk and his loyal followers joined forces with a communist guerrilla organization known as the Khmer Rouge. Soon after, civil war in Cambodia began.

The conflict in Cambodia was also caught up in another country’s war: Vietnam. Vietnam at this time was fighting against the French for independence. The French were defeated in 1954, and Vietnam found itself divided in two: communist North Vietnam and pro-Western South Vietnam. Civil war immediately broke out between the two factions. The Viet Congo, a Vietnamese communist guerrilla group with support from North Vietnam and China, fought the South Vietnamese army.[1] In 1964, the US entered the Vietnam War and, after several years of fighting, the US finally withdrew. The war was inconclusive, had cost over three million American and Vietnamese lives, and left the region devastated.

Under Prince Sihanouk, Cambodia had maintained neutrality during the Vietnam War by giving support to both sides. The Viet Cong were allowed to use Cambodian ports to ship in supplies while the US was allowed to bomb Viet Cong hideouts in Cambodia—secretly and illegitimately. US troops were allowed to move freely into Cambodia to continue their struggle with the Viet Cong. For the next four years, American B-52 bombers led attacks to destroy suspected North Vietnamese supply lines. In this effort, as many as 750,000 Cambodians were killed.[3] In 1975, North Vietnamese forces seized South Vietnam’s capital, Saigon, and by the Khmer Rouge and its leader Pol Pot defeated Cambodian Lieutenant-General Lon Nol. Approximately 156,000 Cambodians died in the civil war, half of them civilians.
RISE OF THE KHMER ROUGE

The Khmer Rouge was a brutal, murderous revolutionary group intent on revolutionizing Cambodian society. On April 17, 1975, the Khmer Rouge army marched into Phnom Penh, the modern capitol. Khmer Rouge soldiers, young peasants from the provinces, mostly uneducated teenage boys who had never been in a city before, swept through town. They set to their job right away, evacuating Phnom Penh and forcing all of its residents to leave behind all their belongings and march towards the countryside. “Hospital patients still in their white gowns stumbled along carrying their IV bottles. Screaming children ran in desperate search for their parents.”
Although the Khmer Rouge movement was small at first, new people were constantly being recruited. Many Cambodians had become disenchanted with western democracy due to the huge loss of Cambodian lives that resulted from the US strategy to involve Cambodia in the Vietnam War. The heavy U.S. bombardment, and Lon Nol’s collaboration with the US, drove new recruits to Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge guerrilla movement. Pol Pot’s communism brought with it images of new hope and national tranquility for Cambodia. By 1975, Pol Pot’s force had grown to over 700,000 men. Within days of the Khmer Rouge takeover of Phnom Phen, Pol began implementing his extremist policies of collectivization. The government confiscated and took control of all property including schools, hospitals, various other societal institutions, and communal labor.

Pol Pot was educated in France and he was an ardent admirer of “Mao” (Chinese) communism as well as Stalinism. Pol Pot envisioned the creation of a “new” Cambodia based on the Maoist-Communist model and wanted to restore the country to an agrarian society based on Maoist ideals.[6] The aim of the Khmer Rouge was to deconstruct Cambodia back to a primitive “Year Zero,” wherein all citizens would participate in rural work projects, and any Western innovations would be removed. “It was an attempt of the Khmer Rouge to nationalize and centralize the peasant farming society of Cambodia virtually overnight, in accordance with the Chinese Communist agricultural model.”
In order to achieve the “ideal” communist model, the Khmer Rouge believed that all Cambodians must be made to labor for a federation of collective farms; anyone in opposition to this system must be eliminated. Under threat of death, Cambodians nationwide were forced from their hometowns and villages. The ill, disabled, old, and young who were incapable of making the journey to the collectivized farms and labor camps were killed on the spot. People who refused to leave were killed, along with any who appeared to be in opposition to the new regime. Residents of entire cities were forcibly evacuated to the countryside. All political and civil rights of the citizen were abolished. Children and parents were separated and sent to different labor camps.

Cambodians who survived the purges and marches became unpaid laborers, working on minimum rations for endless hours. They were forced to live in public communes, similar to military barracks, with constant food shortages and rampant disease. Due to conditions of virtual slave labor, starvation, physical injury, and illness, many Cambodians became incapable of performing physical work and were killed by the Khmer Rouge as expenses to the system.[9]

“To spare you is no profit, to destroy you is no loss.”
-Kang Kek Iew (mid-level leader of the Khmer Rouge regime)
Victims

This list of “potential opposition” included, but was not limited to, journalists, lawyers, doctors, professionals, intellectuals, such as students and professors, and members of the upper class. Factories, schools, universities, hospitals, and all other private institutions were shut down; all their former owners and employees were murdered along with their extended families. It was very common for people to be shot for speaking a foreign language or wearing glasses as these were traits that were associated with the West. Many were also shot for smiling or crying as it was forbidden to show any kind of emotion. Much of the killing was inspired by the extremist propaganda of a militant communist transformation with the belief that individuals such as journalists, intellectuals, and others were threats to the state.

The Khmer Rouge also targeted various religious and ethnic groups during its time in power. Religious enthusiasts, Buddhists, Muslims, Christians, ethnic Chinese, Vietnamese, Thai, and Cambodians with Chinese, Vietnamese or Thai ancestry, were all persecuted. Leading Buddhist monks and Christian missionaries were killed, and temples and churches were burned. Minority groups were forcibly relocated and the use of minority language was also banned.

The Khmer Rouge also vigorously interrogated its own membership and frequently executed members on suspicions of treachery or sabotage. Survival was determined by one’s ability to work. Therefore, Cambodia’s elderly, handicapped, ill, and children suffered enormous casualties for their inability to perform unceasing physical labor on a daily basis.

While the Khmer Rouge was gaining power, the U.S. government had very little interest in the events that were occurring in Southeastern Asia. The American Embassy had little concern about the regime and was principally concerned with Cambodia in relation to the effect on the Vietnam War. The U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh was not particularly interested in the victims, either. General William Westmoreland, the commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, stated, “The Oriental doesn’t put the same high price on life as does a Westerner. Life is plentiful, life is cheap in the Orient.”

It is estimated that one and a half to three million Cambodians lost their lives at the hands of the Khmer Rouge. On July 25, 1983, the Research Committee on Pol Pot’s Genocidal Regime issued its final report, including detailed province-by-province data. The data showed that the number of deaths was 3,314,768. An estimated 25 percent of the total population died due to the Khmer Rouge policies of forced relocation of the population from urban centers, torture, mass executions, used of forced labor, and malnutrition.

Even after the fall of the Khmer Rouge, the people of Cambodia suffered greatly. Thousands of people fled to Thailand; many forced to eat leaves, roots, and bugs along the way. Many died of
starvation en route, or stepped on land mines, for Khmer Rouge soldiers had laid mines almost everywhere along the western border, to prevent their victims from fleeing. Those who made it to Thailand brought malaria, typhoid, cholera, and a host of other illnesses into the camps. Human rights groups estimated that about 650,000 more people died in the year following the fall of the Khmer Rouge.

Most of the nation’s Khmer Rouge survivors suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, but through the 1990s, no one in Cambodia recognized this or was offered any treatment. No one paid any attention at all, allowing the illness to fester and, in some cases, worsen. For someone suffering from PTSD, almost anything out of the ordinary could set off a heart-wrenching panic. For older people with heart trouble, these panics could trigger a heart attack.

In the early 1990s, mass graves were uncovered throughout Cambodia. “Each held dozens, or hundreds, of skeletal remains from Khmer Rouge execution grounds. Most often villagers piled the remains in barns or outbuildings the Khmer Rouge had once used. Even now, decades later, villagers say the skulls speak to them.”
Response?

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA

Bringing the perpetrators to justice proved to be a difficult task. Almost three decades after Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge were driven out of Phnom Penh, the Cambodian government requested help from the United Nations in prosecuting its former leaders for crimes that were committed between 1975 and 1979. Initially, the UN wanted to create a court resembling the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, but the Cambodian government resisted the establishment of such a court. The Cambodian government refused the UN’s proposal, opposing Western influence in prosecuting individuals of the Khmer Rouge regime. After much negotiation through the UN General Assembly, the Cambodian government agreed to an amended bi-lateral agreement on June 6, 2003, which approved an agreement on the prosecution of crimes committed between 1975 and 1979. This agreement resulted in the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.
Because it took so long to set up the Extraordinary Court, many of the members of Khmer Rouge had already died before the trials began. The deceased included Pol Pot, Son Sen (Defense Minister and responsible for the Santebal, the Political Police), Yun Yat (Minister), Thiounn Thioeunn (Minister), Ta Mok (Chief of Military Command), and his deputy Ke Pauk. Many suspected perpetrators were also killed in the military struggle with Vietnam or eliminated as internal threats to the Khmer Rouge itself. So far the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) has prosecuted the following cases:

Kang Kek Iew (AKA Comrade Duch)
- The head of the Khmer Rouge’s internal security branch who extended the prison system nationwide. He was responsible for overseeing the notorious Tuol Sleng prison in Phnom Pehn. Kang Kek Iew was placed in charge of Tuol Sleng together with his lieutenants Mam Nai and Tang Sin Hean. Approximately 16,000 Cambodians were killed within the Tuol Sleng prison. There are only seven known survivors.
He was the first Khmer Rouge leader to be tried by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia and was convicted of crimes against humanity, murder, and torture. During his trial, Kang Kek Iew admitted his guilt over the crimes carried out in Tuol Sleng and on July 26, 2010, he was found guilty on charges of crimes against humanity, murder, and torture in which he was given a sentence of 30 years imprisonment.

Nuon Chea (AKA Brother Number Two)
- Second in command of the Khmer Rouge regime and was their chief ideologist.
- Nuon Chea was arrested at his home on September 19th, 2007, and charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity. He denied all charges but was ultimately convicted of crimes against humanity and sentenced to imprisonment for the remainder of his life.
- He appealed the verdict, but his life sentence was upheld in November of 2016.

Ieng Sary (AKA Brother Number Three)
- A co-founder and senior member of the Khmer Rouge, he was the Minister of foreign affairs as well as deputy prime minister.
- Ieng Sary was arrested on November 12th, 2007, for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Before the trial could conclude, Ieng Sary died of a gastrointestinal problems.

Ieng Thirith
- Minister of Social Affairs from 1975 until 1979.
- Ieng Thirith was arrested on November 12, 2007, after being indicted by the Cambodian Tribunal.[26] She was arrested for crimes against humanity and “planning, direction, coordination and ordering of widespread purges…and the unlawful killing or murder of staff members from within the Ministry of Social Affairs.” Following evaluations from
medical experts, she was ruled mentally unfit to stand trial due to her severe case of Alzheimer’s Disease.

Khieu Samphan
- Was an extremely powerful politician in the Khmer Rouge and served as head of state of Cambodia from 1976 until 1979.
- Khieu Samphan was arrested on November 19, 2007, charged with crimes against humanity, and was given a life sentence.
- He appealed the verdict, but his life sentence was upheld in November of 2016.

The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia has been criticized for being slow, as only three people who were sentenced to life imprisonment in 2011 have been tried and convicted. There have also been allegations of corruption and politicization since the Chambers have been in session and concerns about the costs of the court, which has exceeded over $200 million.

In 2013, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen and Cambodia’s National Assembly approved a bill, which makes illegal the denial of the Cambodian genocide and the atrocities that were committed by the Khmer Rouge.
Rwandan Genocide

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About?

The “Rwandan Genocide” refers to the 1994 mass slaughter in Rwanda of the ethnic Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu peoples. The killings began in early April of 1994, and continued for approximately one hundred days until the “Hutu Power” movement’s defeat in mid-July. The genocide was carried out primarily by Hutu supremacist militia groups, co-perpetrated by the state government of Rwanda, the Rwandan Army, and Rwandan civilians in compliance with the “Hutu Power” movement. By its conclusion, at least 500,000 ethnic Tutsis were murdered, along with thousands of Tutsi sympathizers, moderate Hutus, and other victims of atrocity. Some estimates claim anywhere between 800,000-1,000,000 killed, with another 2 million refugees (mostly Hutus fearing the retribution of the newly-empowered Tutsi rebel government) packed in disease-ridden refugee camps of neighboring Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and former Zaire.

Where?

Rwanda is a very small country (about the size of Maryland), located near the center of Africa, a few degrees south of the Equator. It is separated from the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire) by Lake Kivu and the Ruzizi River valley to the west; it is bounded on the north by Uganda, to the east by Tanzania, and to the south by Burundi. The capital, Kigali, is located in the center of the country. According to the 1991 national census, the total population of Rwanda
was 7.7 million, with 90 percent of the population in the Hutu ethnic group, 9 percent Tutsi, and 1 percent Twa. The Rwandan Genocide itself began with mass killings in Kigali, but over the course of its 100-day duration, killing spread to all corners of the country.

What?

The Rwandan genocide took place over a time span of only 100 days, between April and July 1994.

Perpetrators

Hutu nationalist group Parmehutu led a social revolution which overthrew the Tutsi ruling class, resulting in the death of around 20,000 Tutsis and the exile of another 200,000 to neighboring countries. Rwandan independence from Belgium would follow in 1961, marking the establishment of a Hutu-led Rwandan government. The Tutsis remaining in Rwanda, mostly due to intermarriage or other family ties, would be discriminated against as racially “lesser” citizens by the new Hutu government. The RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) was formed in 1985 as a political group of Tutsi nationalist exiles who demanded the right to return to their homeland as citizens and an end to social discrimination against the Tutsi in Rwanda. The RPF rebels invaded Rwanda from neighboring Uganda in October of 1990, re-igniting Tutsi hatred throughout Rwanda. It was this act of Tutsi aggression, coupled with decades of discrimination and fear for a loss of power, that paved the way to genocide. Killed alongside the Tutsi people were those native Rwandan Hutu, who sympathized with their Tutsi neighbors and resisted by defending,
hiding, or providing aid to their Tutsi neighbors. Moderate Hutus, many of whom refused to take action against their Tutsi neighbors, were also victimized in the genocide.

Victims

Most of the killing was carried out by two Hutu radical militant groups: the Interahamwe and the Impuzamugambi. Armed, backed, and led by the government of Rwanda (MRND), the Interahamwe are remembered today as the driving force of the genocide, comprised mostly of young Hutu men, brainwashed by the “Hutu Power” ideology. Springing from a separate political entity, the CDR, the Impuzamugambi was made up of members of the CDR’s youth wing. These forces were fewer in number than those of the Interahamwe. The “more-extreme” anti-Tutsi agenda of the CDR reflected on the Impuzamugambi; their killings were often regarded as less organized, and more vicious. The genocide was obviously supported by the Hutu-led government (MRND) and members of the Rwandan army: they armed and directed militias, dispatched killing orders, and even participated in the rounding up of victims themselves. The most unsettling co-perpetrators of the genocide, however, were those Rwandan civilians who collaborated with and supported the genocide. Many Tutsis and moderate Hutus were handed over and/or killed by their own neighbors, also bent on anti-Tutsi sentiment.

Response

Unlike other genocides of the 20th century, the Rwandan genocide unfolded before the eyes of the national media. Journalists, radio broadcasters, and TV news reporters covered the events live from Rwanda, until the violence escalated to fanatical levels and all foreigners were encouraged to evacuate. In short, the world knew of the genocide from its first day up until its conclusion. Mark Doyle, a reporter for the BBC in Kigali, tried to explain the situation to the world in late April 1994 as follows, “…you have to understand that there are two wars going on here. There’s a shooting war and a genocide war. The two are connected, but also distinct. In the shooting war, there are two conventional armies at each other, and in the genocide war, one of those armies, the government side with help from civilians, is involved in mass killings.”

UNAMIR, the UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda, was present on the ground throughout the course of the genocide. With disregard to the violence portrayed in the national media, France, Belgium, and the United States declined to send additional support, despite UNAMIR’s specific warnings to the U.N. Security Council in early 1994, describing the Hutu militia’s plan for extermination. The Security Council denied UNAMIR’s request to intervene, and in early April, the Belgian contingency of UNAMIR’s force were pulled out, due to the murder of ten Belgian soldiers. Almost overnight, 4,500 UNAMIR peacekeepers on the ground were reduced to a mere 260. Not until mid-May (approx. 500,000 Rwandans had already been killed) did the UN recognize that “acts of genocide may have been committed,” at which point the UN pledged to
send in 5,500 troops and 50 armored personal carriers. This force, however, was further delayed due to continuing arguments between the UN and the U.S. army over the cost of the Armored Personnel Carriers. The genocide would be ended by the RPF overthrow of the Hutu Regime in July; the UN intervention never occurred. The state support for the genocide in Rwanda was no doubt one of its primary engines. The Hutu-led government provided arms, planning, and leadership for the militias. It also funded the RTLM “Hutu Power” radio broadcast, the primary source of “brainwashing” for the Rwandan civilians who also took part in the genocide.

Immediately following the RPF takeover, around 2 million Hutus (perpetrators, bystanders, and resisters to the genocide) fled into the neighboring countries to avoid potential Tutsi retribution. Thousands died of epidemics, which spread like wildfire through to overcrowded refugee camps. The refugee presence in Zaire, among other factors, led to the first Congo War in 1996 and the formation of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Due to worsening conditions in the DRC and Tanzania, more than a million Rwandan refugees would return home by 1997. Back in Rwanda, the fully regenerated “UNAMIR 2” assumed control until March 8th, 1996. They faced the enormous task of cleaning up a war-torn country side, and dealing with the bodies of more than 1 million victims of genocide and war. The “machete” would become a symbol, synonymous to the Rwandan genocide for its widespread use by untrained civilians, to hack their neighbors to death. With the return of the refugees, the long-awaited genocide trials could proceed. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, located in Arusha, Tanzania, began proceedings in 1996. As of Spring 2017, the Tribunal has indicted 93 individuals, and sentenced 62 persons guilty of war crimes, acts of genocide, rape, and the creation of “hate media.” Three criminals remain at large.

*Luke Walker of the Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies researched and wrote this description. CHGS is a partner of World Without Genocide.*
On November 2, 2007, I had the honor of visiting the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, Tanzania. I attended with twenty-seven other university students as part of the International Honors Program, a study-abroad program focusing on issues of globalization. At the tribunal, we received an initial briefing about its purpose. It was created November 8, 1994, by the United Nations, to prosecute those responsible for orchestrating the murder of more than 800,000 Rwandans during that same year. The first trial began in January 1997; since then, twenty-seven judgments have been made, involving thirty-three accused persons. Twenty-eight were convicted, and five acquitted. Twenty-seven accused persons are being tried now, and eighteen indicted remain at large. This brings the total to seventy-eight indictments.

We were able to sit in on the trial of a man named Bikindi. Mr. Bikindi is a musician and performer, and he is accused of creating songs and dances that encourage people to kill Tutsis and commit other acts of violence. It’s a fascinating case and the decision will set a strong precedent for the future; it brings in issues of free speech, artistic license, and responsibility and accountability for artistic creation. It is also a reminder of the enormous power that music, dance, and other art forms have, and how that power can be exploited and used in dangerous and deadly ways.

During the portion of the trial we attended, Mr. Bikindi was being asked by the prosecutor about his ties to the government, and about a particular photograph which showed members of his
dance troupe wearing uniforms of the interahamwe, the Hutu militia. A long discussion ensued, in which Mr. Bikindi argued at length about the meaning of the words uniform and costume, and whether the photograph therefore revealed that his dancers were part of the militia or simply acting, providing entertainment.

It was at that point that the reality of the situation overwhelmed me. I was sitting behind a soundproof glass window, looking at ten or twelve judges and court officials surrounding this one man, Mr. Bikindi, seated at the witness stand in the center. I was listening to an inane conversation about costumes versus uniforms, translated carefully and rapidly into my headset. Fifteen minutes later, I left the room and had pastries and coffee in the cafeteria. Is this justice? Is it really? Nearly a million people are dead. Will the conviction or acquittal of this one man, who has the confidence to sit in this place and quibble over semantics, really matter? The justice of this court can only be, at best, symbolic. And it is not that the symbols do not matter; they do, tremendously. Of course it matters that this trial is taking place; of course it matters that the rules of law, which are all we have, are being followed. Of course we have a desperate need for symbolic meaning, and this court offers that to the world, to humanity, in the best way that it can. If it is this or nothing, semantics or silence, I choose semantics. But it is not enough. It can never be enough. The only justice that would be enough is too great for me to fathom. It would indict all of us, every human being on this planet. Every person who has participated in or benefited from colonialism, which in many ways created this whole mess. Every person who killed another. Every person who supplied arms to combatants. Every person who remained silent when the genocide was happening. Every person who remains silent now, when it is still going on. The scale of guilt, of sin, is too great. No human justice can ever be great enough to encompass it. The blood of our brothers and sisters is crying out, to whatever God can hear, from the ground where our apathy, our greed, our silence, has spilled it, not just in Rwanda but in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guatemala, El Salvador, Vietnam, Laos, Bosnia, Germany, Poland, the United States—everywhere. No justice will ever be enough. I am left to wonder what, then, could possibly be great enough. We are here, and we have to survive somehow, with this burden. What can we do? I come to mercy—forgiveness—love. I don’t know if I have the right to use these words; my family has not been killed, or deported, or imprisoned. Would I still use these words if they had? I don’t know. All I know is that for now they are the only words I have. What else is there? I’m open to suggestions. Perhaps we can think about the words of Mr. Adama Dieng, the registrar of the tribunal. He shared with us a proverb from Senegal, his home: “A human being is a remedy for humanity.” The only remedy we have for the ills of this world is to be human, to feel and to love and to live. It is the only hope I have for the future. I hope that we can strive to reach the power behind the words of mercy, and love, and forgiveness; to find out what it means and to live it. We can strive to hear the voices that are crying out. We can strive to change those things that hurt us, that take away our humanity. What else is there? I see no other way to live.
Observations from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

*This paper was written by a World Without Genocide Associate

In 2008, I had the honor of visiting the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. I attended as part of a study abroad program that focused on Peace and Conflict Studies in the Lake Victoria Basin. Throughout the program, we visited refugee camps, met with organizations working toward reconciliation, and lived with families who had been affected by conflict. My host family in Rwanda fled to Southern Uganda during the genocide. My host family in Uganda lived in an IDP camp for seventeen years where their youngest son, my host brother, was kidnapped. He was forced into child soldiery for four years before escaping. These interactions taught me firsthand that there is no one more forgotten or neglected than an innocent civilian who is caught in the throes of violence. Sadly, often enough it seems that the same disregard applies when it comes to justice.

While at the courts, we spoke with Mr. Charles Phillips, the Senior Trial Attorney from the Office of the Prosecutor. Mr. Phillips tried several landmark cases during his time at ICTR, including a case involving Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, the first woman to ever be tried for crimes against humanity and the first woman to ever be charged with using rape as a crime of genocide. While she did not actually commit the rapes, she abused her power as Minister of Family and Women’s affairs to incite the militia to rape thousands of women.

Hearing about the ICTR from a judge who had been involved from the beginning shed light onto the extreme importance of an international code of justice. The courts were an important step in
establishing accountability and an international standard of acceptable behavior. They took strides to define rape as a tool of genocide, held key players responsible for organizing crimes during the genocide, and began the long process of overcoming an international indifference to genocide. However, Mr. Phillips also brought attention to the many intricate steps involved in actually determining superior responsibility, and in finding and keeping the witnesses necessary to prove someone guilty. These challenges are just a few examples in the string of difficulties that face the ICTR.

While sitting in on cases was fascinating, it was interacting with people outside of the ICTR that really provoked questions of what justice means in the context of genocide. Three big questions stood out at the time.

First, who actually benefits from the form of justice given by ICTR? Who does that justice serve?
In the case that I sat in on, the room for observers was completely full of people – and every single one of them was white. When talking about this later, my host father said that in Rwanda, people do not feel connected to the courts or know the outcomes of them because Arusha is too far away for Rwandese to travel to, and translated transcripts are not sent back or distributed. He questioned whether the international community might be benefiting more from Rwanda’s courts than he was as a Rwandese citizen.

With most of the people viewing the cases not part of the actual genocide, whose justice was it really? I wondered about my host family, and the kids I had met at refugee camps in Uganda. Does locking perpetrators up behind bars in these faraway cases actually mean anything to them? Does it give them closure or any sort of benefit? Maybe in the long term – with the conflicts in Eastern and Central Africa becoming increasingly interconnected, arresting the ringleaders of one genocide might very well help to prevent the next. Arresting Joseph Kony in Uganda will ultimately benefit people in Congo and Sudan as well. But what about the short term? What about an apology or assistance for the boy I met in an orphanage whose parents were killed in front of his eyes at the age of 4? He has lived his life as an orphan since then. What about the young woman who was raped, infected with HIV, and is now an outcast from society because the rape was perceived as her fault? They are the ones whose lives were destroyed, not the international community. The kids in orphanages and refugee camps will most likely never physically see the men who organized so many crimes against them. Will they be able to come to terms with being orphans simply because the men who organized the massacre killing their parents are in jail? What justice is served for every child who lost a parent, every family who lost years of life and education in a refugee camp, and every generation of lost children? Or can any system ever create adequate individual justice for what was lost? The Gacaca courts were an important step, but people still slip through the cracks. My host sister was scoffed at when she
tried to present her case of being raped because a.) it was her word against a man’s, and b.) she was fourteen years old at the time and was accused of making the story up.

So first, who benefits from the justice?
The second question that came up was who should be held accountable or tried for the crimes committed, and who gets to decide that?

My dad was a criminal military judge for 28 years. Growing up I always saw his work as clear-cut. There were the good guys and the bad guys. The bad guys were always guilty. Sentencing them to years in jail was the clear solution. Those who were victims were therefore innocent, and could then live in peace when the perpetrators were imprisoned. But what happens once the distinction between victim and perpetrator is blurred, and the line between innocent and guilty is not so straight?

Before entering Rwanda, we visited a refugee camp in Uganda comprised of 95% Hutu refugees. The men and women in this camp dictated a completely different story of what had occurred during the genocide than that told by Tutsis. They also gave us a glimpse into the discrimination that currently faces Hutus today. In their stories they focused much more on the long history leading up to the 1994 genocide – on the widespread massacre of Hutus in Burundi – on the RPF invasion of Rwanda in 1990. According to the refugees, the violence was far from one-sided. One man showed us scars all over his head from an axe that a Tutsi official had cut him with. Another claimed that some of the piles of bones that were discovered and are now being memorialized were actually bones from mass killings of Hutus. They also said that today Hutus
have no freedom of speech in schools or workplaces, that the term “survivor of genocide” brings only Tutsis to the minds of most people, and that every April for genocide remembrance month, only Tutsis are remembered. Moderate Hutus are given no place in the story. It is possible that this is all denial, and that the perpetrators are making excuses for their actions. It is also possible, however, that the division between victim and perpetrator is not as clear cut as we thought.

But if and when there is uncertainty in the distinction between perpetrator and victim, who has the right to decide which side attains justice and which side is tried? Is it simply because one side is currently in power? At the time I visited, not one Tutsi had been tried at the ICTR. Hutus were not allowed to make accusations at local Gacaca courts, and memorials failed to remember the moderate Hutus who had been killed.

Continuing along this vein, when the definition of perpetrator is blurred, at what point do we reach even further out to cast responsibility for the crimes committed? Should we hold colonists responsible for converting the terms Hutu and Tutsi from an economic differentiator into an ethnic divide? Tutsi was originally used to describe someone who owned 10 cows or more, and people moved easily between being Hutu and Tutsi based on their economic situation. Or should we blame the US media who played the O.J. Simpson trial over and over again on the news instead of sharing coverage with the genocide in Rwanda? What happens to the justice system when everyone has contributed to the genocide in some way? A close colleague of mine wrote an essay about justice after her time at ICTR. She wrote, “The only justice that would be enough is too great for me to fathom. It would indict all of us, every human being on this planet. Every person who has participated in or benefitted from colonialism. Every person who killed another. Every person who supplied arms to combatants. Every person who remained silent when the genocide was happening. Every person who remains silent now. The scale of guilt is too great. No human justice can ever be great enough to encompass it.”

The ICTR was not promised as the end-all answer to justice for everyone and every situation. But with so many uncertainties involved in international justice, the final question that came to mind from my time spent at ICTR was how can we proceed with justice when we do not know the whole truth?

After the abroad program I found myself not wanting to fully believe in anything I heard or experienced. There were so many sides to everything that it was overwhelming. It made me question whether anybody can ever believe in something concretely enough to devote his or her entire life to it and not have it be a lie. I even began doubting my own doubts, thinking that by even questioning the genocide’s story, and trying to study it intellectually, I was somehow taking away from the stories that people told. And that by trying to find facts rather than just absorbing the emotion of the genocide I was taking away people’s right to their own truths.
It is really difficult to see something you know needs to be resolved and want to help out so badly but feel like there is no solution. Such a feeling of uncertainty has almost driven me away many times. I remember thinking how easy it would be to pursue a lifestyle that ignores all of this inequity. I have a privilege to do that – but how could I live with that when I know that not everyone is in a situation to do that, and that because of our interconnectedness I would somehow be benefiting from others’ pain. Many people choose to take this life of privilege without looking back. It is so easy to do, and this is where greed comes in, this is where genocide and violence happens – in forgetting the other, in thinking only of oneself, of one’s own survival. But what would the world be like without the other? Don’t we all shape each other? Aren’t we all apart of each other? As my host brother said, “It seems key to always think about the other as your own…if you think about him and he thinks about you, then you have 2 people looking out for yourself rather than only 1, and soon the whole world is looking after each other.”

To me, justice is denying the option of turning the other way, acknowledging our own personal involvement in every situation, and working to end the negative ramifications of our individual actions. Above all, the experiences at ICTR and in Rwanda emphasized that we should always strive to question what is before us and to embrace those who are around us.
Prelude to the Srebrenica Genocide

In April 1992, the government of the Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence from Yugoslavia. Over the next several years, Bosnian Serb forces, with the backing of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army, targeted both Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) and Croatian civilians for atrocious crimes resulting in the deaths of some 100,000 people (80 percent Bosniak) by 1995. It was the worst act of genocide since the Nazi regime’s destruction of some 6 million European Jews during World War II.
BACKGROUND

http://www.caingram.info/Balkans/Pic.htm/balkans_map.htm

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Balkan states of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia became part of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. After the death of longtime Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito in 1980, growing nationalism among the different Yugoslav republics threatened to split their union apart. This process intensified after the mid-1980s with the rise of the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, who helped foment discontent between Serbians in Bosnia and Croatia and their Croatian, Bosniak and Albanian neighbors. In 1991, Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia declared their independence; during the war in Croatia that followed, the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army supported Serbian separatists there in their brutal clashes with Croatian forces.

Did You Know?
In 2001, Serbian General Radislav Krstic, who played a major role in the Srebrenica massacre was convicted of genocide and sentenced to 46 years in prison.
In Bosnia, Muslims represented the largest single population group by 1971. More Serbs and Croats emigrated over the next two decades, and in a 1991 census Bosnia’s population of some 4 million was 44 percent Bosniak, 31 percent Serb, and 17 percent Croatian. Elections held in late 1990 resulted in a coalition government split between parties representing the three ethnicities (in rough proportion to their populations) and led by the Bosniak Alija Izetbegovic. As tensions built inside and outside the country, the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his Serbian Democratic Party withdrew from government and set up their own “Serbian National Assembly.” On March 3, 1992, after a referendum vote (which Karadzic’s party blocked in many Serb-populated areas), President Izetbegovic proclaimed Bosnia’s independence.

**STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL IN BOSNIA**

Far from seeking independence for Bosnia, Bosnian Serbs wanted to be part of a dominant Serbian state in the Balkans—the “Greater Serbia” that Serbian separatists had long envisioned. In early May 1992, two days after the United States and the European Community (precursor to the European Union) recognized Bosnia’s independence, Bosnian Serb forces with the backing of Milosevic and the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army launched their offensive with a bombardment of Bosnia’s capital, Sarajevo. They attacked Bosniak-dominated town in eastern Bosnia, including Zvornik, Foca, and Visegrad, forcibly expelling Bosniak civilians from the region in a brutal process that later was identified as “ethnic cleansing.” (Ethnic cleansing differs from genocide in that its primary goal is the expulsion of a group of people from a geographical area and not the actual physical destruction of that group, even though the same methods—including murder, rape, torture and forcible displacement—may be used.)
Though Bosnian government forces tried to defend the territory, sometimes with the help of the Croatian army, Bosnian Serb forces were in control of nearly three-quarters of the country by the end of 1993, and Karadzic’s party had set up their own Republika Srpska in the east. Most of the Bosnian Croats had left the country, while a significant Bosniak population remained only in smaller towns. Several peace proposals between a Croatian-Bosniak federation and Bosnian Serbs failed when the Serbs refused to give up any territory. The United Nations (U.N.) refused to intervene in the conflict in Bosnia, but a campaign spearheaded by its High Commissioner for Refugees provided humanitarian aid to its many displaced, malnourished and injured victims.

ATTACK ON SREBRENICA: JULY 1995

By the summer of 1995, three towns in eastern Bosnia—Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde—remained under control of the Bosnian government. The U.N. had declared these enclaves “safe havens” in 1993, to be disarmed and protected by international peacekeeping forces. On July 11, however, Bosnian Serb forces advanced on Srebrenica, overwhelming a battalion of Dutch peacekeeping forces stationed there. Serbian forces subsequently separated the Bosniak civilians at Srebrenica, putting the women and girls on buses and sending them to Bosnian-held territory. Some of the women were raped or sexually assaulted, while the men and boys who remained behind were killed immediately or bussed to mass killing sites. Estimates of Bosniaks killed by Serb forces at Srebrenica range from around 7,000 to more than 8,000.
After Bosnian Serb forces captured Zepa that same month and exploded a bomb in a crowded Sarajevo market, the international community began to respond more forcefully to the ongoing conflict and its ever-growing civilian death toll. In August 1995, after the Serbs refused to comply with a U.N. ultimatum, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) joined efforts with Bosnian and Croatian forces for three weeks of bombing Bosnian Serb positions and a ground offensive. With Serbia’s economy crippled by U.N. trade sanctions and its military forces under assault in Bosnia after three years of warfare, Milosevic agreed to enter negotiations that October. The U.S.-sponsored peace talks in Dayton, Ohio in November 1995 (which included Izetbegovic, Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman) resulted in the creation of a federalized Bosnia divided between a Croat-Bosniak federation and a Serb republic.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Though the international community did little to prevent the systematic atrocities committed against Bosniaks and Croats in Bosnia while they were occurring, it did actively seek justice against those who committed them. In May 1993, the U.N. Security Council created the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) at The Hague, Netherlands. It was the first international tribunal since the Nuremberg Trials in 1945-46 and the first to
prosecute genocide, among other war crimes. Radovan Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb military commander, General Ratko Mladic, were among those indicted by the ICTY for genocide and other crimes against humanity.

Over the better part of the next two decades, the ICTY charged more than 160 individuals of crimes committed during conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Brought before the tribunal in 2002 on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, Slobodan Milosevic served as his own defense lawyer; his poor health led to long delays in the trial until he was found dead in his prison cell in 2006. In 2007, the International Court of Justice issued its ruling in a historic civil lawsuit brought by Bosnia against Serbia. Though the court called the massacre at Srebrenica genocide and said that Serbia “could and should” have prevented it and punished those who committed it, it stopped short of declaring Serbia guilty of the genocide itself.
The end of the Cold War and the decline of Communism greatly altered the international political scene – the reunification of Germany, the rapid democratization of Russia, and the velvet divorce of Czechoslovakia from Communist influence, among some of the changes. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was one of the more liberal communist regimes, led by the enigmatic dictator Josip Broz Tito. Tito kept tight control over the various ethnic, religious, and nationalist groups under the umbrella of a ‘greater Yugoslavia.’ After Tito’s death, politicians began exploiting nationalist rhetoric, pitting the Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks against each other and igniting the flame of nationalist fervor. The multi-ethnic republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina quickly became the site of the deadliest warfare and the target of an ‘ethnic cleansing.’ The genocide in Bosnia claimed the lives of an estimated 100,000 people.

Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the other six nations that made up the former republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), is located in southeastern Europe (also known as the Balkans) along the coast of the Adriatic Sea between Italy and Romania. The population of Bosnia is about 3.8 million, with 48 percent Bosniaks (also known as Bosnian Muslims), 37 percent Serbs, and 14 percent Croats. Bosnia is slightly smaller than West Virginia, but with more than double the population.

BACKGROUND OF YUGOSLAVIA

The country of Yugoslavia, located in southeastern Europe on the Adriatic Sea, has a complex history and is a mosaic of peoples, languages, religions, and cultures. Yugoslavia comprised many different ethnic groups with varying religious and cultural backgrounds. Tension between the groups existed in the past and continues to exist today.
The three major ethnic groups in Yugoslavia were the Serbs, Croats, and the Slovenes. Although all three derived from Slavic backgrounds, there were many differences among them. The Serbs, under Ottoman control, were of the Eastern Orthodox religion, spoke the Serbian language, and used the Cyrillic alphabet. They held the biggest territory and were also the largest of the three. The Croatians, under French and Austro-Hungarian control, were predominately Catholic and spoke the Croatian language. They were the second largest population group and had the greatest amount of natural resources. Finally, the Slovenians, under Austro-Hungarian control, were also Catholic and spoke the Slovenian language.[2] The table below illustrates the three ethnic groups and the differences among them.

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<td>Catholic</td>
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<td>Serbia</td>
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With the end of World War I and the fall of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, these three major ethnic groups joined together to form the first state that was the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in December of 1918. There were many reasons for the three to unite and form a country of their own, including gaining human rights, enhancing protection from larger foreign empires and countries, and obtaining security and autonomy.[3] Many believed that the only way for southern Slavs to regain lost freedom after centuries of occupation under the various empires would be to unite and create a state of their own to free themselves from tyrannies and dictatorships.

The country of Yugoslavia was formed in 1929. During the first few years after the birth of the new country, national dissatisfaction grew between the three groups and many disliked the idea of a new state. Much of the turmoil between the different cultural and religious backgrounds of the groups resulted in political separations. Croatians resented the idea of centralism,[4] the favored government of the king and of the Serbs. The Croatians instead wanted a federalist state.[5] Both Croatians and Slovenians resented Serbian domination in government and military affairs.[6] Within the three ethnic groups, a variety of political parties formed and tensions kept rising. Bosnia, located in southeastern Europe along the Balkan peninsula, with a population of about 3.8 million, was caught in the middle of this rising tension. About half of the country of
Bosnia is composed of Bosniaks (also known as Bosnian Muslims), thirty-seven percent are Serbs, and fourteen percent are Croatian.

During World War II, Josip Broz, known as “Tito,” successfully held the country together under a communist/socialist dictatorship. Tito worked to ensure that no ethnic group dominated the federation and he successfully implemented a multi-ethnic peaceful co-existence. Political mobilization along ethnic lines was banned and state authorities worked hard to defuse ethnic tensions and create an overarching Yugoslav identity.[7]

Not only did Tito work to diffuse ethnic differences among the people, but there was also great economic reform. In 1945, the economy of Yugoslavia began to develop differently than its socialist counterparts by creating a unique form of decentralized market socialism based on workers self-management. The original state-control of industry was localized and councils were created for respective industries. Tito ensured that the regions kept trading with one another and “profits were distributed amongst the workers in each individual firm, and some functions of state control were relinquished and allocation became more relied on the basic mechanisms of the market to ensure self-management and proper distribution.”[8] Although this economic model worked was viewed as a success, it was not intended to be a long-term solution. In the late 1980s, Yugoslavia’s debts soared to unsustainable levels and eventually the economic bubble burst, spreading fear into all regions of Yugoslavia.

Much has been written about Tito and many praise him as one of the greatest political leaders of World War II because he was able to keep the country united. Expert Richard West argues that Tito was an indispensable leader and that the country of Yugoslavia relied on him to maintain
peace and stability within the country and to keep it from separation. Without him, the “strings that tied the nation together were broken.”[9]

CIVIL WAR

After Tito’s death in 1980, the various groups lost their economic integration and many old tensions were reignited and disrupted the thirty-five year peace that existed under Tito’s reign.[10] His death left a power vacuum and ambitious politicians such as Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia competed for power. Slobodan Milosevic rose to power in 1987. With his view of a “Greater Serbia,” Milosevic began a propaganda campaign that incited feelings of hatred among the people of Yugoslavia. Both Tudjman and Milosevic realized sooner than most that rousing nationalist passions was an effective way to exploit the Yugoslav upheavals for their own power.[11] Milosevic’s vision of an ethnically pure Serb-dominated state understandably scared the other six regions (Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Vojvodina) of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, causing them to question their future in the Republic.[12]

Talks of independence began to spread throughout the six republics, and Slovenia and Croatia were the first to declare independence. Although Slovenia left Yugoslavia relatively peacefully, this was not the case for the other regions. The tensions between the Croats, Serbs, and others were exposed and proved too great to be dealt with in peaceful terms. War finally broke out. Bosnia was the most ethnically heterogeneous of Yugoslavia’s republics, with 43 percent Muslims, 35 percent Orthodox Serbs, and 18 percent Catholic Croatians, and suffered the worst fate.[13] The multi-ethnic republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina quickly became the site of the deadliest warfare and the target of ‘ethnic cleansing.’
Like the Nazis’ “cleansing” Europe of its Jews, the Serbs’ aim was the “ethnic cleansing” of any Bosniak or Croat presence in Serbian territory. Human rights violations occurred in many different forms, including curfews, forced relocations, rape, castration, imprisonment in concentration camps, and killings. Journalist Mark Danner describes the Serbs’ plan of attack in city after city was as follows:

1. **Concentration** – urge Serb residents of the city to leave, while surrounding the town and bombarding it with artillery fire.
2. **Decapitation** – execute the leaders and intelligentsia of the town.
3. **Separation** – separate the women, children, and old men from the men of “fighting age.”
4. **Evacuation** – move women, children, and old men to concentration camps or national borders.
5. **Liquidation** – execute the men of “fighting age.”

The most famous example of this plan of attack was the massacre at Srebrenica, a Bosniak-dominated town under weak UN protection. In July of 1995, Serb General Ratko Mladic marched into Srebrenica, separated the women and children from the men, and murdered approximately 7,000 Bosniak men and boys. It was the single largest massacre in Europe since World War II. For those who were not killed in the initial massacre, many were sent to one of 381 concentration or detention camps in Bosnia. Inhumane living conditions, beatings, torture, and mass executions were daily occurrences at these camps and claimed the lives of around 10,000 people over the course of the war. Women were often taken to rape camps where they were raped and tortured for weeks and months until they became pregnant. It is estimated that 20,000 rapes occurred between 1992 and 1995 in Bosnia.
Reports of mass killings and had slowly came out of Bosnia, once photos and videos of concentration camps like Omarska and Trnopolje were published by Western journalists, the reports captured the world’s attention. According to author Samantha Power, “No other atrocity campaign in the twentieth century was better monitored and understood by the U.S. government than the Bosnian genocide.” However, despite the wealth of information and irrefutable evidence of genocide, the U.S. government under both Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton initially chose isolationist policies, citing the lack of U.S. interests at stake in the conflict.

In July of 1992, the first international press reports, photos, and videos of the conflict in Bosnia were published, eerily evoking memories and images of the horror of the Holocaust fifty years earlier.\[18\] Despite the public outrage created by these reports, the international community still refused to intervene. A year later, after Serbian forces had taken over several Bosniak-dominated cities, the UN established six safe areas that were to be protected by international peacekeepers.\[19\] However, with very few weapons and orders not to fire unless in self-defense, these peacekeepers were highly ineffective.
After the fall of Srebrenica, which had been designated as one of the UN safe areas, the Croatians and Bosniaks combined their forces to launch Operation Storm, an offensive campaign to push Serbian forces out of the Krajina region in the northwest corner of Bosnia. For the previous two years, Bosniak and Croat forces led separate efforts against the Serbs. [20] Yet by combining their forces, the Croatian-Bosniak offensive was able to push Serb forces, as well as 200,000 civilians, out of Krajina and into other Serb-dominated areas. [21] Although Operation Storm succeeded in pushing back Serbian forces, it also created one of the largest refugee populations in Europe.

The defeat of the Bosnian Serb forces led to the realization that a settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina must be negotiated as soon as possible, leading to a peace agreement. This agreement, called the Dayton Accords, was signed in Dayton, Ohio, on December 14, 1995. The Accords ended the conflict in Bosnia and stationed 60,000 NATO troops to keep the peace. The initial purpose of the Dayton Accords was to act as a transitory document and to freeze military confrontation. However, there were various shortcomings. The agreement has been criticized for allowing international actors to shape the post-war transition, without input from the Bosnian people and government. [22] It also left the region politically unstable and fractious since its implementation in 1995.
Darfur Sudan Genocide

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About?
The “Darfur Genocide” refers to the current mass slaughter and rape of Darfuri men, women, and children in Western Sudan. The killings began in 2003, as the first genocide in the 21st century. Unrest and violence persist today.

The genocide is being carried out by a group of government-armed and funded Arab militias known as the Janjaweed (which loosely translates to ‘devils on horseback’). The Janjaweed systematically destroy Darfurians by burning villages, looting economic resources, polluting water sources, and murdering, raping, and torturing civilians. These militias are historic rivals of the main rebel groups, the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM), and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). As of today, over 480,000 people have been killed, and over 2.8 million people are displaced.

Where?
Sudan is the largest country in Africa. Located in Northeastern Africa, it borders the Red Sea and falls between Egypt, Chad, Uganda, as well as six other countries. The capitol, Khartoum, is in the Northeastern part of the country. Darfur is a region in Western Sudan that encompasses an area roughly the size of Spain. The population of Darfur is estimated at 6,000,000 people. The conflict in Darfur has also increased tensions in neighboring Chad and the Central African Republic as hundreds of thousands of refugees stream over the two countries’ borders to escape violence.
When?

Following independence from Britain in 1956, Sudan became embroiled in two prolonged civil wars for most of the remainder of the 20th century. These conflicts were rooted in northern economic, political, and social domination of largely non-Muslim, non-Arab, southern Sudanese. Competition for scarce resources played a large role. As nomads began to compete for grazing land, traditional reconciliation measures were no longer able to settle disputes, causing the region to become increasingly militarized. The complexities of desertification, famines, and the civil war raging between North and South Sudan contributed to a rise in regional tensions during the 1980s. Similarly, as oil was discovered in Western Sudan, the Sudanese government and international contributors became increasingly interested in the land in Darfur.

The first civil war ended in 1972 but broke out again in 1983. The second war and famine-related effects resulted in more than 4 million people being displaced and, according to rebel estimates, more than 2 million deaths over a period of two decades. As the civil war between the North and the South reached its peak in the 1990’s, the government ignored reports of rising violence in Darfur.

While the Comprehensive Peace Agreement ended the North-South War in 2005, granting additional political power to South Sudan, it failed to take into account the effects of the war on Darfur. Additionally, Darfur remained underdeveloped and marginalized at the federal level, lacking infrastructure and development assistance. This neglect, combined with allegations that the government was arming Arab tribesmen (Janjaweed) to raid non-Arab villages, was cited as the justification for a February 2003 rebel attack on a Sudanese Air Force Base at El Fasher, North Darfur. This attack sparked a series of government reprisals on residents of Darfur, contributing to the large-scale human rights atrocities facing Darfurian civilians today.
Failed peace talks have allowed for the continuation of the conflict. The most successful talks thus far took place in Abuja in 2005-2006, leading to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Present at these negotiations were the Sudanese government and three main rebel groups: the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Abdel Wahid Mohamed al-Nur’s faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), and Minni Minawi’s faction of the SLM. However, multiple negotiations have thus far been largely unsuccessful.

Early in 2008, the UN issued a hybrid United Nations-African Union mission (UNAMID) to maintain peace in Darfur. UNAMID, with a projected strength of 26,000 troops, was authorized to use force to protect civilians. Despite this mandate, however, only 9,000 were sent, and they lacked the necessary equipment to carry out their mission.

On March 4, 2009, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Bashir for crimes against humanity and, in July 2010, a warrant for arrest on charges of genocide. The government of Sudan, however, has yet to turn him over, and since the issuance of the warrants, the country has seen major protests and increased violence. The government has also forcefully expelled aid agencies from the country that has further jeopardized the conditions for thousands of displaced and marginalized civilians.
It is expected that al-Bashir will not face trial at the International Criminal Court in The Hague until he is apprehended in a nation which accepts the ICC’s jurisdiction. Sudan is not a state party to the Rome Statute, the international treaty creating the ICC, which it signed but didn’t ratify. By all accounts, al-Bashir should be a prisoner in his own country. However, the Arab League has announced its solidarity with al-Bashir. Since the warrant, he has visited Qatar and Egypt. Both countries have refused to arrest him and the African Union also condemned the arrest warrant and asked the United Nations Security Council to delay its enforcement.

The Sudanese government and JEM signed a ceasefire agreement in February 2010, with a tentative agreement to pursue further peace. However, talks have been disrupted by accusations that the Sudanese army continues to launch raids and air strikes against Darfur villages.

The Janjaweed have also been accused of incursions and attacks in neighboring Chad. Hundreds of aid workers in Chad have already been evacuated due to increased tension between rebel groups and military forces. Meanwhile, the Janjaweed have ventured deep into Chad to conduct assaults, resulting in the fleeing of nearly 100,000 Chadians.

In July 2011, South Sudan gained independence and became its own nation. During the same month, the Liberation and Justice Movement, an umbrella organization representing rebel groups, and the Sudanese government signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). This document represents the process of peace in Darfur; however, little progress has been made after the document was signed because of lack of implementation and enforcement.

As 2013 began, there was violence between Abbala/Reizegat and Beni Hussein tribes over goldmines. This left thousands displaced and many dead. Conflicts between communities in Central Darfur spread to South Darfur, displacing tens of thousands of people in April 2013.
The UN estimates that approximately 130,000 people were displaced in 2015 in an unverified report. Out of approximately 7.5 million people living in Darfur, the UN estimates that over 3 million are still heavily impacted by the conflict.

What?
Attacks on Darfuri villages commonly begin with Sudanese Air Force bombings. Air campaigns are often followed by Janjaweed militia raids. All remaining village men, women, and children are either murdered or forced to flee. Looting, burning food stocks, enslaving and raping women and children, and stealing livestock are common. Dead bodies are tossed in wells to contaminate water supplies and entire villages are burned to the ground.

The on-going conflict in Darfur, Sudan was declared “genocide” by United States Secretary of State Colin Powell on September 9, 2004, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. On February 18, 2006, President George W. Bush called for the number of international troops in Darfur to be doubled.

On September 17, 2006, British Prime Minister Tony Blair wrote an open letter to the members of the European Union calling for a unified response to the crisis. In supporting the United Nations Security Council Resolution in 2007 to authorize the deployment of up to 26,000 peacekeepers to try to stop the violence in Darfur, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown said in a speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Darfur crisis was “the greatest humanitarian disaster the world faces today.” The British government also endorsed the International Criminal Court’s ruling regarding Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and has urged the Sudanese government to co-operate.
Both China and Russia have worked to block many United Nations resolutions in attempts to appease the Sudanese government. From its seat on the United Nations Security Council, China has been Sudan’s chief diplomatic ally. China invests heavily in Sudanese oil. The country is China’s largest oversees oil provider. Sudan’s military is supplied by Chinese-made helicopters, tanks, fighter planes, bombers, rocket launch propelled grenades, and machine guns.

For decades, Russia and China have maintained a strong economic and politically strategic partnership. The countries opposed UN peace keeping troops in the Sudan. Russia strongly supports Sudan’s territorial integrity and opposes the creation of an independent Darfuri state. Also, Russia is Sudan’s strongest investment partner and political ally in Europe. Russia considers Sudan as an important global ally in the African continent.
I. Empirical View

I.1 Genocides in the 20th Century

The number of, and deaths resulting from, genocides taking place around the world has been on a downward trend since the end of the Second World War. The Holocaust is perhaps the darkest chapter in human history. The scale, organisation and nature of the killing was unprecedented and there has been a concerted effort ever since to prevent a similar tragedy. The first session of the United Nations General Assembly affirmed the crime of genocide describing it as “a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings.”

The following chart tracks the number of active genocides and politicides around the world between 1955-2014. The data comes from the Political Instability Task Force and details of the definition used in their construction can be found in the definitions section.
The following two maps are also generated using data from the Political Instability Task Force (PITF). Note that Yugoslavia is omitted from both visualisations. The first displays active genocides and politicides around the world between the period 1955-2014.
The map below displays the death magnitude as recorded by the PITF. The death magnitude is a non-linear scale developed by the PITF to classify the number of people killed in each episode. For countries that experienced multiple episodes of genocide, a new value is calculated using the midpoint of the range. For more information please consult the codebook for the PITF or see the table beneath the map.

**Death Magnitude** | **Number of deaths**
--- | ---
0.0 | Less than 300
0.5 | 300 – 1,000
1.0 | 1,000 – 2,000
1.5 | 2,000 – 4,000
2.0 | 4,000 – 8,000
2.5 | 8,000 – 16,000
3.0 | 16,000 – 32,000
3.5 | 32,000 – 64,000
4.0 | 64,000 – 128,000
4.5 | 128,000 – 256,000
I.2 Historical Genocides

Although the word genocide was only created in the 20th century, there exist many historical examples of genocide. One of the earliest examples identified is the destruction of Melos in 416 BCE by the Athenian army. The Athenians laid siege to the small island of Melos until the Melian government surrendered, at which point the Athenians proceeded to kill all the adult men and enslaved the women and children. A useful reference for genocide in the ancient world can be found here.

II. Correlates, Determinants & Consequences

II.1 Causes: Mainstream Theories

The mainstream theories of the causes of can be broadly summarised as:

1. **Fractionalisation, grievance and dehumanisation**: This group of theories collectively argue that genocide can be predicted by higher ethnolinguistic or religious fractionalisation within a country combined with grievances between groups. The final important dimension is dehumanisation of the victim group. This theory is associated with the sociologist Leo Kuper, who conducted some of the earliest studies in comparative genocide.3

2. **National crises**: Here, cataclysmic events such as war, economic depression or revolution are the triggers for genocide or other types of mass killing. This causality is motivated by one of two theories, the scapegoat theory and the political opportunity theory. The first theory posits that a particular group is identified as the cause of the crisis and that the solution is to eliminate the group. The second theory instead argues that the crisis creates the opportunity for a group to consolidate their power.

3. **Government power**: This theory is largely due to Rudolph Rummel and is referred to as the power principle. Rummel argues that “The more power a government has, the more it can act arbitrarily according to the whims and desires of the elite, and the more it will make war on others and murder its foreign and domestic subjects. The more constrained the power of governments, the less it will aggress on others.”4 A major implication of this theory is that authoritarian regimes are far more likely to resort to democide than democratic regimes.

III. Data Quality & Definitions

III.1 Data Quality

One major obstacle in quantifying atrocities of this nature is that many perpetrators work hard to conceal the true number of victims or simply do not keep count. For this reason the estimated death tolls are imprecise with large confidence intervals. Scholars still debate the number of victims of The Holocaust, the largest and most well documented case of genocide in human history.
III.2 Definition of Genocide: United Nations

The United Nations uses the following definition to classify acts of genocide:

any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

III.3 Definitions: Rudolph Rummel

Rudolph Rummel was professor emeritus of political science at the University of Hawaii and wrote many seminal works on war and violence. Rummel was the first to distinguish between different forms of state violence and invented the term democide. His definitions are listed below:

1. **Genocide**: among other things, the killing of people by a government because of their indelible group membership (race, ethnicity, religion, language).

2. **Politicide**: the murder of any person or people by a government because of their politics or for political purposes.

3. **Mass Murder**: the indiscriminate killing of any person or people by a government.

4. **Democide**: The murder of any person or people by a government, including genocide, politicide, and mass murder.

It is important to recognise that these definitions are not the same as those used by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF). In the PITF dataset a dominant entity other than the government may carry out politicide and a distinction is made between state terror and politicide.

III.4 Definition of Genocide and Politicide: PITF

The dataset used for data visualisations in this section is the Political Instability Task Force (PITF). A distinction is made between acts of genocide and politicide, the first being motivated by ethnic or religious difference, while the second is motivated by political opposition to the dominant power. Another important distinction is made between genocide/politicide and state repression or terror.

In genocides the victimized groups are defined primarily in terms of their communal (ethnolinguistic, religious) characteristics. In politicides, by contrast, groups are defined primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and dominant groups.

Genocide and politicide are distinguished from state repression and terror. In cases of state terror authorities arrest, persecute or execute a few members of a group in ways designed to terrorize the majority of the group into passivity or acquiescence. In the case of genocide and politicide
authorities physically exterminate enough (not necessarily all) members of a target group so that it can no longer pose any conceivable threat to their rule or interests.

IV. Data Sources

**Political Instability Task Force, State Failure**

- **Data**: “State Failure Problem Set, annual data on cases of ethnic war, revolutionary war, adverse regime change, and genocide/politicide (also, consolidated cases of political instability), includes annual indicators of numbers of rebels, area affected, and numbers of deaths”
- **Geographical coverage**: Global by incident
- **Time span**: 1955-2014
- **Available at**: [http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html](http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html)

**Rudolph Rummel: 20th Century Democide**

- **Data**: Deaths resulting from democide (genocide, politicide and mass murder)
- **Geographical coverage**: Global by incident
- **Time span**: 1900-1987
- **Available at**: [http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/20TH.HTM](http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/20TH.HTM)

**Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)**

- **Data**: Armed conflict and violence
- **Geographical coverage**: Global by incident
- **Time span**: 1946-2014
- **Available at**: [http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/)

**Genocide Studies Programme at Yale**

- **Data**: Genocide data
- **Geographical coverage**: Cambodia, Rwanda, East Timor, Guatemala, and Former Yugoslavia
- **Time span**: 1946-2014
- **Available at**: [http://gsp.yale.edu/](http://gsp.yale.edu/)
Footnotes


   Many data sources were used to construct this figure: Rummel’s estimates (1900–1987) are taken from Rummel, R. J. 1997. Statistics of democide. Piscataway, N.J.: Transaction.

   Pinker explains: ‘The death tolls for the latter were geometric means of the ranges in table 8.1 in Harff, 2005, distributed across years according to the proportions in the Excel database.’

   World population figures were taken from the U.S. Census Bureau (2010): International data base (IDB) – Total midyear population for the world: 1950–2020. Online here.

   The population figures for the years 1900–1949 were taken from McEvedy & Jones, 1978, and were multiplied by 1.01 to make them commensurable with the rest.


A History of Genocide
Chapter Study Questions

1. What led to the Armenian genocide?
2. Why are/were the U.S. and other Western nations reluctant to recognize this as a genocide?
3. What is the meaning of the word “Holocaust”? How did it become a new definition for the atrocities against European minorities in WW2?
4. How many Jews were killed in Auschwitz every day?
5. How did the Cambodian genocide come about? What was the long lasting impact of the genocide?
6. What groups of people did Khmer Rouge target during the genocide?
7. How many were killed during the Rwandan genocide?
8. What led to this genocide?
9. How was the Rwandan genocide different from other genocides in the 20th century?
10. How did the Bosnian genocide come about?
11. Who struggled for control in Yugoslavia?
12. What was the cause of the Darfur genocide?
13. What kind of tensions existed in Sudan before the genocide?
14. Why do you think genocides keep happening even with international intervention?
15. Who do you think is responsible for stopping genocide?
16. How has the UN worked to stop genocides? Do you think it has been effective? Why or why not?
VII. **Reference Materials**

1. Bibliography
2. Filmography
3. Relevant Organizations and Websites
Bibliography
Related Resources

Historical References

- Abstract: The grandson of victims of this genocide, Balakian’s book combines excellent research with highly engaging prose.

- Abstract: Excellent history of Nazi genocide and its background, this book has been adopted by hundreds of high school and college courses since its first edition.

- Abstract: Richard Holbrooke, American diplomat, and his service around the world for the U.S. government.

- Abstract: This text provides an overview and key insights regarding the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, The Cambodian genocide, and the Rwandan genocide.

- Abstract: Hatzfeld, a renowned journalist, masterfully weaves together interviews with perpetrators (in the first book) and victims’ families (in the second) with historical context, resulting in two exceptionally powerful, insightful books.

- Abstract: Written by one of the world’s top experts and tailored for broad audiences, this is the most far-reaching overview of genocide and its causes.

- Abstract: A piece that explains how a revolution in Cambodia killed an eighth of its population through murder and starvation.
- Abstract: The religious and ethnic differences are examined in the history of Bosnia.

- Abstract: Samantha Power begins her journalism career covering the Balkan’s War at 23 years of age and goes on to be a voice for human right abuses and genocides.

- Abstract: It tells the story of humanitarian Sergio Vieira, who died in a UN terrorist attack in Iraq.

- Abstract: One of the most influential psychological and historical analyses of the question: how is it possible for “ordinary people” to perpetrate terrible acts?

**Memoirs**

- Abstract: Bashir tells his story about living in a village in Darfur, Sudan, before catastrophe strikes.


- Abstract: Author looks back at the Rwandan genocide 20 years after it has happened and reflects how life has changed because of it.


• Abstract: Elie Wiesel takes us through his days of childhood in a village in Romania to his adulthood and his story of the victims of the war and concentration camps.

• Abstract: A young Romanian-born Jewish boy tells about his experience in a concentration camp in Poland during WW2.

Fiction

• Abstract: A true story following a young boy through the Armenian genocide of 1915 to 1923.

• Abstract: A boy’s dreams of being an Olympic athlete are threatened by ethnic tensions growing in his country, Rwanda.

• Abstract: A girl living in New York who discovers her Armenian family’s history which covers love, loss, and a secret that has been buried for ages.

• It is a story of a holocaust survivor who visits Jerusalem after it is reunited, just days following the Six-Day War.

Art

• Abstract: A photographer providing a unique look at the Balkans during the Balkan War, as well as an essay giving Haviv’s photographs historical and cultural context.

Other books:

An Ordinary Man: An Autobiography by Paul Rusesabagina

Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts by Samuel Totten

Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide by Gérard Prunier

The Echo Foundation 190 Inspire Action Against Indifference
*East West Street: On the Origins of "Genocide" and "Crimes Against Humanity"* by Philippe Sands

*Justice on the Grass: Three Rwandan Journalists, Their Trial for War Crimes and a Nation’s Quest for Redemption* by Dina Temple-Raston

*Life Laid Bare: The Survivors in Rwanda Speak* by Jean Hatzfeld

*Like Water on Stone: The Story Of Amnesty International* by Jonathan Power

*Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak* by Jean Hatzfeld

*The Jews of Silence* by Elie Wiesel

*Voices from S-21: Terror and History in Pol Pot's Secret Prison* by David P. Chandler
Filmography

1955  Night and Fog
1984  The Killing Fields
1985  Shoah
1993  Schindler’s List
1997-1998 A Prince Among Men
2002  Ararat
2004  Hotel Rwanda
2004  Rush to War
2005  Shooting Dogs
       Sometimes in April
2006  The Armenian Genocide
       A Sunday in Kigali
2007  Darfur Now
       Munyurangabo
       Sand and Sorrow
2008  Defiance
2009  Sergio
2011  Kinyarwanda
2013  The Missing Picture
2015  1915
2016  The Promise
2017  Intent to Destroy
Relevant Organizations and Websites

Academy of Achievement
For more than 40 years, this unique non-profit entity has sparked the imagination of students across America and around the globe by bringing them into direct personal contact with the greatest thinkers and achieveers of the age.
www.achievement.org

Amnesty International
Amnesty International undertakes research and action focused on preventing and ending grave abuses of the rights to physical and mental integrity, freedom of conscience and expression, and freedom from discrimination, within the context of its work to promote all human rights.
www.AmnestyUSA.org

Human Rights Watch
Human Rights Watch is an independent, nongovernmental organization, supported by contributions from private individuals and foundations worldwide. We stand with victims and activists to prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom, to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring offenders to justice.
www.HRW.org

International Crisis Group
The International Crisis Group is an independent, nonprofit, nongovernmental organization, with nearly 120 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.
www.CrisisGroup.org

The Nobel Foundation
A private institution established in 1990 based on the will of Alfred Nobel. The Foundation manages the assets made available through the will for the awarding of the Nobel Prize in Physics, Chemistry, Psychology or Medicine, Literature and Peace.
www.NobelPrize.org

The Petra Conference of Nobel Laureates
The Petra Conference is a yearly conference of Nobel Laureates established in 2005 designed to address pressing world issues.
http://www.petranobel.org/
The Save Darfur Coalition
The Save Darfur Coalition is an alliance of over 100 faith-based, humanitarian and human rights organizations. Our mission is to raise public awareness and to mobilize an effective unified response to the atrocities that threaten the lives of two million people in the Darfur region.
www.SaveDarfur.org

United Nations
The United Nations (UN) is an international organization that aims at facilitating cooperation in international law, international security, economic development and social equity.
www.UN.org

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